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Plaintiffs/Appellants Joseph Kitchen and Richard 
Phillips, through their legal counsel, James R. Black and 
Susan Black submit the following brief in support of their 
appeal: 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court improperly grant defendant Cal 
Gas1 motion for summary judgment? 
2. Were there genuine issues of material fact in this 
case regarding defendant Cal Gas1 negligence that should 
have been submitted to the jury for determination and not 
resolved by the trial court as a matter of law. 
3. Does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in relation 
to the actions of defendant Cal Gas apply in this case? 
4. Should this matter be remanded and set for trial 
as to defendant Cal Gas. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs filed this suit to recover damages they 
suffered on February 6, 1986, when the tractor-trailer they 
occupied overturned 600 feet west of Milepost 19 on 
Interstate 80 in Tooele County. Immediately prior to the 
time plaintiffs' vehicle overturned, a Cal Gas tanker 
overturned 800 feet west of milepost 19 on Interstate 80. 
Plaintiff Kitchen was the driver of an ANR Garrett tractor 
with two trailers. It is his testimony that he saw the 
defendant Cal Gas tanker truck overturned ahead of him on 
the roadway. The tanker was blocking 1% lanes of the two 
eastbound lanes so plaintiff began to slow his truck 
anticipating he could stop prior to coming into contact with 
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the Cal Gas tanker. Traveling immediately behind the 
plaintiffs was a CR England tractor and trailers. It is the 
testimonies of the plaintiffs that as their truck slowed 
down, the CR England truck hit them from behind causing them 
to roll over. There was no contact between the ANR Garrett 
truck and the Cal Gas truck. The depositions of plaintiffs 
were taken. The deposition of Richard Foreman, CR. 
England's driver, was taken. The driver of the Cal gas 
vehicle, Blaine Beckstead, died of causes unrelated to the 
accident shortly after it occurred. Various expert 
witnesses' depositions for the parties were taken as well. 
These depositions plus the pleadings constitute the record 
in this appeal. Plaintiffs reached a settlement with 
defendant CR. England prior to trial so no issues on appeal 
deal with CR. England. 
Defendant Cal Gas filed a motion for summary judgment 
claiming there was no proximate causation between the Cal 
Gas truck accident and the ANR Garrett truck accident. The 
trial court denied that motion. Defendant Cal Gas then 
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming there was no 
evidence of negligence on the part of the Cal Gas driver. 
The trial court granted Cal Gas' Motion. Hence, this appeal 
was filed, since it is plaintiffs' position there are 
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clearly disputed factual issues that should be determined by 
a jury, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips 
were drivers for ANR Garrett Freight lines as of February 
1986. On February 6, 1986, they were transporting freight 
from the Los Angeles, California area to Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The tractor they were operating had a sleeping 
compartment so one of them would drive while the other 
slept. 
2. At about midnight on February 6, 1986, they pulled 
into the Wendover, Utah Weigh Station. They were instructed 
to drop their third trailer. They were told the road 
further ahead had patches of black ice all the* way to Salt 
Lake City. (Kitchen deposition p. 43 and p. 44.) 
3. After the ANR Garrett truck had left the Wendover 
Weigh Station, it was passed by the defendant Cal Gas tanker 
at a rapid rate of speed. The Cal Gas truck was heading 
east as well. Plaintiff Kitchen testified in his deposition 
on pages 48 and 49: 
Q. Did any trucks pass you? 
A. Yeah. Cal Gas tanker truck. 
Q. Where did it pass you? 
A. Coming out of the scales. 
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Q. Right out of the scales? 
A. Well, I had been out of the scales 
I guess five minutes. 
Q. You'd been out of the scales and 
then it passed you? 
A. Out on interstate 80. 
Q. Driving 20 to 25 miles an hour? 
A. I didn't even get up in the higher 
gears yet. 
Q. Did it pass you on the wet but not 
slick portion of the freeway? 
A. Yeah. On the left side of me, 
yeah. 
Q. And you'd barely pulled out of the 
Wendover weigh station? 
A. It's what I call barely pulling out 
of there. 
Q. How far out? Less than a mile? 
A. Yeah. I'd say that. Wherever he 
was going, he was in a hurry. 
Q. Did you keep the Cal Gas truck in 
sight between the mile out of the weigh 
station and the time of the accident, the 
place of the accident? 
A. I didn't keep him in sight. He was 
blowed out of sight. He was gone. 
He further testified on this point at page 74 of his 
deposition. 
Q. But I mean before the accident? 
A. I wasn't talking to him, no. 
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Q. All right. 
A. Well, when I was leaving port I 
made comment about this Cal Gas truck going 
around me, figuring he was in a hurry. 
Because I just barely got out on the 
Boulevard when that sucker passed me. Other 
than that, I didn't have nothing to say to 
him. 
Plaintiff Phillips verified what plaintiff Kitchen had said 
in his deposition on pages 35 and 36: 
Q. Tell me about everything you said 
to him and everything he said to you? 
A. Well, he said, "There goes the Cal 
Gas truck rocky mountain doubles". 
Q. That was after you'd got into the 
sleeper? 
A. That's after I'd got in the 
sleeper. 
Q. Tell me everything else that he 
said? 
A. And I said, "What?" And he mumbled 
something else. And that's when I pulled the 
curtain back a little bit to where it wasn't 
snapped where my head is, and he said, "There 
went the Cal Gas truck lickity splitting". 
And I couldn't even see it. It was going. 
4. Plaintiffs proceeded east on 1-80 in the right lane of 
the roadway at 20 to 25 miles per hour up to the point in the 
road where the accident occurred. There were two eastbound 
lanes of traffic (Kitchen deposition, p. 49; Phillips 
deposition, p. 32, 33). 
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5. In the area where the accident took place, the roads 
were icy and slippery, (Kitchen deposition, p. 46; Phillips 
deposition, p. 10, 13.) 
6. In the area of milepost 19, a white Toyota Pickup truck 
was traveling ahead of the ANR Garrett truck in the left-hand 
lane of traffic. In the Toyota's headlights, Kitchen saw the 
shadow of something blocking the left and part of the right 
lanes of traffic ahead of him. In his deposition he testified 
on this point as follows: 
Q. How far ahead of you was the Cal 
Gas truck when you saw it tipped over? 
A. The next time I saw that Cal Gas 
truck was when I was down on the ground and 
they was pulling me out of it. But I saw it 
before I got down there due to a pickup truck 
that was riding in my left-hand lane. He 
turned on his high beam lights. So when I 
was driving down the road I had a Toyota 
pickup truck riding in the left-hand lane, I 
was in the right-hand lane. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That pickup truck turned on its 
high beams. Now, I didn't, at that time I 
didn't know it was the Cal Gas truck across 
the highway. All I saw was a shadow down 
there. 
Q. A shadow? 
A. Yeah. It's like a glare at the 
pickup from the lights hitting on the object. 
(Kitchen deposition, p. 49, 50.) 
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Q. Was he slowing down at that poiirvt? 
Did you see his brake lights? 
A. He never touched his brake lights. 
The only thing he did when he got ahead of me 
a little ways, is he turned on his high 
beams. And when he turned on his high beams 
we both saw the shadow across the highway. 
(Kitchen deposition, p. 79.) 
Q. With him right in front of you? 
A. Right. Well, he was the one that 
actually picked the tanker across the 
highway. 
Q. Could you see over his pickup from 
where you were? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And it was his lights that picked 
up the Cal Gas tanker up ahead? 
A. Right. Right. 
(Kitchen deposition, P. 121.) 
7. The overturned Cal Gas truck was blocking the left lane 
and part of the right lane on the roadway directly ahead of 
Kitchen. (Kitchen deposition, p. 51 and P. 94.) 
8. Perceiving the problem the Cal Gas tanker presented in 
the roadway ahead of him, Kitchen took his foot off the 
throttle, causing his vehicle to slow. (Kitchen d€»position, 
pages 123, 124.) 
9. As plaintiffs1 vehicle slowed, plaintiffs felt an 
impact to the rear of their vehicle, which impact caused 
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plaintiffs1 vehicle to overturn. (Kitchen deposition page 125; 
Phillips deposition pages 36-38, 50-52.) 
10. Foreman testified that the C.R. England vehicle did not 
hit plaintiffs1 vehicle and that he saw plaintiffs' vehicle 
overturned and blocking the roadway as he approached Milepost 19 
on 1-80 and therefore drove off the roadway to avoid hitting it. 
11. The driver of the Cal Gas truck died shortly after the 
accident of causes unrelated to the accident. The wife of the 
Cal Gas Driver who was accompanying her husband cannot be 
located to give her testimony according to counsel for Cal Gas. 
12. After the accident, plaintiff Kitchen walked the short 
distance up to where the Cal Gas tanker was to see if anyone 
needed help. (Kitchen deposition, p. 55.) 
13. Section 41-6-46(1)(e) U.C.A. states in pertinent part: 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and 
appropriate speeds at certain locations — 
Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power 
of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle 
at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the existing conditions, and 
giving regard to the actual and potential 
hazards then existing, including, but not 
limited to when: 
* * * * * 
(e) special hazards exist 
regarding pedestrians or other traffic, 
or due to weather or highway conditions. 
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14. It is plaintiff's contention the Cal Gas driver was 
unable to maintain proper and immediate control over his vehicle 
as he was driving too fast for the conditions as they then 
existed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There are genuine issues of material fact involving the 
negligence of the Cal Gas driver that precipitated this triple 
truck accident. Additionally, under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitor, defendant's negligence can be inferred. Therefore, it 
was inappropriate for the trial court to grant defendant Cal 
Gas' motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
There are genuine issues of material fact on the 
issue of Defendant Cal Gas1 Negligence. 
therefore Summary Judgment is improper 
The Utah Supreme Court as well as Courts throughout the 
United States have repeatedly emphasized the very restrictive 
standard of when Summary Judgment is appropriate. 
In Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the propriety of summary judgment 
and the approach courts must take to motions for summary 
judgment as follows: 
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Summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If 
there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the opposing party. 
Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the party opposing summary judgment. 
Although summary judgment may on occasion be 
appropriate in negligence casesf it is 
appropriate only in the most clear-cut case. 
In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 
294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967), this Court 
stated: 
Summary judgments are more frequently given 
in contract cases . . . . However, when it 
comes to determining negligence, contributory 
negligence, and causation, courts are not in 
such a good position to make a total 
determination for here enters a prerogative 
of the jury to make a determination of its 
own, and that is: Did the conduct of a party 
measure up to that of the reasonably prudent 
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause of 
the harm done? 
(See Case in its entirety in Attachment 1) 
With the Bowen standard in mind, it is clear by its prior 
ruling on defendant Cal Gas1 motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of proximate cause that the trial court was of the opinion 
there is disputed evidence in this case. The court determined 
that there was a jury question as to whether the overturned Cal 
Gas truck was a proximate cause of the collision between the ANR 
Garrett truck and the C.R. England truck. Since the issues of 
proximate cause and negligence are so intertwined it is 
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illogical to find there is an issue of material facts regarding 
proximate cause and no such dispute regarding negligence. The 
necessity of having a jury consider all the factual disputes in 
the present case is especially clear. When the facts of the 
case are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 
Since these are all disputed issues of material fact, 
summary judgment was inappropriately granted. This matter 
should be tried to a jury. 
Point II 
There is substantial evidence from which a jury 
could infer defendant Cal Gas1 negligence 
In earlier Memorandum on this point, defendant cited the 
landmark Utah Supreme Court case of Horsley v. Robinson. 112 
Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947) for the proposition that "The mere 
occurrence of an accident, considered alone, does not support an 
inference that the Cal Gas driver was negligent." 
It is plaintiffs contention that the Horsley decision 
supports their position that Cal Gas negligence is an issue for 
jury determination. The facts of Horsley are analogous to the 
facts in this case in many respects. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Horsley supported the trial court's submission to the jury of 
the issue of negligent operation of a bus that collided with an 
oncoming automobile which skidded into its path on an icy road. 
The court held that the jury could infer excessive speed for the 
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existing circumstances without evidence of stopping distances. 
After making the statement upon which defendant relies, the 
court went on further to explain: 
* * * * 
But negligence may be inferred from facts and 
circumstances which according to human 
experience tend to show and from which 
reasonable minds might be convinced that in 
operating the bus as thev did under the 
surrounding facts and circumstances the 
defendants should have anticipated that they 
were endangering the safety of their 
passengers. . . . 
Suppose conditions were such that the driver 
could anticipate that if he moved at the rate 
of 5 miles per hour he would slide 100 feet 
before he could stop and that in so doing he 
would be apt to slide over the side of the 
highway and his bus would overturn or slide 
onto a railroad track where he would be struck 
by an approaching train, would anyone contend 
that he could proceed even at that rate of 
speed without being guilty of negligence? 
Here the driver had driven more than 20 miles 
under similar road and weather conditions 
which he encountered at the time of the 
accident. He had ample time to fully realize 
the amount of control or lack thereof which he 
could exert over the bus in case of an 
emergency. . . . The evidence was sufficient 
from which the jury could find the defendants 
were negligent. 
Referring to Section 57-7-113, U.C.A. 1943 the Court stated: 
This statute requires that a driver shall 
not drive at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent in view of the existing 
conditions and hazards on the highway . . . . 
In other words, since the greater the speed 
the less control the driver has over his 
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vehicle and a longer distance is required 
within which to stop, and his ability to guide 
his vehicle is decreased, and since his 
control will also be decreased when traveling 
on icv roads covered with slush when a sleet 
of snow and rain is falling, he must under 
such conditions according to this statute 
decrease his speed so that he can drive with 
reasonable safety to others using the 
highway . . . 
* * * 
It is universally recognized that negligence 
may be inferred from the happening of the 
accident and the surrounding facts and 
circumstances where the facts are such as to 
reasonably justify such inference even though 
there is no direct testimony to establish the 
exact grounds of negligence which caused the 
accident. (Citations omitted.) 
186 P.2d at 596, 597, 599 (emphasis added). (See case in its 
entirety in Attachment 2.) 
In the present case, as in Horsley, supra, there are issues 
of fact which preclude summary disposition. There can be no 
doubt that based on Horsley, the jury may infer negligence on 
the part of the Cal Gas truck driver. While the mere occurrence 
of an accident may not imply negligence, whether or not it is 
negligent to overturn a tractor/tanker on a slippery road and 
thereby block the traffic lanes is a question of fact to be 
determined by a fact finder. As in Horsley, the trier of fact 
could infer from the accident and the surrounding facts that the 
Cal Gas driver was driving too fast for the existing conditions 
and failed to keep proper control of his vehicle. 
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In the case of Kelly v. Montova. 470 P.2d 563, (Ct. of App., 
New Mexico, 1970), a multiple car accident in a severe sand 
storm resulted in blocking the highway. The plaintiff was a 
passenger in a truck which collided with the last car in the 
previous accident. The trial court entered summary judgment in 
favor of defendant vehicle drivers only to be reversed by the 
New Mexico Court of Appeals. The New Mexico Court specifically 
stated that blocking a highway in violation of statute may cause 
other persons to have accidents. (Utah has a similar statute 
embodied in Utah Code Ann. 41-6-103 (1953) as amended.) Issues 
of fact as to foreseeability, proximate cause, and negligence 
were to be resolved by the trier of fact. (See case in its 
entirety in Attachment 3.) 
The plaintiffs testified that Mr. Beckstead, the driver of 
the Cal Gas tanker, passed him at a rapid rate of speed shortly 
before the accident. The next time the plaintiff saw the Cal 
Gas truck it was laying in the road blocking the eastbound 
traffic lanes less than 200 feet ahead of plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff, in an effort to avoid the Cal Gas truck also crashed. 
There was snow on the ground and black ice on the road. Thus, 
there is an obvious question of fact which precludes summary 
judgment, i.e.; did the accident of the Cal Gas truck, resulting 
in that truck blocking the eastbound lanes of traffic contribute 
to the plaintiffs' accident which resulted in their personal 
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injuries? Was defendant's negligence a contributing factor to 
plaintiffs' accident? It is plaintiffs' position that this was 
a chain reaction type accident and that Cal Gas' negligence was 
the initiating event. This is a prime case for a comparative 
negligence analysis for the finder of fact. 
In Weber v. Sprincrville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986) the 
Court described four elements of a negligence action. Each of 
those four elements as applied to the present facts creates an 
issue for the jury. First, does a driver of a truck have a duty 
of care to maintain control over his vehicle so as not to block 
the traffic lanes of the highway, especially in winter driving 
conditions? Second, did the Cal Gas truck driver breach that 
duty when he overturned his truck and left it laying in the road 
blocking the eastbound lanes? Third, did the accident of the 
defendant Cal Gas truck case plaintiffs' injuries in whole or in 
part and fourth, did plaintiffs suffer damages as a result 
thereof? The proper body to resolve these issues is the jury. 
Defendant Cal Gas, Inc. cited below a recent Utah Court of 
Appeals case of Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical Inc., 769 P.2d 
636. In Reeves, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge 
because summary judgment had been inappropriately entered in 
favor of the respondents on all of the causes of action except 
one. That one dispute involved a medical question concerning 
standard of care and breach of that standard which had to be 
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established by expert testimony. No expert was produced by the 
plaintiff. As shown above, the current situation is very much 
different from a medical malpractice action which requires 
expert standard of care testimony in most instances as set forth 
in the Reeves case. Here there was a duty and a breach of that 
duty that can be inferred from all the circumstances. 
As mentioned hereinabove, defendant previously filed a 
motion for summary judgment on the issue proximate causation 
which the court denied. Since the issues of proximate cause and 
negligence go hand in hand, it may be helpful to review the 
courts decisions regarding the appropriateness of summary 
judgment on proximate causation issues. 
In the case of Hall v. Blackham. 417 P.2d 664 (Utah 1966), 
another often cited decision, the court rendered a decision on 
appeal by plaintiffs from the portion of a jury verdict in favor 
of one of the defendants in the case, Deleeuw. Plaintiffs had 
alleged that Deleeuw handed a sandwich to another defendant, the 
driver of the car which collided with plaintiffs1 decedent's 
car, and that the handling of the sandwich to the driver 
distracted his attention. 417 P.2d 15 665. The jury was asked 
two questions regarding Deleeuw: was he negligent, and, if he 
was, was his negligence a proximate cause of the accident. The 
jury answered both questions in the negative. 417 P.2d at 667. 
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The decision stands for the proposition that negligence and 
proximate causation are questions for the jury. They are not 
questions for the Court on a motion for summary judgment. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), 
considered a jury instruction which directed a verdict on 
plaintifffs negligence and, in effect, directed a verdict on the 
issue of proximate cause. 671 P.2d at 219. After a discussion 
of the law of superseding causation, in which the Court pointed 
out that it has adopted the rule stated in Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 447, on the issue of superseding causation, the 
Court stated, 
In the present case, the disputed instruction 
was erroneous because it failed to submit the 
proximate cause issue to the jury for 
determination. . . . 
Where the evidence is in dispute, including 
the inferences from the evidence, the issue 
should be submitted to the jury. 
* * * 
We do not mean to imply that rulings by the 
trial court which decide a factual contention 
as a matter of law are never appropriate. But 
the right to trial by jury is a basic 
principle of our system that cannot be allowed 
to be eroded by improper intrusions on the 
jury's prerogative. 
671 P.2d at 220 (citations omitted.) 
Also, of relevance to the present case, the Harris Court 
stated that a person's negligence is not superseded by the 
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negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of another is 
foreseeable. The Court adopted the Restatement Rule which it 
applied as follows: 
The fact that an intervening act of a third 
person is negligent in itself or is done in a 
negligent manner does not make it a 
superseding cause of harm to another which the 
actor's negligent conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his 
negligent conduct should have realized that a 
third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the 
situation existing when the act of the third 
person was done would not regard it as highly 
extraordinary that the third person had so 
acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal 
consequence of a situation created by the 
actor's conduct and the manner in which it is 
done is not extraordinary negligent. 
(671 P.2d at 219) 
Although the factual issues presented in Harris were 
somewhat of a flip flop of the facts in the present case# the 
court's discussion of intervening and/or superceding causation 
is significant and instructive: 
Instruction no. 14 appears to have been based 
on the rule stated in Hillyard v. Utah 
Bv-Products Co.. 1 Utah 2d 143, 151, 263 P.2d 
287, 292 (1953); and restated in . . . 
Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970). 
. . . [T]he test in Hillyard is two-pronged: 
(1) where a motorist sees a stationary object 
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in the road and negligently fails to avoid it, 
his negligence is. as a matter of law, a 
superseding cause, but (2) if the motorist 
negligently fails to see the stationary object 
in time to avoid it, the issue of whether the 
motorist's negligence is a superseding cause 
is for the jury. 
The strong drift away from deciding the issue 
of superseding causation in automobile 
accidents as a matter of law is evident in 
Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co.. Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980), and 
Watters v. Ouerrv. Utah 588 P.2d 702 (1978). 
Indeed, Jensen all but overruled the first 
prong of Hillyard sub silento. 
* * * 
TT]he first prong of Hillvard cannot stand 
analysis from a theoretical point of view. 
There is no valid distinction between one who 
negligently fails to keep a proper lookout and 
rear-ends another car and one who keeps a 
proper lookout but negligently fails to avoid 
a collision. The two situations are similar 
to the doctrines of assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence—which are now treated 
for the most part simply in terms of whether a 
defendant failed to act as a reasonably 
prudent person under the circumstance. 
* * * 
Finally, the unsound distinction made in 
Hillvard serves to frustrate the purpose of 
the Comparative Negligence Statute by 
precluding the kind of comparison of fault 
that a Jury ought to make. The 
allocation of liability should be 
made on the basis of the relative 
culpability of both parties. To do 
that the jury must assess the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness 
of the second driver's actions in 
light of all the circumstances, 
including whatever action it takes 
to avoid a collision, his initial 
- 20 -
speed, the initial speed of the 
first car, road conditions, traffic 
conditions, and the like. 
To avoid further confusion in the doctrine of 
superseding causation in cases such as this. 
we hereby overrule the first prong of the 
Hillyard test as stated in Hillvard, • . . and 
Anderson. 
671 P.2d at 221, 222 (emphasis added.) 
The Harris decision, a relatively recent decision by the 
Utah Supreme Court, stands for the principle of trial by jury. 
Following that tenet the issues of negligence and proximate 
cause especially in an automobile accident case are within the 
purview of the jury. The jury may draw inferences of the 
neglect of a party from the evidence as it sees fit. (See copy 
of the Harris decision in its entirety in attachment 4.) 
In the present case, the Court ruled as a matter of law on 
the issue of negligence prior to the submission of any evidence 
to a jury. The facts as elicited from the plaintiffs in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs demonstrates negligence on the 
part of defendant Cal Gas. Without question, a jury could 
reasonably infer that Cal Gas was negligent by failing to drive 
at an appropriate speed; by failing to maintain proper control; 
by overturning and blocking almost all of the traveled portions 
of the roadway. The grant of summary judgment in these 
circumstances was erroneous. 
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Point III 
Defendant Cal Gas is not entitled to a 
Presumption of Due Care 
At the trial court level, Cal Gas asserted it was entitled 
to a presumption of due care since its driver had died shortly 
after the accident. Such is not the case. Its driver died as a 
result of health problems totally unrelated to the accident 
therefore, the presumption does not apply. However, defendant 
cited the general rebuttable presumption that the Cal Gas driver 
was exercising due care at the time of the accident relying on 
DeMille v. Erickson. 462 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969). That is a case 
in which there was a headon collision between two automobiles. 
All occupants of the vehicles were killed and there were 
apparently no other witnesses. There was no evidence of 
excessive speed. The only evidence of negligence was that one 
of the vehicles was in the other's lane of traffic. This was a 
contributory negligence case prior to the enactment of the 
Comparative Negligence Statute so has only limited application 
to the case under consideration. The court inferred that the 
driver of the car in the wrong lane was negligent as a matter of 
law. The court further found that the heirs of the passenger of 
the car in the wrong lane could not recover because there was no 
direct or inferred evidence the other driver did anything to 
contribute to the accident. 
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That simply is not the situation in this case. The evidence 
is that absent a lack of control of the Cal Gas truck by its 
driver while traveling at an excessive speed for the inclement 
conditions on the straight, level interstate, it would not have 
overturned creating a hazard for following vehicles. Those 
reasonably inferred facts preclude summary disposition. As in 
Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985), citing DeMille, 
supra., " . . . once the opposing party produces a prima facie 
case as to the nonexistence of [the presumed fact of due care], 
the presumption disappears." There it was adduced from the 
evidence that a drowning victim had discarded his lifejacket. 
The court ruled that whether that was negligent under the 
circumstances was a question of fact for the jury to evaluate. 
In the present case, there is convincing evidence that the 
Cal Gas driver was negligent. He drove too fast for the snowy, 
icy conditions; lost control of his tanker truck which caused it 
to rollover blocking the traveled portion of the road. Under 
these facts, no presumption of due care can be sustained. 
Point IV 
Defendant's Negligence can be inferred 
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor 
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions held that 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable in certain cases 
and juries should be so instructed where it is appropriate. It 
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is plaintiffs' position that their case is one in which the 
doctrine should apply. 
In Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828 (Utah Sup. Crt. 
1980), plaintiff brought a claim against the owners and 
operators of a business whose device was used to exhibit sheet 
metal samples. The device collapsed causing serious injuries to 
the plaintiff. Neither party could demonstrate what caused the 
device to fail. The jury was instructed on the theory of res 
ipsa loquitor but, still returned a verdict in defendant's 
favor. While the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
rulings, it discussed the doctrine and its applicability which 
may be insightful in reference to the case on appeal. 
In Anderton, the court cited approvingly the case of Lund v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co.. 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960) 
wherein the court stated: 
to permit one who suffers injury from 
something under the control of another, which 
ordinarily would not cause injury except for 
the other's negligence, to present his 
grievance to a court or jury on the basis that 
an inference of negligence may reasonably be 
drawn from such facts; and cast the burdem 
upon the other to make proof of what happened. 
(607 P.2d 833) 
The Court further described the criteria under which res 
ipsa loquitor could be implemented: 
(1) that the accident was of a kind which, in 
the ordinary course of events, would not have 
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happened had due care been observed; (2) that 
the plaintiff's own use or operation of the 
agency or instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the injury; and (3) that the 
agency or instrumentality causing the injury 
was under the exclusive management or control 
of the defendant. 
(607 P.2d 833) 
Of most importance in reference to this present appeal the 
Utah Supreme Court emphasized that the application of the 
doctrine to a given situation was a question of fact to be 
determined by the jury: 
It is to be noted that the weighing of 
evidence presented to establish the above 
elements, like all other questions of fact, is 
within the province of the jury; where the 
trial court determines that the evidence, 
viewed in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, could establish the prerequisites 
to the application of the doctrine, an 
instruction to that effect is proper. It then 
becomes the jury's responsibility to apply, or 
refuse to apply, the doctrine based on its 
factual findings regarding the circumstantial 
prerequisites. 
(607 P.2d 834) 
The Anderton court in a footnote made comments that are 
especially relevant to the present case regarding the 
application of res ipsa loquitor and the principles of 
comparative negligence: 
This is not to say that any contributory 
negligence on plaintiff's part prevents the 
application of the doctrine, such that it may 
not be used in those cases where plaintiff is 
seeking partial recovery under Utah's 
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comparative negligence statute (U.C.A., 1953, 
78-27-37). The requirement here is that 
plaintifffs use of the agency or 
instrumentality not be primarily responsible 
for the injury, not that his actions be free 
from negligence of any kind. (Note that the 
comparative negligence provision bars partial 
recovery under any type of proof where 
plaintiff's negligence equals or exceeds that 
of the defendant.) See 58 Am.Jur.2d 
Negligence § 481. p. 58. 
(underlining added)(607 P.2d 833)(See Anderton in its entirety 
in Attachment 5.) 
Another recent Utah Supreme Court decision discussing res 
ipsa loquitor is Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah Sup. Crt. 
1980). In Nixdorf, a patient brought a medical malpractice 
action against a doctor and hospital because a surgical needle 
was left in her body after surgery. At the trial in this 
matter, plaintiff did not introduce expert testimony to show 
that the defendants care was below the standard of care but, 
relied instead on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. The trial 
court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
because of plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for a new 
trial. The Court reaffirmed the proposition that in a medical 
malpractice action expert testimony is not always necessary if 
the standard of care owed plaintiff is within the common 
knowledge and experience of a layman. Then, the Court surmised 
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the plaintiff met her burden through the application of res ipsa 
loquitor. The Court stated: 
When the appropriate evidentiary basis is 
presented a plaintiff may employ the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitor to carry this burden. 
This doctrine establishes an inference of 
negligence from the circumstances incident to 
the operation. It is a procedural rather than 
substantive rule of law which carries the 
plaintiff past a motion for nonsuit where the 
circumstantial evidence introduced by the 
plaintiff is sufficient to support the 
application of the doctrine and its inference 
of negligence. 
(612 P.2d 352)(See case in its entirety in Attachment 6.) 
A key case is Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 
1232 (Ut. Sup. Crt. 1984). The plaintiff suffered personal 
injuries when the pallet on which he was standing broke causing 
him to fall. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendant. Plaintiff appealed on several grounds including the 
refusal to give plaintiff's proffered instruction regarding res 
ipsa loquitor. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter 
instructing the trial court to decide whether plaintiff made a 
prima facie showing of the res ipsa loquitor elements and, if 
so, the jury should receive plaintiff's proffered instruction. 
The Court in Kusy reaffirmed Anderton, in its description of 
the elements of res ipsa loquitor. It noted in reference to the 
third element that "The control necessary for a res ipsa 
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instruction is control exercised at the time of the negligent 
act." (681 P.2d 1235) The Utah Supreme Court also held in Kusy 
that a plaintiff could sustain and be allowed instructions on 
theories of res ipsa loquitor and negligence in the same lawsuit 
as long as the exact cause of the accident was not known. The 
jury based on the circumstances could infer negligence. (See a 
copy of Kusy in its entirety in Attachment 7.) 
In the case under consideration, plaintiffs are entitled to 
present their claims under the theories of negligence and res 
ipsa loquitor. Plaintiffs can establish all the elements 
necessary for res ipsa loquitor: 1) the Cal Gas tanker truck 
rollover is the kind of accident that does not happen if due 
care has been observed, 2) the plaintiffs had no use or hadn't 
operated the Cal Gas tanker and, therefore, could not be said to 
be primarily responsible for their injuries and 3) the Cal Gas 
tanker was under the exclusive control of defendant. 
Since the plaintiffs can make a prima facie showing of the 
above elements, the jury could infer defendant Cal Gas1 
negligence. The application of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine 
is a question of fact so is within the exclusive province of the 
jury. Thus, it was improper to grant defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
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It was improper for the trial court to grant defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligence. When 
viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence, 
both direct and circumstantial establishes neglect on the part 
of Cal Gas. There can be no argument that a jury could 
reasonably infer that it was negligent for Cal gas to drive too 
fast in snowy, icy conditions late at night thus causing it to 
lose control of its tanker so it rolled over onto the roadway 
blocking one and one-half lanes of the two lane road. The 
doctrines of negligence and res ipsa loquitor require that this 
issue of negligence be considered by a jury as the fact finder 
and not as a matter of law by the court. 
The trial court already decided there was sufficient 
evidence to put the issue of proximate cause to the jury. 
Certainly the issue of negligence should be considered by the 
jury as well. Plaintiffs request that the trial court's 
granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment be reversed 
and this matter be remanded for a trial on it's merits. 
Dated this 10th day of December, 1990. 
James R. Black 
rhuus^i^ W4&*^/? 
Susan Black 
F:\USER\SB\Bricf 
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ber of years of the husband's employment 
The wife is entitled to one-half of t h ^ 
portion pursuant to the award of the tri^1 
judge in this case, which our modification *s 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse Jn 
part and remand to the trial court so t h ^ 
the order may be amended to conform wii*1 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded* 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS atfd 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
fa | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowe*1' 
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, heT 
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and App^ *" 
lants, 
v. 
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, Sterling R. Draper and Eno^n 
Smith Sons Company, Defendants a*1" 
Respondents. 
No. 17732. 
Supreme Court of UtaTi. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
In a personal injury action, the 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James $' 
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment i°r 
&Yy an& s\&sfeq\>en%, pursuant \x> motic^ 
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis" 
missed all claims, counterclaims and ctoss 
claims with prejudice except for c l ^ m 
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (D 
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether 
city fulfilled its duty to maintain c#v 
streets in safe condition was question ° 
fact for jury, precluding summary judg" 
ment. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
1. Appeal and Error <®=»430(1) 
Since failure to file timely notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice 
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 
42(a), 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2) 
Trial court's April 13 order, entered 
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both 
consolidated actions, was final judgment in 
each case for purpose of calculating timeli-
ness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on 
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely 
filed appeal from trial court's grant of sum-
mary judment on January 26 for city. 
3. Judgment <s=>181(2, 3) 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Judgment <s=>185(2) 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should 
be resolved in favor of opposing party on 
motion for summary judgment and thus 
court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from ev-
idence in light most favorable to party op-
posing summary judgment. 
5. Judgment o= 1^80 
Summary judgment is appropriate * only 
in the most clear-cut negligence cases, IO 
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 757(1) 
City lias nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets withinVitsf 
corporate boundaries in reasonably 'isafe 
condition for travel and may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. 
7. Municipal Corporations <s=>798 
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty^ t^p 
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities^to 
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe 
visible and working condition. 
8. Judgment <s=> 181(33) 
Whether city, which was arguably neg-
ligent in not conducting immediate inspec-
tions of signs where road maintenance work 
was done, and which after receiving notice 
that stop sign was down sent individual to 
repair sign rather than calling police to 
regulate traffic until sign could be raised, 
fulfilled its duty to maintain city streets in 
safe condition was question of fact to be 
determined by jury, precluding summary 
judgment in action arising from automobile 
collision at intersection. 
9. Municipal Corporations <s=>798 
Municipality has duty to respond in 
reasonable fashion once it is on notice of 
defective sign or signal. 
John G. Mulliner, Orem, Gary B. Fergu-
son, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel-
lants. 
Raymond Berry, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
In this personal injury action, plaintiffs 
appeal an adverse summary judgment on 
the ground that there are issues of material 
fact which should be tried by a jury. Riv-
erton City, the defendant, seeks affirmance 
of the summary judgment and, in the alter-
native, argues that plaintiffs failed to file a 
timely notice of appeal and that the appeal 
should therefore be dismissed. We reverse 
the summary judgment and remand for a 
trial on the merits. 
At approximately 1:08 p.m. on Saturday, 
April 9,1978, two cars collided at the inter-
section of 12600 South and 2700 West in 
Riverton, Utah. The vehicle driven by 
plaintiff Kristine Bowen was westbound on 
12600 South. The other vehicle, driven by 
Sterling Draper, was travelling north on 
2700 West. Traffic on 2700 West is re-
quired to stop and yield the right of way to 
traffic on 12600 South. However, on the 
day of the accident, the stop sign regulating 
northbound traffic on 2700 West was lying 
on the ground and the Draper and Bowen 
automobiles collided in the intersection. 
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Prior to the accident, a passing motorist 
noticed the sign was down and notified 
Riverton City at 12:50 p.m., approximately 
eighteen minutes before the accident A 
Riverton City employee responded to the 
notice of the fallen sign, but arrived after 
the accident. 
On November 29, 1978, the Bowens filed 
suit (Bowen suit) against Sterling Draper, 
Riverton City, and Enoch Smith Sons Com-
pany, a construction company that had 
worked on the intersection the day prior to 
the accident. On January 25, 1979, Draper 
filed suit (Draper suit) against Kristine 
Bowen, Riverton City, and Enoch Smith 
Sons Company. The Bowen suit alleged 
that Riverton City was negligent in main-
taining the stop sign and in responding 
negligently when it received notice of the 
downed stop sign. Crossclaims and coun-
terclaims were subsequently filed by the 
defendants. On motion of Riverton City, 
the trial court ordered the Bowen and 
Draper cases consolidated pursuant to Utah 
R.Civ.P. 42(a). 
On January 26, 1981, the trial court 
granted summary judgments for Riverton 
City in both the Draper and the Bowen 
actions. On January 27, 1981, summary 
judgment was granted in favor of Enoch 
Smith Sons Company, a defendant in the 
-Draper action, and against all other parties. 
On February 2, 1981, the Bowens, as plain-
tiffs in the Bowen action and as crossdefen-
dants in the Draper action, filed a "notice 
of intent to appeal" the summary judgment 
entered in favor of Riverton City. On 
March 25, 1981, pursuant to stipulation, the 
trial court awarded Bowens a money judg-
ment against Sterling Draper in the Bowen 
action. On April 13, 1981, counsel for Ster-
ling Draper, Florence Draper, Kristine 
Bowen, and Cynthia Bowen stipulated and 
agreed that all claims, counterclaims and 
crossclaims set forth in the Bowen and 
Draper actions could be dismissed with prej-
udice, except for claims against Riverton 
City, since such claims, counterclaims and 
crossclaims had been fully compromised and 
settled. On the same day the parties re-
maining in the Bowen and Draper actions 
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moved for an order dismissing the actions 
since all matters but for the claims against 
Riverton City had been compromised and 
settled. On April 13, 1981, pursuant to the 
motions and stipulations filed by the parties 
in both actions for dismissal with prejudice 
and in an order bearing the heading and 
numbers of both the Bowen and Draper 
actions, the court ordered that all claims, 
counterclaims and crossclaims, except for 
the claim of Kristine Bowen against River-
ton City, be dismissed with prejudice. On 
May 12, 1981, Bowens filed a notice of 
appeal in the Bowen suit. 
Riverton City claims that the final judg-
ment in the Bowen suit was rendered 
March 25, 1981, and since the notice of 
appeal was not filed within the jurisdiction-
al one-month period from that time, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this 
appeal.1 The Bowens, on the other hand, 
argue that the final judgment in these 
cases was not entered until the order dated 
April 13,1981. Since the Bowens filed their 
notice of appeal within one month from 
that date, they contend the appeal is prop-
erly before this Court. 
[1] Since failure to file a timely notice 
of appeal is jurisdictional, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal if notice was 
not timely filed. In re Ratliff, 19 Utah 2d 
346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967); Anderson v. An-
derson, 3 Utahr2d 277, 282 P.2d 845,(1955). 
[2] Without deciding-whether 'consoli-
dated actions should be^  treated as a single 
action for purposes of appeal,2 we shall deal 
with the actions in this case^as separate and 
distinct for determining J3ie timeliness of 
appeal. Nevertheless, we .hold the April 13 
order, entered pursuant to the stipulation of 
counsel in both actions, is the final judg-
ment in each case for the purpose of calcu-
lating the timeliness of the appeal. Calcu-
lating the timeliness of the appeal as of the 
entry of that order dismissing all claims, 
1. Utah R Civ.P. 73(a) provides in part "[T]he 
time within which an appeal may be taken 
shall be one month from the entry of the judg-
ment or order appealed from A party 
may appeal from a judgment by filing with the 
distnct court a notice of appeal 
counterclaims, and crossclaims in both ac-
tions, we hold the Bowens timely filed this 
appeal. 
The next issue is whether summary judg-
ment was appropriately awarded to River-
ton City in this action. The Bowens assert 
that Riverton City was not only negligent 
in maintaining the stop sign but also re-
sponded negligently upon receiving notice 
that the sign was down. 
[3-5] Summary judgment is proper only 
if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 
83, 348 P.2d 683 (1960). If there is any 
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions 
of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the 
court must evaluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment Dur-
ham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332 
(1977); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964). Although 
summary judgment may on occasion be ap-
propriate m negligence cases, it is appropri-
ate only in the most clear-cut case FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979). See Preston w 
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968): 
In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 
294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967), this Court 
stated: 
Summary judgments are more fre-
quently given in contract cases 
However, when it comes to determining 
negligence, contributory negligence, and 
causation, courts are not in such a good 
position to make a total determination for, 
here enters a prerogative of the jury to 
make a determination of its own, and 
that is: Did the conduct of a party meas--
2. See generally State ex rel Pacific Intermoun-
tam Express Inc v Dist Court of Second Judi; 
ciai'Dist, Wyo, 387 P2d 550 (1963), 9 C< 
Wright & A Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-, 
dure § 2386 (1971) 
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ure up to that of the reasonably prudent 
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause 
of the harm done? 
[6-8] In evaluating the facts of this case 
in a light most favorable to the Bowens, we 
hold that summary judgment in favor of 
Riverton City was improperly awarded. 
The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe 
condition for travel, Murray v. Ogden City, 
Utah, 548 P.2d 896 (1976); Sweet v. Salt 
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913); 
Bills v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 507, 109 P. 
745 (1910), and the city may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 
Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). See also 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 41-6-22 and 63-30-8. In 
fulfilling this duty, it is necessary for cities 
to maintain traffic signals in a reasonably 
safe, visible, and working condition. Smith 
v. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295, 543 P.2d 
848 (1975). Whether the city fulfilled its 
duty to maintain the city streets in a safe 
condition in the instant case is a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury. See 
Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320,159 
P. 530 (1916). 
In Riverton City's answers to the Bow-
ens' interrogatories, it stated that visual 
inspections were made by city personnel of 
all traffic signs within Riverton City on an 
annual basis to msure that the jsigriswere in 
place. It is arguable that Riverton City 
was negligent in not conducting immediate 
inspections of signs where road mainte-
nance work was done. Reasonable persons 
might differ as to whether the annual in-
spections conducted by Riverton City were 
sufficient under the circumstances. Enoch 
Smith workers present at the intersection 
the day before the accident stated that the 
sign was loose and blowing in the wind. 
[9] Riverton City argues that the eigh-
teen minutes between its receipt of notice 
and the accident was insufficient time to 
take corrective action. Of course, a jury 
might so find. But clearly, a municipality 
has a duty to respond in a reasonable fash-
ion once it is on notice of a defective sign or 
signal. Gaspard v. Stutes, La.App., 380 
So.2d 201 (1980); Bergen v. Koppenal, 97 
N.J.Super. 265, 235 A.2d 30 (1967), app'd 52 
N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968). In Lochbaum 
v. Bowman, La.App., 353 So.2d 379, 381 
(1978), the court stated: 
[T]here was no attempt [by the highway 
department] to notify law enforcement 
personnel to direct traffic until repairs 
could be accomplished. The Depart-
ment's radio operator simply notified the 
service man on call, who got dressed, 
went to the office to pick up tools, and 
finally arrived on the scene after the 
accident had occurred. 
We conclude that the Department was 
negligent both in failing to properly 
maintain the traffic signal at the inter-
section and in failing to take steps when 
notified of the malfunction to alert the 
proper authorities so that traffic at the 
intersection could be directed manually 
until repairs could be accomplished. 
After notice was received in the instant 
case, Riverton City responded by sending an 
individual to repair the sign rather than 
calling the police to regulate traffic until 
the sign could be raised. Whether it 
should, and if so could, have responded 
more effectively and quickly is a matter for 
trial. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. No 
costs. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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HORSLEY v. ROBINSON et aU 
No. 6940. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 6, 1947. 
1. Appeal and error <§=>989 
The reviewing court is not concerned 
with preponderance of evidence, but only 
with question of whether there is substan-
tial evidence to support verdict. Const, 
art. 8, § 9. 
2. Carriers <§=s297 
The driver of passenger vehicle owes 
passengers duty to operate vehicle within 
such rate of speed as a reasonable prudent 
person would operate under the existing 
circumstances.1 
3. Carriers <§=295(l) 
The operator of bus must exercise a 
proportionate increase in care to avoid in-
jury to his passengers where road and 
weather conditions make driving hazard-
ous. 
4. Carriers <£=>32Q(I7, 21) 
In action for injuries received by bus 
passenger when bus collided with oncoming 
automobile which skidded into path of bus 
on icy highway, evidence relating to speed 
of bus and distance between bus and auto-
mobile when automobile went out of con-
trol was sufficient for jury on question of 
negligence in operation of bus. Utah Code 
1943, 57—7—113(a).* 
5. Carriers <§=>3I6(4) 
In action for injuries sustained by bus 
passenger when bus collided with oncoming 
automobile which skidded into path of bus 
on icy highway, where there was evidence 
frota which, iury could infer that bus was 
traveling at excessive speed under the cir-
cumstances/ it _was unnecessary that plain-
tiff introduce Evidence of distances in 
iPaul v. Salt Lake City By. Co.', 30 
Utah 41, 83 P. 563. 
2Cederloff v. Whited, Utah, 169 P.2d 
777; Hart v. Kerr, Utah, 175 P.2d 475; 
Nikeropoulos \ . Ramsey, ^ 61 Utah 465, 
214 P. 304; Dalley v. Mid-Western 
Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.* 
which bus could be stopped at various 
SQegd& a.nd under vaxious, cit^um&tmo.^ 
PRATT, J., dissenting. 
Appeal from District Court, Third Judi-
cial District: Salt Lake County; C. E. 
Henderson, Judge. 
Action by Erma D. Horsley against B. 
H. Robinson and others, doing business as 
the ' Utah Transportation Company, and 
another to recover for injuries sustained in 
a collision between the company's bus and 
an automobile. Judgment for the plaintiff 
against the company and the company ap-
peals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Moyle, McKay, Burton & White and R. 
A. Burns, all of Salt Lake City, for appel-
lants. 
Hanson & Hanson, for defendant. 
Judd, Ray, Quinney, & Nebeker, all of 
Salt Lake City, for respondent 
WADE, Justice. 
The defendant, Utah Transportation 
Company, appeals from a $5,175 verdict 'in 
favor of plaintiff Erma Horsley for dam-
ages suffered in an accident while riding as. 
a passenger for hire in a bus operated by 
the transportation company between Hill 
Field and Salt Lake City. The same jury 
-returned a .verdict of no cause for action 
in favor of-the defendant Reinhardt. 
There was an aisle down the center of 
the r bus -with seven double seats on each 
side and one long seat1 for five persons* 
across the~rear end, thus seating 33 persons' 
besides the driver. In the accident plain-
tiff was thrown forward causing her throat 
to strike against the back of the seat in 
front of her and thereby causing injuries 
which affected her voice. 
The accident occurred about 5:25 p. m. 
on January 23, 1944, in Davis County i 
- [ • - _ r , 
2d 309; <Haarstrich v. Oregon Short 
Line R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 P. 100; 
O'Brien v.. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 P. 
791; Green v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539, 
244 P. 906; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah/ 
151,'l40P.2d 772. 
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short distance north of the Salt Lake-
Davis County "Line on highway 91, the 
main highway between Ogden and Salt 
Lake City. T h e ! paved portion thereof 
consists of four 10 foot traffic lanes with a 
13 foot shoulder on each side. At the time 
of the accident the shoulders were lined 
with snow banks which substantially re-
duced their' width; the highway was cov-
ered with ice, and slush and a sleet of snow 
and rain was falling, thus rendering driv-
ing conditions very hazardous. While the 
bus was proceeding southward at a i speed 
between 20 ' and 50 miles per hour in the 
outside west traffic lane on the driver's ex-
treme right-hand side of the highway in 
the proximity of a long and very gradual 
curve and on a slightly down hill slope, the 
defendant Reinhardt was approaching driv-
ing his car from the opposite direction at 
from 20 to 30 miles per hour in the east 
traffic lane next to the center of the high-
way, when suddenly Reinhardt's car went 
out of control and swung around so that it 
was facing to the south in the outside west 
traffic lane and directly in the course of 
the oncoming bus. While the car was mov-
ing slowly toward the south the left front 
side of the bus ran into the rear right side 
of the car thereby shoving it down the 
highway a distance of from 30 to 50 feet 
where it was ^stopped by colliding with an-
other car on the highway. By the impact 
with the Reinhardt car the bus was turned 
slightly to the west where
 (it ran into an-
other automobile which was parked on the 
west shoulder .which deflected its_course to-
ward the east and it finally came to a stop 
in the snow bank on the east side of the 
highway about 75 feet from the parked car. 
The terms "between'distance" and "dis-
tance between" used throughout this -opin-
ion to indicate* the distance between the bus 
and the Reinhardt car when it first became 
discernible ' that the latter was out of con-
trol, and the/term "due care speed" used to 
indicate a reasonable speed in view of the 
surrounding-circumstances, were suggested 
by Mr. Justice Wolfe. ^The word '-"con-
trol" is used herein in its'ordinary sense to 
mean the ability of the driver to stop or 
reduce the speed of his vehicle within a 
reasonable distance and to guide the same 
in the desired course. 
18(5 P 2 J - .°8 
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From the .evidence it is clear that when 
the Reinhardt car commenced to turn it 
was within full yiew of the driver of the 
bus but that he did not slacken his speed 
prior to the collision nor apply his brakes 
until within 5 or 10 feet of the Reinhardt 
car.' From these facts one of three things 
or a combination thereof must have caused 
the accident: (1) the Reinhardt car went 
out of control and into the course of the 
bus when it was so near thereto that there 
was no time for the bus driver to do any-
thing to avoid the accident; (2) the driv-
er of the bus, although he had sufficient 
time and had the bus under sufficient con-
trol to avoid the accident failed to see that 
the Reinhardt car was turning into his 
course in time to avoid the accident, or 
seeing it in time failed to exercise the nec-
essary control to avoid the accident; or 
(3) the bus driver, although he had suffi-
cient time after the Reinhardt car com-
menced to turn into his course to avoid the 
accident had he had the bus under control, 
did not have the bus under sufficient con-
trol to avoid the accident. 
I f the Reinhardt car went out of control 
and into the course of the bus when it was 
so near thereto that the driver did not have 
time to avoid the accident then defendants 
were not negligent and plaintiff cannot re-
cover. Cederloff v. Whited, Utah, 169 P.2d 
777; Har t v. Kerr, Utah, 175 P.2d 475. 
If the second proposition above stated v/as 
the* cause of the accident then clearly the 
defendants were .'negligent and,such negli-
gence ^proximately caused the accident be-
cause-clearly the* driver owes a ^  duty to 
keep-a proper lookout and see ^substantial 
objects on the road in front of him and to 
take" the necessary steps to avoid colliding 
therewith and if he failed to do.so he is 
liable for the dam *g"es resulting therefrom. 
However, I am not sure that the evidence 
would justify the. jury in finding that such 
was the cause of the accident: If the acci-
dent -was caused -by the third set of facts 
above 'set out then the jury could from the 
evidence find facts sufficient to sustain' a 
finding that the driver negligently operated 
the bus at such a speed that he was unable 
to maintain sufficient control thereof to 
••avoid the accident. So it is necessary to 
analyze ~ the evidence and determine what 
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facts the jury could reasonably find there-
from. 
The controlling facts for the jury to de-
termine are : -(1) At what rate of speed 
was the bus travelling at the time of the 
accident? (2) How far was the between 
distance ? (3) Did -the driver have suffi-
cient control over the bus to stop it within 
the between distance? And from - those 
facts the jury would have to determine 
whether the defendants were guilty of neg-
ligence which proximately caused the ac-
cident and-injuries. The jury had before 
it evidence that the bus was traveling as 
slow as 20 and as fast as 5(hmiles per hour. 
From all the evidence how fast could the 
jury reasonably find the bus was traveling? 
The testimony adduced by the defendants 
fixed its speed at from as slow as 20 to 
slightly faster than 25 miles per hour, and 
plaintiff fixed it at 50 miles per hour. The 
fact that the bus struck the Reinhardt car 
and shoved it from 30 to 50 feet where it 
was stopped when it hit a parked car, and 
the fact that after striking the Reinhardt 
car the bus swerved to the right into an-
other parked car and was deflected to the 
left across the highway where it was stop-
ped by a snow bank about 75 feet from the 
parked car indicates that it was traveling 
with considerable speed. The evidence 
would sustain a finding by the jury that 
the bus was traveling as fast as 40 miles 
per hour. 
What is i the maximum which the jury, 
from the evidence, could find the -between 
-distance was? Plaintiff testified that^that 
distance r-was a Salt Lake~*City block (660 
feet), Reinhardt'estimated it at-less-than 
300 feet and the bus driver estimated it at 
75 to 100 feet. These were all interested 
< witnesses but six passengers on the bus at 
the time of the accident were called by the 
defendants who testified at various distanc-
es ranging from 30 feet to 330 feet. All 
of them except one fixed it at 150 feet or 
less. I The sixth witness was a Mrs. Ses-
sions who when on direct examination fby 
defendants' counsel without leading was 
asked what that distance was answered 
twice that it was about a half a Salt Lake 
City block (330 feet). Later defendants' 
counsel led her into estimating, that dis-
tance at about the width of a Salt Lake 
City street (100 feet). Apparently she-di8l 
not recognize that this testimony was^uP 
conflict with her previous statement. From! 
the position the Reinhardt car was struck 
and the testimony -of all the witnesses if 
had turned completely in the opposite' di% 
rection and was traveling slowly toward 
the south, the same direction that ther-but 
was going. This would require some timel 
From all of the evidence we concludettHat: 
the jury could have reasonably found that-
the between distance was as far as 330 feetl 
It is argued that since there is no evir] 
dence of the distance required to stop tne 
bus under the then existing condi t ions .^ 
any given rate of speed the evidence^Jlj 
not sufficient from which the jury could; 
find the defendants guilty of negligenqe 
which proximately caused the accident. •; Ifi 
plaintiff must, in order to make a case/ 
show that the driver could have stopped^ 
the bus within the between distance then; 
her evidence is clearly insufficient to justi-
fy a finding in her favor, because the evi-
dence does not justify such a finding. 
On the contrary the evidence points defi^ ; 
nitely to the fact that the driver did £igt 
have the bus under sufficient control so thai-
he could either bring it to a stop, reduce^ 
its speed, or steer it to one side sufficiently; 
to avoid the accident within the in betweetr 
distance. And this is true even though! 
that distance was as far as 330 feet. 
The following facts" quite definitely point 
to that conclusion: 'The icy highway*c#v-] 
ered with show 'and1 slush'-with a sleet*«fllj 
snow -and rainJ falling; * the * fact that^tH| 
Reinhardt car went completely out of "con^ 
trol while traveling'from 20-to 30 r miles! 
per hour; one witness testified that 'as^he 
approached the scene of the accident ifrom 
the north he slowed his car down and :j)ut 
it in intermediate gear in order to insure 
that he could sufficiently control it*so{thjat 
he could safely-stop and pick up passejj^ 
gers; the rate,of speed at which thqjjus 
was traveling which the jury could^reason;; 
ably, find to be as _fast as 40 miles per hour; 
the slightly down hill slope of the highway; 
the if act
 xthat the* driver, ^according toxins 
own testimony saw the Reinhardt car when 
it commenced to turn and that thereafter, 
as the jury could reasonably find, he trav-
eled as far as 330 feet without applying 
HORSLEY v. 
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his brakes until within 5 or 10 feet of that 
car and without appreciably decreasing 
his speed prior to the impact therewith, 
point almost conclusively to-the fact that 
the driver did not have the bus under suffi-
cient control to bring it to a stop or to 
turn it to one side sufficiently to avoid the 
collision. The jury would be amply justi-
fied in so finding. 
Here the jury was only required to re-
turn a general verdict and we do not know 
how the jury determined the controlling 
questions of fact. Had the jury been re-
quired to answer special interrogatories 
covering these questions, and had they an-
swered them in the manner we have above 
indicated they reasonably could find from 
the evidence no one would contend that the 
evidence was not sufficient to sustain such 
a finding. Since the trial court is not re-
quired to submit special interrogatories and 
therefore we do not know how the jury in 
fact did determine the controlling issues we 
must presume that they found the facts 
necessary to support their verdict if the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain such a 
finding. Thus we must view the evidence 
in its most favorable aspect to support the 
verdict which the jury has rendered and if 
from the evidence the jury could reason-
ably find facts necessary to sustain their 
verdict it must be sustained. This is true, 
even though had we been the triers of the 
facts we would have found them differ-
ently, or even though we may not believe 
-that the jury did in fact so find or, even 
though we believe that such a finding /would 
be against the great preponderance-of the 
evidence. 
[1] Under a general verdict we cannot 
be assured what facts the jury found or 
that they found the facts necessary to sus-
tain their verdict. So it is universally held 
under the common law system, as it must be 
in order to give stability to jury verdicts, 
that the appellate court must sustain the 
verdict where the evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding of the necessary facts 
to do so. Otherwise, the appellate. court 
would be required to reverse every verdict 
where in its>ropinion the-great preponder-
ance of the evidence is against a finding of 
the necessary facts tov support it, - even 
though the evidence is such that reasonable 
ROBINSON Utah f>Q* 
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minds might conclude from the evidence 
that such necessary facts happened. To 
do so would be to review the evidence no 
matter what we call it.- The question of 
what were the facts and where is the pre-
ponderance of the evidence is for the jury 
and not for the court to determine. Our 
problem is only to determine whether there 
is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. 
In doing so our standard is : Could a rea-
sonable mind be convinced by the evidence 
of the necessary facts to support the ver-
dict? If so, it must be sustained. 
That this court is not authorized to re-
view the facts found by the jury is express-
ly provided by our Constitution, Article 8, 
Section 9, where it is provided "In cases at 
law the appeal shall be on questions of law 
alone." Since we cannot review the facts, 
whatever we think of where the preponder-
ance of the evidence is, is immaterial. If 
we were to review the evidence and reverse 
this case because we think the preponder-
ance of the evidence on a material issue is 
against the plaintiff, we do so in violation 
of that constitutional provision. We can-
not avoid violation of this constitutional 
provision by holding that since we have no 
assurance that the jury did find that the 
between distance was 330 feet, we may as-
sume that they found it to be much less 
and reverse the judgment on that ground; 
because this ' requires us first to find that 
the preponderance of the evidence is 
against the plaintiff on this question, and 
thus requires us to review the evidence 
for that purpose, which the Constitution 
forbids us tocdo. 
If the jury found the between distance 
was as far as 330 feet, that the bus was 
traveling as fast as 40 miles per hour and 
that the driver did not have sufficient con-
trol thereof so that he could stop or turn 
sufficiently to one side* so that he could 
avoid the accident within that distance, 
then under the existing circumstances the 
jury could reasonably find that he was guil-
ty of negligence which proximately caused 
the accident. 
The contention that the defendants were 
not negligent if the bus could not be stop-
ped within the between distance is based on 
,the assumption that the rate of speed at 
which the bus was traveling was reasonable 
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regardless of whether the-driver was able 
to control it under; the. existing condition's 
when traveling at such rate, and that. the 
question of how much control the driver 
could maintain over r.the bus at such; rate 
of i [speed • is -immaterial••.." in determining 
whether such-rate of speed is reasonable 
under the existing road conditions, r What 
is* a reasonable' rate of speed under exist-
ing conditions must always be determined 
very'largely oh how much control the driv-
er can maintain while driving at such rate. 
[2] The driver of a vehicle carrying 
passengers for hire, rowes: them a duty to 
operate his vehicle within such -rate of 
speed as a reasonably prudent person would 
operate under the existing'conditions. ^Un-
der those conditions an increase in speed 
would proportionately decrease the control 
of the operator over[ his vehicle, and in-
crease the danger to his passengers. Rea-
sonable prudence : requires that the~ driver 
shall not foreseeably expose his passen-
gers to danger of serious bodily harm. If 
the operator drove the bus-at such a fast 
rate of speed that he should realize that 
he could not have sufficient control •* there-
of to avoid serious danger to his passen-
gers under the ; existing road and weather 
conditions then he was negligent regardless 
of :hbw slowly' he must operate his Vehicle 
in order to assure1 reasonable" safety to' his 
passengers.-
[3] Where the road, and weather condi-
tions ;make^driving hazardous, .reasonable 
prucience requires .a. proportionate' increase 
in the care of the rdriver to avoid injury to 
his passengers;
 r. Np"rate.'of speed can be 
fixed"'which7'will vb'e Reasonable1- under all 
"Conditions' 'and . circumstance's. On a; clear 
dry road burdened with little traffic;;a per-
"soh could with;reas6narble prudence operate 
;al vehicle much faster ihah he • could when 
travelirig 'over l a ;high\vay covered1- with 
'slick ice on ; top of which; was slush 'while 
av:'sleet: of snow and 'rairi' was "falling, and 
where" the1 .'highway"vwas"'burdened with 
h'eivy traffic.' ':Th'e 'duty ; o i : the operator is 
to drive his vehicle at such a rate of speeci 
that he cari'-sufficiehtly( control the-same so 
that he does hot-fofeseekbly jeopardize-the 
safety^of-his passengers.. = Heiismhder-this 
duty -regardless" of '(the';, size i and weight f of 
his • vehicle 'arid. the -road and ^'weather con-
ditions. Where, the road and weather^ 
ditions are bad he must, in order-to^ay^ 
being negligent, reduce his- speedi to^ra] 
at which he" can operate it with reasonaS 
safety. 
Here we are only concerned with theadP 
fendants' duty-to their passengers nbf^ yrafjg 
their duty : to -th^ public generally nor^witi? 
their last clear chance duty-to ReiiiKa'fdl 
The. rules:above stated apply)to theypublS 
generally '•; and ••• especially - to;, .a passengif 
for hire, since^a carrier owes to itspassjet 
gers for hire -a" duty; to. exerciseifgrep 
care for .their safety than it.jOwes": to.'^ilB 
public generally.: . Paul:-v.;. Salt Lakey3tf l 
Ry.iGo., 30 Utah 41, 83 P. 563. '" 
The mere : 'happening of ithe'accidenfiffJH 
course does not prove that the .defendant 
were negligent. • Nor does the fact that>tnej 
rate of speed at which they A- travelers 
brought them at the scene of the acddaf | 
at the time that the Reinhardt car'-WenS 
out of control and into the course of travelj 
of the bus, because that is something;dial! 
they could not anticipate and guard against! 
That seems to be the point which is cleared^ 
up. by the cases of Whalen v. D u n b a r ^ ^ 
R.I. 136, 415 "A.; 718; and :0%lal leyi^ | 
Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, 77 ^ f l ^ 
582. - But • negligence may be inferred 
from facts and circumstances > whichv^^ 
cording to human experience tend to":shbta 
and from which reasonable minds m i g h t s 
convinced that in operating the bus as'dtf? 
did under: the •surrounding facts "'andi^ci; 
curiistances t h e defendants should have'f 
ticipated :that- : they were vendahgeringittfi 
-safety of : their' passengers. 
It is argued that on an icy highway^.,7 | a 
impossible to' 'drive: so as to; avoid 'the pipssi^ 
m 
bility; of all 'collisions,•";that the roadfanl 
-weather conditions might be such that '"ey£ 
at : 5 ,miles. per; hour.a bus of t h e . sizer£h,<| 
•weight of-this one might, slide 400 
.more: regardless -/of anything o t h e y t d d ^ S 
:could ido; about :it; r; Of coufse,;;if thisjj$§ 
• had;been: traveling,' at-the rate ;of 5j|mil& 
rper; hour the .collision with/the :Rein^ai3# 
Icar rwpuld not . have inj tired the plaintiffrbg3 
.'causer a t : that-.rate; the Lbu'sjpbeing $riy£!| 
-against a;smalhcar moving jnithe:same#ffi 
irectioh; would-:nqt create .;sufficient o j a r ' l ^ 
iinjure the -passengers.- - On the other{ha#3| 
cif the. conditions were such that,the; dri.^eg 
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could anticipate that if he drove at the 
rate of 5 miles per hour he would not be 
able to stop his bus within 100 feet and 
that he would thereby seriously jeopardize 
the safety of his passengers then it would 
be negligence for him to proceed at such 
rate of speed Suppose conditions were 
such that the driver could anticipate that if 
he moved at the rate of 5 miles per hour he 
would slide 100 feet before he could stop 
and that in so doing he would be apt to 
slide over the side of the highway and his 
bus would overturn or slide onto a railroad 
track where he would be struck by an ap-
proaching tram, would anyone contend that 
he could proceed even at that rate of speed 
without being guilty of negligence? 
[4] If the bus undei normal road and 
weather conditions wei e operated on a 
highway burdened with heavy traffic, at 
such an excessive rate of speed that it 
could not be stopped or turned to one side 
sufficiently to avoid crashing into another 
car which came into its course of travel 
when the bus was 330 feet away and con-
tinued slowly in the same direction the bus 
was traveling, the driver of the bus would 
clearly be guilty of negligence in driving 
too fast The defendants would also be 
negligent if they operated the bus under 
normal conditions with such defective 
steering and braking equipment, on a high-
way burdened with heavy traffic, so that it 
could not be stopped or steered to one side 
sufficiently to avoid a collision with a ve-
hicle which came into its course 330 ieet 
away in the manner that the Remhardt car 
did in this case Here the driver had driv-
en more than 20 miles under similar road 
and weather conditions which he encoun-
tered at the time of the accident He had 
ample time to fully realize the amount of 
control or lack thereof which he could 
exert over the bus in case of an emergency 
The driver must know that this highway 
Would be burdened with much traffic, he as 
a j reasonable prudent man must anticipate 
that vehicles would be constantly crossing 
and coming into his course of travel - Un-
der such conditions he must anticipate that 
*t would be highly dangerous for him to 
operate the bus at such a rate of}speed 
that he could not stop or turn to one side 
sufficiently to avoid a collision with the 
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Remhardt car if it came into his course 
of travel 330 feet away. The evidence was 
sufficient from which the jury could find 
the defendants were negligent 
To this effect, the law is well established 
in this state: Section 57—7—113, U.C.A. 
1943, provides: 
"(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on 
a highway at a speed greater than is rea-
sonable and prudent under the conditions 
and having regard to the actual and poten-
tial hazards then existing In every event 
speed shall be so controlled as may be nec-
essary to avoid colliding with any person, 
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entei-
mg the highway in compliance with legal 
requirements and the duty of all persons to 
use due care 
* * * * * 
"(c) The driver of every vehicle shall, 
* * * drive at an appropriate reduced 
speed * * * when special hazard ex-
ists with respect to pedestrians or other 
traffic or by reason of weather or highway 
conditions " 
This statute requires that a driver shall 
not drive at a speed greater than is reason-
able and prudent in view of the existing 
conditions and hazards on the highway, 
that his speed shall be controlled so as to 
avoid colliding with other vehicles enter-
ing or upon the highway in a lawful man-
ner, and that the speed shall be appropri-
ately reduced when special hazards exist 
with respect to other traffic or by reason of 
weather conditions In other woids, since 
the greater the speed the less control the 
driver has over his vehicle and a longer 
distance is required within which to stop, 
and his ability to guide his vehicle is de-
creased, and since his control will also be 
decreased when traveling on icy roads cov-
ered with slush when a sleet of snow and 
ram is falling, he must under such condi-
tions according to this statute decrease his 
speed so that he can drive- with reasonable 
safety to others using trie highway and, ac-
cording to our cases, he even owes greater 
care to his passengers' 
In Nikoleropoulos^v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 
465, 214 P. 304, the defendant was driving 
his car at night dunng Ja heavy ram storm 
at about 12 miles per hour, in the distance 
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the lights'of oncoming cars reflected on the 
wet pavement into his eyes so that at the 
time of the accident he was unable to see 
the plaintiff walking on the^ pavement in 
front of him until he was within 6 feet and 
then it was too late to avoid running him 
down. We held that defendant was negli-
gent as a matter of law, no matter how 
dark1 and stormy the night or how bad the 
visibility, if he drove at such a rate of 
speed that he was unable to avoid running 
plaintiff down within the distance plaintiff 
could be seen walking ahead of defendant's 
car on the highway. To the same effect 
see: Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Prod-
ucts Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309; Haar-
strich v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70 
Utah 552, 262 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston, 
61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791. 
The Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey case is in 
substance a holding that it is negligence to 
operate a vehicle on the highway at any 
time without having it under sufficient con-
trol so that others using the highway will 
not be unreasonably endangered thereby, 
regardless of how slow it is required to 
travel to accomplish that end. If that is 
the rule where visability is involved, it 
follows that the same rule applies where 
the ladk of control which endangers others 
is the result of slippery roads and stormy 
conditions. This would be especially true 
where a passenger for hire is involved. 
As above pointed out, if the lack of control 
which caused the danger 'to the passengers 
was the result of excessije speed; or defec-
tive steering~apparatus and faulty brakes, 
then he would clearly be negligent. Under 
the above case the fact that the lack of con-
trol was the result of bad weather and 
road conditions, would not exonerate him 
from negligence. 
Here the situation is slightly different 
than it was in the cases cited in that the 
Reinhardt car was out of control and mov-
ing from one side to the other in an uncer-
tain manner. Under such circumstances a 
driver might try to pass to one side only to 
have the skiding'car swerve into his path 
which he expected to be free. However, 
here as in the cases'cited, the driver could 
be certain to avoid the collision by stopping 
the bus before it reached the skidding car. 
Jsm 
Since the car was traveling away frornltliS 
bus had the bus been stopped, no-collisr 
could "have > occurred. There is also ajfc] 
difference that in the cases cited, the^dri^ 
was traveling at nighttime, when the:drr 
er's ability to see objects on the highw^B 
was limited by darkness, and here there wa|» 
no such limitation on the driver's fabili|ja 
to see. Since his ability to see was not? 
limited, his duty to keep his car under corg| 
trol on that account was not so grea't.Kfclql 
view of these circumstances the driver £wi 
not, as a matter of law, guilty ofonegl. 
gence, which proximately caused the "a&|J 
dent. But in view of the fact that the^j 
might have concluded that the car^con 
menced to turn into the path of theribSS 
when it was 330 feet away, and thatrtnl 
weather conditions were such that, at^thil 
rate of speed the bus was traveling it cc^lol 
not be stopped, slowed down, or broughp 
under control in time to avoid the accidentia 
the jury could reasonably conclude frorf8 
their own experience and practical judg 
ment, of what an ordinary prudent persoSI 
would do, that the driver was negligent*--^ 
driving at such a rate of speed, and thai 
such negligence was the proximate ,causfe 
of the accident.
 > •> *5 
If the jury found that when the Rein 
hardt car commenced to turn into the pat1 
of the bus, it was as much as 330 feet awa: 
it being clear from the evidence that (tig 
visibility • was such and the highwayViw 
free from obstructions so that the 'drivS 
could clearly see the car when it coma 
menced to turn; that the slippery condition 
of the highway had been the same' all tU9 
way from Hill Field to the place of the # 
cident a distance of more than 20 mile 
thus giving the driver ample opportunity*t(9 
know how fast he could safely drive*and] 
still keep it under proper control; thatitfijg 
accident occurred on a main highway 
where the driver must anticipate iheayjg 
traffic conditions; and in view of; theca l 
that the transportation company bwedtcf i' 
passengers a special degree of careitfqj 
their safety, the jury might reasonably cotfj 
elude that the driver was operating the buj 
at such a fast rate of speed that he coulS 
not control it sufficiently to avoid the &cci| 
dent. If the jury so found they could relfe 
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Sbhably conclude therefrom that he was 
guilty of negligence which proximately 
caused the^accident and plaintiff's injury. 
This is a finding of negligence' from the 
surrounding * facts and circumstances and 
not merely from the happening of the acci-
dent alone. It is universally recognized 
that negligence may be inferred from' the 
happening of the accident and the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances where 
the facts are such as to reasonably justify 
such inference even though there is no di-
rect testimony to establish the exact 
grounds of negligence which caused ^the 
accident* Green v. Higbee, '66 "Utah' 539, 
244 P. 906; Morrison v. PefryJ 104'Utah 
*151, 140 P.2d 772; which is the last opinion 
in that case which supercedes the one cited 
In appellant's brief. 
[5] The defendants' negligence is based, 
not on the premise that the driver could 
nave stopped within the between distance, 
jbut on the opposite premise that by reason 
of excessive speed under the existing con-
ditions he could not stop within that dis-
tance, and has thereby foreseeably endan-
gered his passengers.
 r Evidence of the dis-
tance required to stop the bus at various 
rates of speed would be necessary only 
where it supplies proof of some essential 
element of negligence which would other-
wise be lacking. Here the essential ele-
ments necessary to establish negligence on 
.account of lack of a due care rate of speed 
requires a, showing that the buY was being 
'6perate"d a tSuc l r a^a s t rate of speed that 
the driver should have realized that^it was 
fcut of control to such an extent as to en-
danger the sa-fety of his passengers/ ' ;Evi-
dence of the distance required to stop the 
"bus at various rates of speed would tend 
to show either that the driver did or that 
'he did not have the ability to stop the bus 
within the ' in between distance. If it 
establish one of the necessary elements of 
this type of negligence, .but, as previously 
pointed out,'that element was amply shown 
by the evidence which was introduced. No 
complaint is made that such fact was not 
sufficiently; established. The complaint 
seems to be that such fact was established 
and that the defendants were thereby ex-
onerated from neglignce. 
A comparison with other distances will 
help us to visualize how far 330 feet is. It 
is 110 yards, one-half of a Salt Lake City 
block, one-sixteenth of a mile, nearly four 
times the;distance between the poles of an 
ordinary utility pole line. These distances 
are familiar to every one who has lived a 
long time in this state. It is <a long and 
dangerous distance for a bus to travel on 
a highway burdened with traffic wilhout the 
ability to stop or reduce its speed sufficient-
ly to avoid a collision such as this.. 
The distance within which the bus could 
be stopped at a given rate of speed is an 
evidentiary fact and not an ultimate one. 
The value of evidence thereon would be 
that the ultimate facts which are control-
ling in this case might be inferred there-
from. That fact would have some bearing 
on the^ question of what was a due care 
rate of speed but it certainly is not control-
ling on that question. ^ , t 
Here, "as above pointed out, there are 
three sets of facts which were very largely 
.'determinative of what was not a due care 
.speedmnder the existing conditions. They 
are:r . (1) How far was .the between dis-
tance ?jil (2) How/fast was the bus travel-
ing: J .(3) .Did .the driver have sufficient 
control over the bus so that his speed was 
a due care speed? . Both of the first two 
questions were answered by direct evi-
dence, and the question of the distance re-
quired to stop the ;bus when 'traveling at 
various (speeds would have no bearing on 
showed that "'the rdriver could stop the 'bus ^either-of them. That evidence would only 
"within the between distance then it would 
'defeat-a .claim of negligence on this theory, 
"but would 'conclusively establish negligence 
on the" grounds that''had he. used due, care 
he would Jiave stopped the bus within that 
distance and thereby avoided the ^accident. 
^If it showed that the driver could not stop 
*the bus within that distance then it would 
tend *to^ show whether or-not the bus was 
out of control. ;Here~the evidence is ample 
to show that the bus was out of control, so 
that it, could not be stopped or its speed 
reducedesufficiently .to avoid the accident. 
Such-, evidence was not necessary in order 
>for plaintiff to make a prima facie case, 
and this court is not authorized to require 
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the qlaiatift to grodace it Especially is 
this true where as 'here the missing evi-
dence has no tendency to establish 'the dis-
puted questions of-fact in the case. 
Although the smoother the road surface 
the greater the distance required'to stop tlie 
bus at a given speed it does not follow that 
a driver can, without being negligent, drive 
at such a rate of speed over a smooth road 
that the safety of his passengers will t>e 
thereby jeopardized. What is due care un-
der the existing conditions is determined 
by the driver's duty to his passengers, arid 
that-duty is that he must not foreseeably 
jeopardize their safety; he f has that duty 
whether driving over a smooth icy road or 
over a normal dry pavement. To this effect 
the statute and cases cited are positive. 
The evidence here was sufficient since tlie 
jury could reasonably find that the bus w#s 
traveling at 40 miles per hour, that tlie 
between distance was 330 feet &nd that tpe 
bus was out of control so that it could not 
be stopped or its speed reduced sufficiently 
to avoid this accident within that distance. 
It must be kept in mind that here our 
problem is whether the evidence is sufficient 
to sustain the verdict, not whether the evi-
dence in question is admissible. Had de-
fendants offered to prove the distance 
which would be required to stop the bus 
under the surrounding circumstances at a 
given rate of speed and such offer had b^en 
rejected we would haveihad a different 
'problem. Since the "evidence was sufficient 
to make'a prima faciei case for plaintiff it 
is sufficient to sustains verdict in her^fav^r 
and that is all we can require 'her to^do. 
She is not required to "produce evidence 
which will tend to defeat <her -claim.. If 
there are other material facts which de-
fendants wanted to prove they were at 
liberty to introduce 'evidence 'thereof but 
they certainly cannot defeat plaintiffs 
claim merely on the ground that she 'has 
failed to produce all the material evidence. 
This is especially true where i as here the 
defndants are in a better position to supply 
the- missing evidence than', isJplaintiff. 
They, no doubt, have :as their employees 
many experienced drivers of buses similar 
to this one whom they, could Tcall to give 
evidence on the distance ^required to '"stop 
the bus under the then existing conditions 
and the driver who was then operatih*g£j$M 
bus at the ' t ime of this accident:washing 
better position to know these facts^fctiH 
any
 r one else. 
We have carefully considered .th&tfljjigg 
assignments of error and find nOjmerijKH| 
them. The judgment of the trial,cWrifjf 
affirmed with costs to the respondent 
' McDONOUGH, C. J., concurs iff tfiS 
opinion of Mr. Justice W A D E as elucidali 
ed by the opinion of Mr. Justice W O I £ K 1 | 
WOLFE, Justice (concurring). 
I concur. 
While there is much in the reasoning1 
the main opinion with which I am in^i' 
cord, there are a number of statements ]vvifi 
which I do not agree. Rather than entej 
into a critical analysis of those stateme*fii 
pointing- out wherein I think they are^r 
correct, I believe a more constructive5^ 
tribution can be made by an elucidation^ 
some of the concepts applicable to 'sp$ 
cases and in pointing out the peculiar *nL| 
ture of the bus driver's responsibilities^!! 
his passengers in view of the sitii 
which confronted him—that is, the su^ej 
and unexpected sliding of the Reinliarl 
car athwart the right of way of the'bui., 
as compared to the duty of the driverfge] 
erally to drive at a due care speed when 3 
emergency confronted him. 
, LshaH preface the main part of my»gginj 
ion by a^  brief .consideration of the .pfirr" 
"control of a car", or its equivalents^ 
under ^control", and its ^counterpart^ 'gL 
ofy control". I am convinced after ^som^ 
years in the practice and on the bench \thaj 
these phrases are often used without* su: 
cient thought as to their conceptionalpCoJ 
tent in view of the facts of the particul; 
situations .claimed to involve negligence^ 
- > Ordinarily the word "control" applied 
the -operation of a moving mechanica l j j^ 
ject such as a car when used in thejptirlj | | 
"under control" as distinguished f rom^ 'c | | 
ofo control", means tha t ' the operator W& 
^the .power to make the car respond totfiij 
"will -which in the case of an automobile 
•means that it-will respond .to his steering 
. and to his action to accelerate or decelej£#J 
by manipulating the throttle or brakes 
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''Out of control" usually means'that the car 
can no longer be depended upon to respond 
to the driver's efforts to guide or slow it. 
I go to some pains to describe these terms 
because I think that they are often used in 
a different and perhaps inexact sense. 
"Out of control" is the opposite of "under 
control" butTexcess speed is not the counter-
part of "under control".1 r Cars "going .at 
high speed may be under control in the 
sense that they are not out of control. We 
have an excellent example of a car "out of 
control" in the movements of the Reinhardt 
car. In many cases a pleader will use the 
phrase "failed to have proper control of 
the car" as meaning that the driver was go-
ing so fast as not to be able rto slow down 
for eventualities although there was no in-
ability of the driver to steer the car, apply 
brakes or decelerate the car. The only 
reason he could not do so in time to avoid 
an accident was that he was going too fast. 
Such allegation is synonymous with "excess 
speed" which in turn may be included in the 
still more inclusive phrase "driving without 
due care under the circumstances" or 
equivalent phrases. The'pleader tends to 
multiply stigmata of delict in order to make 
defendant's conduct seem *as reprehensible 
as possible. For the purpose of framing is-
sues it is well to particularize as to the na-
ture of the failure to exercise due care. In 
this case'also we must fasten on what we 
mean when we use the phrases "under con-
trol" and "out }6i"control". 
In his opinion Mr. Justice Wade states 
definitely^ that he ruses the-word "control" 
to "mean the.rability of the^ driver to 'Stop 
or reduce the speed of his vehicle within a 
reasonable distance and to guide the same 
in the desired course". I , take this to be 
somewhat equivalent to what I shall call 
"due care speed", which I define as the 
speed which a driver should not exceed, in 
view.of the likelihood of, eventualities—not 
to avoid all collisions which no driver could 
do—but to enhance the , possibility and 
probability of avoiding collisions. "Due 
care speed" is rthat- speed at which a pru-
dent and careful driver should drive in 
view of the1 prevailing weather and road 
conditions, and in view of the condition and 
responsiveness of the braking apparatus 
186 P.2d—3Sy2 
on his machine and hh duty to passengers, 
and to other traffic on the highway. 
It should be said at the outset that I do 
not -wish to be 'understood as saying that 
the jury-rnust necessarily fix upon a speed 
that would be a maximum due'care speed 
under a given<set of circumstances. 'The 
speed at which a person 'was r going might 
be considered as "too fast"1—to use the pop-^ 
ular vernacular—without the jury having 
to consult and agree or even have in mind 
a process or definite figure as being /the up-
per limit of due care speed. 
Therefore, in order not to'confuse speed 
with "control" used in the sense of ability 
to manipulate the car, I shall use instead" 
of the word "control", the phrase "due care 
speed" and shall use the term "excess 
speed", to mean speed in excess of due care 
speed. Speed seems, even under Mr. Jus-
tice Wade's interpretation of the word 
"control", to be the essence of "keeping 
control" or of "control" although at one 
place in his opinion he seems to confuse 
the meaning with "out of control". 
[5] In this case both sides introduced 
testimony as to the rate of speed at which' 
the bus was travelling at the time the Rein-
hardt car went out of control and skidded 
into its path. Both' sides also presented 
testimony as to the distance between the 
bus and the Reinhardt car at the time the 
Reinhardt' car went out of control. This 
distance is hereinafter "referred vto as the 
r
 r 
"between
 t distance". 'Tn-addition*} to this, 
there was some' evidence of circumstances 
surrounding'the collision-from which infer-' 
ehces of 'speed might ' have been Imade. 
Neither side offered evidence of the dis-} 
tances which would be requiredr i t o ' stop' 
the bus, travelling at various speeds, under 
the road and weather conditions prevail-
ing at the t ime'of the • collision. * I shall 
hereafter refer to such disiances as "stop-
ping distances". ' Appellant contends that 
the failure of plaintiff to introduce" such 
evidence amounts1 to a-failure of proof. 
Appellant's position is'>that"without"such 
evidence the jury could hot determine what 
was a reasonable speed, and therefore could 
not say whether -or- not the 'bus was trav-
elling at an excessive speed. This ques-
tion is fraught with considerable difficulty. 
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As background, and for better under-
standing oi the problem involved, I be-, 
lieve it would be helpful first to'Consider 
the duty of the bus driver to Reinhardt. 
His duty in this respect would be, purely 
one of last clear chance. Even if,he were 
travelling too rapidly in view of -Jthe skid-
ding hazards his speed would not have been 
the proximate cause of the accident. His , 
duty..would arise only when he perceived 
or should have perceived the Reinhardt 
car spinning toward his path and then it 
would have been his duty to avoid the c o l -
lision if, and only if, under all the circum-
stances, taking into account the
 4speed s± 
which he was going, he had had ample op-* 
portunity to stop or slow up sufficiently to 
go around the Reinhardt car if there was 
room for doing that without endangering 
his passengers. A driver is not ordinarily 
required to anticipate that another will 
have gotten out of his proper path of trav-
el and that he, the driver, must drive so as 
to create for some other a last clear chance 
opportunity. A driver of a car does not 
carry with him an anticipatory last clear 
chance obligation. Such obligation arises 
only after the operator of the vehicle is 
or should be aware of the position of the 
other, who, being in a position of danger, is 
unaware of his peril, or, if aware, unable 
timely to extricate himself from it. Gra-
h a m s . Johnson, Utah, 166 P.2d 230; on re-
hearing, 172 P.2d 665. Nor would he be 
compelled to apply his brakes suddenly on 
an^icy pavement if
 t there were danger of 
his skidding off the road by so doing. The, 
high care with which ~he was charged as 
operator of a^ public transport .vehicle at 
the moment of discovery might require 
that he xelease the throttle and let the mo-, 
mentum of the car in part deplete itself 
before he applied the brakes.
 4That might 
also have been the best thing to have done 
for^the safety of his passengers - even in 
this case. Or conditions may have been 
such that; a --due *care _speed would^ be one 
in which he had 'not gathered momentum 
and therefore .could apply-his brakes, in-
stantaneously. * Due care speed^may revolve 
around the time it takes to run out momen-
tum before brakes can be applied with safe-
ty. The difference between the case,of the 
bus driver's duty toward Reinhardt and the 
passengers lies then in this: That as^ta 
Reinhardt, whose car suddenly spun in }ps* 
path, the bus driver's speed cannot be ithen 
proximate cause of the accident (laying] 
aside the case where the oncoming driver^ 
was going in excess of the legal speed, a* 
case which I desire to reserve until it comejfi 
before us properly for consideration), buS 
only failure to take advantage of the oppor-c 
tunity to avoid the collision if it reasonably^ 
presented itself, taking into account thebuV 
driver's speed; whilst as to passengers thh 
bus driver has the duty to drive with :thej 
care that a reasonably prudent person would 
have exercised under like circumstances^ 
and that means a due-care speed in view of-
slippery pavements and eventualities whjchj 
may arise therefrom. As to passengers, if* 
the driver exceeds a due-care speed he carp 
ries such negligence with him although
 Liti 
may or may not have proximately caused, 
an accident. In many instances, negligence^ 
does not result in accidents. As to Reinp 
hardt, the duty arose only after the bus 
driver did or could have seen Reinhardt's 
predicament. Reinhardt could not contend"' 
that had the bus driver been-going slower: 
there would have been more distance with^ 
in which to stop, for by the same token* 
had the driver been going faster he might 
have passed the point where Reinhardt, 
spun onto his pathway before the spin bej* 
gan.
 t No person who gets himself intq'aj 
dangerous position whether by negligences 
or without fault can contend that, had .the* 
on coming party been going slower, nel 
would have *had 'a greater last clear chaifce^ 
to stop. The1 last clear chance "duty is'one* 
which arises out of the scene as ther de1-^  
fendant finds i t ; it does not take into^ac-^ 
count antecedent conditions. If it did"th'e^ 
plaintiff might argue that "had the defend^ 
ant been proceeding at a due-care speed;tfie| 
would even have arrived at the scen£*w 
danger before he, the plaintiff, extricated^ 
himself from such danger *and thus argttfj 
that in 'such wise the excessive * speed 'wa^ 
the proximate cause. 
[2,3] But, as to, a»passenger in thejbu | | 
the last jdear chance doctrine is not appli^ 
cable as a last-clear chance concept. There | 
would be the same obligation as in the. lasg 
clear chance doctrine to do everything
 gto* 
avoid the accident consistent with safetyi 
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toward his passengers but that would be in pable failure to follow the court's instruc-
addition to the continuing duty to drive 
i t i a due care speed in view of possible 
eventualities and before they arose, and 
.would therefore be a part of the bus driv-
er's duty toward his passengers. The duty 
Upward such passengers 1$ to exercise con-
tinuous high care that they be not injured 
by the driving. And that means that the 
driver must drive as a prudent person 
would drive in view of his duty toward 
passengers, which I have designated for 
Shortness "due care driving", or "due care 
^peed". This means that the speed must 
be adapted to the hazards such as ice, snow, 
traffic and the like and, to an extent, to 
"the likelihood of eventualities. Of course, 
no one can drive on an icy day so as to 
avoid all possible collisions. The Rein-
'hardt car might have skidded directly in 
front of or even into the Side of the bus no 
matter how slowly it was going, or even if 
it were stopped. Consequently, the colli-
sion itself does not prove excess speed. 
Such conclusion must cojne from the evi-
dence or from inferences from other facts, 
although by taking into consideration 
such other facts the fact of the collision, 
or the force of it, may themselves be facts 
from which, in view of the total picture, 
inferences could be made, 
When a car, through loss^of control or 
ottier reason, suddenly and~ unexpectedly 
spins away from its side of the highway in-
tions. I " think it unnecessary to bring 
those matters into this case. 
Returning now to the real problem of the 
case, I think it may be analyzed by break-
ing it into two parts. I shall first consider 
the sufficiency of the evidence of between 
distances to prove excess of due care speed. 
I shall then consider the direct testimony 
of speed, and whether or not it is sufficient 
to justify an inference of excess speed. 
There must be some minimum between 
distance, which is so great that all reason-
able minds would conclude that if a ve-
hicle were proceeding along the "highway 
at so great a speed that it could not be 
stopped within such distance, then such ve-
hicle was travelling at an excess of due 
care speed. I shall call this distance x. 
Let us assume that the between distance is 
one mile. All reasonable minds would con-
clude that a bus that could not be stopped 
within one mile was being driven at an ex-
cess of due care speed. One mile is either 
x distance or x plus. 
There must also be some maximum be-
tween distance so short that all reasonable 
minds must conclude that a vehicle travel-
ling at a due care speed would not be able 
to stop within such distance. I shall call 
this distance y. Let us assume that the be-
tween distance is 10 feet. All reasonable 
"minds would say that a bus travelling at 
maximum due care speed could not stop 
Perhaps these concepts can be ^better ^ex-
plained by a simple illustration. 
M "N 
to1 the pathway of another vehicle coming ^ ^
 s u c h d i s t a n c e > T e n f e e t i s e i t h e V y 
from the opposite direction, we rrn^L ^ _ d l s t a n c e £ r y m i n u s . 
careful not to load onto the driver of the 
other vehicle, even as to a passenger, the 
duty to avoid the danger of the spinning 
car unless there is some negligence on the 
part of the driver of the vehicle remaining 
on its own right of way, which negligence 
proximately caused.the. iasuxy to the oa.s-
Venger. 
[1] It is conceded that it is the duty of 
*he appellate court to sustain a verdict 
where there is substantial evidence to sup-
port it. I shall not enter into the matter 
of the appellate court's duty when the evi-
dence is claimed to preponderate so plam-
1) against the verdict as to show an abuse 
of discretion in the trial court m refusing 
to set the verdict aside as arrived at arbi-
Let the line M N represent the highway. 
The bus is travelling from M toward N. 
From point A to point Y is y distance. 
JFrom point A to point X is x distance. P 
represents any point between Y and X and 
p is the distance from A to P. Thus P 
represents every point between Y and X, 
and p represents every distance greater 
than y and less than x. When the bus ar-
rives at point A, the Remhardt car skids 
tranly or through bias or prejudice or pal- onto the west side of the highway into the 
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path .of ^the bus. If iwhenrtheiibus -is-at 
point A; the. Reinhardt b a n d s ' rat point -X 
or at any point beyond X;-the bus;if travel-
ling at a due care, speed, can-be stopped in 
time,.to,.avoid collision. I f .the.jbus jcannot 
be stopped :in time to avoid-the collision,, all 
reasonable minds will agree that :it;-is-Irav-
ejling at - excess of, due care, speed. 
If-when'the-bus is at point A, the Rein-
hafdt' ca rds atrpoint P, reasonable minds 
may differ as to whether or tfiot a bus" trav-
elling
 :at due care speed would .-.-be- able to 
stop in time to avoid the collision. In 
other words, reasonaable minds may dif-
fer/: as to whether or not a bus .7trayel-
lingr.at aljdue care speed, would-\be- able to 
stop "within distance p, or stated. conversely, 
whether:..or not a bus unable; to stop with-
in the distance p was travelling at a due 
care .speed.;. The closer P; is to X, or the 
more closely p approximates x; the |greater 
the number of reasonable minds. which 
would conclude that a bus not able to stop 
within p;was travelling at an excess speed; 
and conversely the nearer P is to Y, or the 
more closely that p approximates ...y, the 
fewer the reasonable.minds that v^ould con-
clude that because a bus , was not. able to 
stop. within p it was travelling, at an ex-
cess of due care speed.. 
- -If:wherijthe.,bus isjat-point A,:the[Rein-
hardt -car is at point;.Y^pryany -point .be-
tween ;:A- and -Y; if the]bus:.is;,travelling:at 
t h e maximum, due.;-carer.speed,\ all-reason-
able;! minds- will i agree.;-.that [the jbus.i"could 
not stop in'time to avoid:Ithe/collision.;^;A 
bus ^travelling. .at? less f: than. ..the ^maximum 
due care speed ;might:; bey able:to stop;with-
in y distance, and of course, it would be 
the duty-of the driver to stojTif possible. 
A: failure to stop under such circumstances 
would make the operator of the bus liable 
—*not"because"he"was "negligent"in" travel-
ling r in : excess - of. due care'' speed—but,Ibe-
cause ;;hej failedoto utilizes the.»last' clear 
chancerto/ avoid the\collision. 
'i' With-jthese" 'conceptsqin1 mind; "> I *rthink 
certain%erieral>rules' can'be:laid^rdbwn!-as 
regards the iiecessity"\)fi'4ntroducing^evr-
dence; >ofr the Various 'distances"' required to 
stop'*;a vehicle-travelling: at*different: rate's 
of speed 'under 'the conditions"' 'prevailing ?at 
the time ofUhe* Collision.. A These rules- are 
intended'to apply only where^th'e^plaintiff 
introduces no direct evidence of soeSffl 
but -leaves, speed to ibe inferred by ~the|#jflB 
from the - evidence :of- betweeniidist^ntai 
alone. 
(a) Where the evidence is concliiafoig 
that the between distance was x jor3greaj 
than x," evidence " ofJ stopping :jlii£tai 
would be immaterial/ The 'defendant*,; 
travelling at -aii: excess speed :as%^1nai 
of law. 
(b) Where, the evidence is concjusl^gi 
that "'the*, between distance was;y..rp"r* 
than y, defendant is entitled to^'aife 
verdict, since.he would not be able to,ay! 
the accident' * even though'traveiling tl |H 
due"" care speecL.'.' "From' this V bet^eep^d: 
tan'ce alone, no reasonable mind couia.inj 
excess of due care speed, arid .thereiS 
there would be no evidence of excess spe© 
to go to the jury'. 
(c) Where the evidence adduced b^ 
plaintiff tends to show that the hetw^eeB] 
distance was x or greater, and the {evM 
dence adduced by defendant tends to sho^ 
that the between distance w a S/ . ,P /^ t | 
burden is on . defendant to shpw.^tl: 
stopping distances. -. -The .reason -ifpr^m 
rule i s : Plaintiff, haying •_ produced KeyS 
dence that the .between; distance
 rw^«? 
or greater has pu t in proof,: whichjif^tu 
contradicted, entitles him.to a directed tier* 
diet (absent contributory negligence). iJT~ 
ieridarit by adducing, evidence that thei 
-?:•: •-/;•-;;•• rJi v.n- n> :jf>!? ?.H mov .*n;vrr m, 
tween distance was.p has not completehp 
butted plaintiff s proof,-since reasonaj 
minds might conclude that .even witnmiaig 
•{::• xo VJ?.VI.J ^ J o:;;v i^ol o' ton unsnm 
tance p a bus travelling: at due •care^speg" 
c6uld.be stopped. Iriother-wordsTinori:" 
.to completely, rebut plaintiff's 'evidencekq; 
.fendant W s t Jriot Jonly .'show that ^the&b' 
•'tween;'^distance was' less ^a^ '^x^V- ' e^p] 
"but also" that 'a bus"'traveiling at'.a'ciue carfe 
-v.^.: :-:<; <,:, 'run 7: t-u: DVZ'T.°:J. ••^Ji^r/io^m 
speed could not: be stopped -within distancr 
p. This does not mean that if defend; 
-fails-to ofterrevidence' ot^stopping^distan^ 
-that i plaintiffs is' : entitled ^to^ a ^directed ^!^ 
diet. aWhatU'do mean is:that-defendahtfp 
•"Slimes the risk of ^failure ko 'produce slic 
e videricef-ah'd Ai f * -the'^  ;j ury:^-firids-ifor^plaiSS 
tiffi^defendant'^cahhbt'ot^ 
'pf obf is- insufficient^ -A^di'of course;^liere 
"defendant ^offers-proof that the betA^eeri^dlS 
"tance^was p,'r but fails* to offer probf of ' tn i 
stopping distances; plaintiff'may "on^ 'buS 
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tal show the stopping distances to prove greater, or at y or less, w^ll the case be 
that a bus driven at a due care speed would 
be able to stop within distance p. In short, 
either party may offer evidence of the shop-
ping distances, but neither may complain 
that the other failed to produce such proof. 
(d) Where the evidence adduced by both 
parties is that the between distance was p, 
either party may introduce evidence of the 
stopping distances, but neither is bound to 
do so. Plaintiff may offer such evidence 
to show that a bus driven at a due care 
speed could be stopped within p, or defend-
ant may offer such evidence to show that 
a bus driven at due care speed could not 
be stopped within distance p. However, in 
the event of an adverse verdict neither can 
complain that the other failed to offer the 
requisite proof, 
(e) Where plaintiff's evidence shows that 
the between distance was p, and defend-
ant's evidence shows that the between dis-
tance was y, the risk of failure to provide 
evidence of stopping distances is on plain-
tiff, but failure to furnish this evidence is 
not failure of proof, and plaintiff is en-
titled to go to the jury. And, of course, 
defendant may offer evidence of stopping 
distances as rebuttal to plaintiff's evidence. 
This is the converse of rule (c). 
(f) Where plaintiff's evidence is that 
the between distance was x, or greater, and 
defendant's evidence is that the between 
distance was y, or less, either party may, 
but neither party must, produce evidence 
of the stopping distances. 
Other situations may be conceived where 
some of plaintiff's witnesses put the be-
tween distance at x or greater, while others 
put it at p, and where some of defendants' 
witnesses put the between distance at y 
or less, and others put it at p. Without 
segregating all of the possible combinations 
of evidence, I think it may be said that in 
these cases either party may offer evidence 
of the stopping distances, but neither is 
bound to do so. 
Summarizing briefly, there is no situation 
in which the failure of either party to 
prove stopping distances will be so fatal 
to his case as to take it from the jury. 
Only where the evidence conclusively es- tance range, 
tabhshes the between distance as x or mates would 
taken from the jury. In all other situa-
tions there is sufficient evidence to go to 
the jury. Either party may offer evidence 
of stopping distances, either in support of 
his case in chief, or in rebuttal to the evi-
dence of the adverse party. In most cases 
it will be advantageous for one side or the 
other to offer such evidence. But if both 
sides neglect to offer such evidence, neither 
can complain that the other failed to do so. 
I think we may analyze speed in the same 
manner as we have analyzed between dis-
tance. Let r represent the minimum rate 
of speed which all reasonable minds will 
agree is in excess of due care speed under 
prevailing conditions. Let s represent the 
maximum rate of speed which all reason-
able minds will agree is a due care speed 
under prevailing conditions. And let k 
represent all speeds between s and r. Rea-
sonable minds would differ as to whether a 
bus travelling at k speed was at due care 
or excess speed. We may now parallel 
rules (a) to (f) announced above. Where 
the evidence is undisputed that the bus was 
travelling at r speed or greater, or at s 
speed or less, evidence of stopping dis-
tances would be of no value since excess 
of due care speed, or due care speed would 
be proved as a matter of law by direct evi-
dence of speed. But where the evidence 
shows that the bus was travelling at k 
speed, or where there is a conflict in evi-
dence as to whether the bus was travel-
ling at r speed, k speed, or s speed, evi-
dence of stopping distances may be intro-
duced by either party, either in support of 
his case in chief or in rebuttal of the evi-
dence produced by the other side. But nei-
ther party has the duty to offer such evi-
dence, and neither can complain, in the 
event of an adverse verdict, that the other 
party failed to prove his case. 
As heretofore noted, in this case, as in 
most cases, there was evidence both of be-
tween distances and speed. The evidence 
of speed varied from 25 to 50 miles per 
hour. The evidence of between distance 
varied from 30 to 330 feet. 
Most, if not all, of the between distances 
testified- to would fall within the p dis-
Whether the extreme esti-
fall within the x or y dis-
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tances is a question which I think we need 
not now determine There was substantial 
evidence that the between distance was p, 
and from this the jury could infer that the 
bus was travelling at an excess speed If 
a bus travelling at an extremely or moder-
ately slow rate of speed could not be stop-
ped within the between distances testified 
to, then defendants ought to have come for-
ward with proof to that effect Not having 
done so, they cannot now complain that 
there was not sufficient evidence of excess 
of due care speed 
As to the evidence of speed, I think that 
the jury might have concluded that even 
the minimum speed testified to—25 miles 
per hour—was an excess of due care speed, 
considering the weight of the bus and the 
stored energy such a heavy vehicle would 
have going at a speed of 25 miles an hour 
and the adverse road and weather condi-
tions prevailing at the time of the colli-
sion Here again, defendant cannot com-
plain that plaintiff did not produce evidence 
of stopping distances Defendant could 
have come forward with evidence that a 
bus travelling at 25 miles per hour could 
be stopped m a relatively short distance 
under the conditions then prevailing, if 
such were the fact Having failed to do 
so, he cannot now complain that plaintiff 
as failed to prove his case 
[4] I conclude that there was both di-
rect evidence of speed and evidence of be-
tween distance from which a jury could 
infer that the bus was travelling at excess 
speed In addition to this, there was the 
further evidence that after the bus struck 
the Reinhardt car if. struck a parked auto-
mobile and then careened across the road, 
and finally came to rest at a point about 75 
feet from the parked automobile This was 
an additional circumstance from which a 
jury might infer that the bus was travelling 
at an excessive speed 
For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
PRATT, Justice (dissenting) 
In dissenting I'm going to write the case 
as I view it in its details 
The pertinent facts are these: The 
plaintiff was a passenger for hire on a bus 
operated by the defendant, Utah Transpor-
tation Company On the day of the ac-
cident plaintiff boarded the defendant's bus 
at Hill Field, Utah, her place of employ-
ment, for the purpose of being transported 
to Salt Lake City She took a seat on the 
left side of the defendant's bus about three 
rows behind the driver The bus left Hill 
Field at approximately 4 20 p m It was 
snowing and raining at the time and the 
highway along which the bus proceeded 
was covered with slush and ice It was .a 
four lane highway each lane being 10 feet 
wide, and it was paved The road shoul-
ders were about 13 feet wide, but cut down 
considerable by snow banks The bus 
while proceeding south in the outside traf-
fic lane on the west side of the highway 
about 1,800 feet north of the Salt Lake 
County line ran into the right rear of the 
defendant Remhardt's automobile Just 
prior to the collision defendant, Reinhardt, 
had been driving his automobile north 
about 20 or 30 miles per hour on the high-
way in the lane of traffic next to the cen-
ter line on the east side of the highway 
For some unexplained reason his car went 
into a spin and spun from the east side of 
the highway into the outside lane on the 
west side and directly into the path of the 
defendant, Utah Transportation Company's 
oncoming bus Remhardt's car was facing 
in a southeasterly direction and still mov-
ing at the moment of impact. I t was 
knocked down the highway some 30 to 50 
feet before it came to rest After the first 
impact with Remhardt's car the bus ran 
into another automobile which was parked 
on the west shoulder of the highway be-
fore being brought to a fullcstop tat a point 
about 75 feet from where it hit the parked 
automobile The bus weighed 7,000 pounds, 
had a 186 inch wheel base, and was 6 feet 
10 inches wide. Its capacity was 33 per-
sons 
It was in the first impact with the de-
fendant Remhardt's car that the plaintiff 
received her injury. 
There is considerable variance in the 
evidence presented as to how far the com-
pany's bus was from Remhardt's car when 
the latter was spinning toward the west 
side of the road and into the path of the 
bus, and also as to the speed of the bus at 
that time The defendant Reinhardt, who 
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was called as a witness for the plaintiff es- evidence just how the defendant could have 
timated the distance to be about 300 feet. 
The bus driver estimated the distance to be 
between 75 and 100 feet. Five passengers 
testified that they saw the Reinhardt car 
prior to the impact and their estimates 
ranged from 150 to 90 feet. One witness 
fixed the distance from the curve where the 
accident could first be seen as 200 feet. 
Mrs. Horsley the plaintiff, hesitatingly tes-
tified to a much greater distance, i. e. about 
660 feet, one city block, but only after her 
counsel suggested she estimate by compari-
son with a city block. Her testimony on 
this point stands by itself. 
Mrs. Horsley estimated that the bus was 
going 40 to 50 miles per hour. The bus 
had a maximum speed governor of 38 miles 
per hour which was locked at that speed. 
Several other passengers estimated the 
speed to be about 25 to 26 miles per hour 
approximately the speed the bus driver 
said he was driving immediately prior to 
the accident. It is undisputed that the bus 
driver did not apply the brakes on-the bus 
until he was within 5 to 10 feet of the 
Reinhardt car. The bus did not slow up 
any appreciable amount from the time 
Reinhardt's car could have been seen un-
til the collision. The bus was proceeding 
down a slight incline at the time of the ac-
cident. It had taken the bus about an hour 
and 10 minutes to travel approximately 
22 miles. 
The real controversy in this case is one 
of speed, and also as to whether or not the 
speed of the bus was the proximate cause 
of the injury to plaintiff. Failure to keep a 
proper lookout is unsupported by the evi-
dence. The alleged failure to slacken speed 
and the alleged failure to apply the brakes 
are bound up- in the question of speed and 
the question of proximate cause between 
speed and injury. 
The question is : Did the evidence link 
speed aaid injury together by a chain of 
Proximate cause? I believe not. Plain-
tiff has failed to establish the speed as a 
Proximate cause of the collision. The case 
of O'Mally v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 
1063, 77 A.L.R. 582, at page 588, discusses 
the necessity of proof of proximate cause 
avoided the accident by the use of proper 
care—proper speed in this case. If plain-
tiff can point that out in the evidence in 
the present case she has established a foun-
dation for the jury's verdict. I cannot 
overemphasize the fact that the jury's ver-
dict must have support in the evidence and 
such support is not found merely in the 
fact that the jury may have chosen to con-
clude that any one of the speeds testified to 
was unreasonable, simply because they be-
lieved it so, or by the fact that they chose 
to believe that such speed proximately 
caused the" collision. There must be evi-
dence to support their conclusions what-
ever those conclusions may be. We quote 
from Whalen v. Dunbar, 44 R.I. 136, 115 
A. 718, at page 720, a quotation quoted and 
approved in O'Mally v. Eagan, (cited 
above) : "If it should be conceded that the 
defendants automobile at the time the 
emergency was created was proceeding at 
a rate of speed in excess of the statutory 
limit, there was no testimony of probative 
value showing or tending to show that the 
accident would not have happened if the 
defendant's automobile had been proceed-
ing at the rate of 25 miles per hour, or 
even at a much less rate of speed, or that 
the speed of the defendant's automobile in 
any way entered into the cause of the col-
lision." 
To arrive at the verdict it did in the 
present case the jury must have found that 
the defendant bus company's driver could 
have stopped this bus upon the road as it 
then was within the space and time avail-
able to him after Reinhardt's car first be-
came visible in its spin, had he been going 
at a reasonable rate of speed. But what 
was that reasonable speed; how was it to 
be determined so that it would show how 
the bus could have been stopped in time? 
There is no testimony as to the distance 
required to stop that bus at any given 
speed. Bus driving is not so common to all 
of us that each of us is qualified to express 
an opinion as to such a required distance. 
Three hundred feet distance or 75 feet dis-
tance on an inclined icy road at 50 miles 
per hour or at 25 miles per hour with a bus 
yery clearly. That court says in effect that weighing 7,000 pounds and an automobile 
one should be able to point out from the spinning toward the bus are not a set of 
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iacts which on their face indicates that 
the bus couJd or could not have been stop-
ped in any particularf distance—or,~for that 
matter, that the collision could or could 
not have -been avoided by the bus driver. 
Such circumstances leave nothing but spec-
ulation as to_ what could have been done 
with the bus at such speed or at other 
speeds. In the absence,of evidence of the 
average human reaction time, the approxi-
mate coefficient of friction on the road un-
der the conditions existing ron,the day of 
the accident, and the braking distances of 
vehicles, or in the absence of testimony of 
expert drivers as to what can be done wfth 
a motor vehicle of that size and weight, 
the jury cannot through the application of 
logic and reason determine whether or ^ot 
a bus proceeding at a reasonable sp^ed 
could have stopped in time to avoid a col-
lision. Unless the jury can say from the 
evidence (not just say) that the collision 
would not have occurred, but for that 
speed, they are not justified in returning a 
verdict for plaintiff. The jury concluded 
that the transportation company's negli-
gence was the only negligence that was the 
proximate cause of the collision. Even 
though it be considered that Reinhar^t's 
skidding was an unavoidable accident so 
far as his responsibility is concerned, it 
does not follow that such a skidding rr^ay 
not have been an independent intervening 
cause between the alleged negligence of the 
transportation company and the collision. 
To take it out of that classification th ere 
must be evidence connecting the alleged 
negligence of the transportation company 
as a proximate cause, to the collision. 
To hand the jury various speeds and «a* 
nous distances and ask them to seloc£ 
which is reasonable and which .is unrea? 
sonable without giving them an evidential^ 
standard upon which to base their selec* 
tion, is to ask them to speculate. In -£h$ 
majority of cases, it will result in thejr 
reasoning backward from the resultant ac4 
cident that the speed at which they con-
clude the driver was going must have been 
unreasonable or else the accident would 
not have happened. Such reasoning byQits 
very nature assumes the proximate cause 
element; and the question of what was the 
proper method, under the circumstances of 
operating the bus upon an icy road is iust 
skipped over. 
What is there in the record upon which" 
a comparison can be made to enable 'the 
jurors to arrive at the conclusion olrex* 
cess or of non-excess speed? I say again? 
bus driving is not a thing of commbfl 
knowledge. It must be founded on expert 
testimony—of which there is none in the 
record. It can't be assumed that any speed 
is excessive, and the burden placed on de-
fendant to defeat that assumption. The 
plaintiff's prima facie case calls for proof 
of negligence and proof of proximate 
cause, neither of which must be assumed 
Proof of facts which cannot be measured, 
for lack of a unit to measure them, accom-
plish nothing. 
I am of the opinion that the motion for 
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant 
Transportation Company should have been 
granted. 
LATIMER, Justice, not
 f participating 
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George G. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Lawrence MONTOYA, John S. Ward, Dar-
vel D. Rlchlns, Richins Bros., Inc., and 
Norbert E. O'Connor, Defendants-Appel-
lees. 
No. 429. 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico. 
May 8, 1970. 
Truck passenger brought an action 
against various defendants for injuries sus-
tained in multiple-vehicle accident. The 
District Court of Sandoval County, Waldo 
Spiess, J., entered a summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant vehicle drivers and 
the passenger appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Wood, J., held that depositions in ac-
tion by truck passenger for personal in-
juries sustained when truck crashed into 
vehicles of two defendants who had stopped 
their vehicles at scene of prior collision be-
tween vehicles driven by two other de-
fendants on highway during sandstorm pre-
sented issues of fact as to negligence be-
cause of violation of statute prohibiting the 
leaving of vehicles on highway, foreseeabil-
ity and proximate cause precluding sum-
mary judgment. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
Oman, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
i. Judgment @=>I85(2) 
In deciding motion for summary judg-
ment, trial court must view matters 
presented and considered by it in most fa-
vorable aspect they will bear in support of 
right to trial on issues. 
2. Trial <§=>I39(I) 
Conflict in testimony of a single wit-
ness is to be resolved by trier of fact. 
3
- Judgment <§=>I86 
It is not function of trial court to 
weigh evidence in considering motion for 
summary judgment as such motion should 
b e
 granted only when facts are undisputed. 
KELLY v. MONTOYA N. M. 5 6 3 
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4. Judgment <§=> 185.3(21) 
Depositions in action by truck passen-
ger for personal injuries sustained when 
truck crashed into vehicles of two defend-
ants who had stopped their vehicles at scene 
of prior collision between vehicles driven 
by two other defendants on highway during 
sandstorm presented issues of fact as to 
negligence because of violation ot statute 
prohibiting the leaving of vehicles on high-
way, foreseeability and proximate cause 
precluding summary judgment. 1953 Comp. 
§ 64-18-49(a). 
5. Negligence <§=^ I0 
Foreseeability is an element of negli-
gence. 
6. Automobiles <§=>I73(2) 
Statute prohibiting leaving of vehicles 
upon highway is for benefit of persons us-
ing highway, and since it is foreseeable 
that blocking highway may cause other per-
sons to have accident a violation of statute 
is negligence per se. 1953 Comp. § 64-
18-49(a). 
7. Negligence @=>56(l.7, 1.12) 
"Proximate cause" is that which pro-
duces the injury and without which the in-
jury would not have occurred. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
8. Negligence <§=>62(l) 
For an intervening act to be an "inde-
pendent cause" the intervening act must be 
sufficient in and of itself to break natural 
sequence of first negligence. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
9. Negligence <©=>56(1.10), 61(1) 
"Proximate cause" of injury need not 
be last act, or nearest act to injury, but 
may be one which actually aided in produc-
ing the injury, and proximate cause need 
not be the sole cause but it must be a con-
curring cause. 
10. Judgment @=>I85(2) 
Party moving for summary judgment 
has burden of establishing that there is no 
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material issue of fact to be determined by 
factfinder and is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, and burden is not on oppos-
ing party to prove prima facie case. 
Avelino V. Gutierrez, Albuquerque, for 
appellant. 
Jackson O. Akin, Rodey, Dickason, 
Sloan, Akin & Robb, Albuquerque, for ap-
pellee Montoya. 
J. J. Monroe, Iden & Johnson, Albuquer-
que, for appellee Ward. 
Frank H. Allen, Jr., Modrall, Seymour, 
Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Albuquerque, 
for appellee Richins. 
Eugene E. Klecan, Albuquerque, for ap-
pellee O'Connor. 
OPINION 
WOOD, Judge. 
[1] Plaintiff was injured in a multi-ve-
hicle accident. The trial court granted de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is not proper where 
there is the slightest issue as to a material 
fact. In deciding a motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court must view the 
matters presented and considered by it in 
the most favorable aspect they will bear in 
support of the right to a trial on the issues. 
Perry v. Color Title of New Mexico, 81 
N.M. 143, 464 * P.2d 562 JCt.App.1970). 
We reverse the summary judgment dis-
cussing: * (1) statutory violation; (2) fore-
seeability; (3) proximate cause and inde-
pendent intervening cause; and (4) the 
burden of the party opposing summary 
judgment. 
The accident occurred on a highway east 
of Deming, during daylight, but also dur-
ing a sand storm. The wind was strong 
and gusting. Because of the sand and 
wind gusts, visibility varied from zero to 
two hundred feet. 
The first accident occurred when Mon-
toya and Ward, both across the center line 
of the highway, collided. There is evi-
dence that a vehicle, or two, stopped on the 
highway behind Ward's vehicle. Next to 
stop was Richins (defendants Richins and 
Richins Bros., Inc.). O'Connor stopped 
behind Richins. Kenosha (Kenosha Auto 
Transport Corporation and Woodburn) 
stopped behind O'Connor. 
The second accident occurred when 
Baumer (Baumer Foods, Inc. and Logan) 
ran into the rear of Kenosha. Kenosha in 
turn, collided with O'Connor and Richins, 
and O'Connor collided with Richins. 
Plaintiff, a passenger in the Baumer 
truck, sued for personal injuries. His 
claim against Kenosha and Baumer has 
been settled. The trial court granted sumr 
mary judgment in favor of Montoya, 
Ward, Richins and O'Connor. Plaintiff 
appeals. 
When we refer to "testimony" or "evi-
dence," we refer to that which appears in 
the depositions. 
Statutory violation. 
Plaintiff says there are several issues qf+ 
negligence. We need consider only one of^  
them. Section 64-l&-49(a), N.M.S.A.1953 
(Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 2) provides in part : 
"* * * [N]o person shall stop, 
park, or leave standing any vehicle.* 
whether attended or unattended, upon 
the paved or main-traveled part of the 
highway when it is practicable to stop, 
park, or so leave such vehicle off such 
part of said highway, * * * " 
There is testimony that the highway at 
the accident scene had good eight foot 
shoulders, that the descent from the shoul-
ders to the bar ditch was not steep, that 
vehicles drove onto the shoulder and into 
the bar ditch area and beyond. There is 
testimony that both the Montoya and Ward 
vehicles were driveable after their "acci-
dent, and that some ten minutes elapsed be-
tween the two accidents. 
Richins and O'Connor do not dispute 
that a factual issue existed as to their vio-
lation of § 64-18-49(a), supra; Montoya 
and Ward do. These two defendants, rely-
ing on selected testimony, assert their cars 
were off the highway at the time of the 
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second collision. They assert the only tes-
timony to the contrary is that of the inves-
tigating State Police officer; they claim 
this officer's testimony raised no factual 
issue because he admitted to uncertainty as 
to the location of the Montoya and Ward 
cars when he arrived on the scene. 
Contradictory inferences may be drawn 
from the officer's testimony. At one place 
he said the vehicles were still on the road. 
At another place it is indicated the officer 
had made a sworn statement that the two 
vehicles were on the road. Other parts of 
his testimony seem to contradict this. 
[2, 3] The fact that contradictory infer-
ences exist shows that the evidence is not 
undisputed. The conflict in the testimony 
of a single witness is to be resolved by the 
trier of fact. Hughes v. Walker, 78 N.M. 
63, 428 P.2d 37 (1967). The trial court 
could not properly resolve such conflict on 
a motion for summary judgment for by 
doing so, it would be weighing the evi-
dence. It is not the function of the trial 
court to weigh the evidence in considering 
a motion for summary judgment; such a 
motion may be granted only where the 
facts are undisputed. Johnson v. J. S. & 
H. Construction Co., 81 N.M. 42, 462 P.2d 
627 (Ct.App.1969). 
[4] There being factual issues as to the 
violation of § 64-18-49(a),"supra, there are 
factual issues as to the negligence of each 
of the four defendants. Gould v. Brown 
Construction Company, 75 N.M. 113, 401 
P.2d 100 (1965); Horrocks v. Rounds, 70 
N.M. 7Z, 370 P.2d 799 (1962); Williams v. 
Neff, 64 N.M. 182, 326 P.2d 1073 (1958). 
Foreseeability. 
Defendants assert that even if they vio-
lated a statute, they could not be held neg-
ligent because of a lack of foreseeability. 
They rely on Anderson v. Jones, 66 111. 
App.2d 407, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966). In 
that case Jones was in the same position as 
Montoya and Ward in this case. There, as 
here, cars had stopped on the highway aft-
er the first accident and before the second 
accident occurred. Anderson was in the 
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last car which had stopped when Zehr's 
car rear-ended Anderson's car. In ruling 
the second accident was not foreseeable, 
the Illinois court states: 
"It is quite clear that the immediate 
cause of plaintiffs' injuries and damages 
was the force set in motion through the 
negligent act of Zehr. The force set in 
motion by Jones had spent itself. It was 
in repose. It was quiescent. The inci-
dent was at an end. Plaintiffs were 
home free save for the wrongful act of 
Zehr. Jones, too, is home free from re-
sponsibility unless it can be said that he 
should have reasonably anticipated or 
reasonably foreseen these or like results 
or that these or like results were reason-
ably probable. If they were, the causal 
connection is not broken. If they were 
not, Jones is effectively insulated from 
responsibility and the new force of Zehr 
is the sole and proximate cause of plain-
tiffs' injuries." 
Defendants state that if Jones could not 
have foreseen the consequences of his neg-
ligence in Anderson v. Jones, supra, then 
they, and particularly Montoya and Ward, 
could not have foreseen the consequences 
of their asserted statutory violation in 
blocking the highway. 
We agree that Anderson v. Jones, supra, 
is factually similar to our case. Is the le-
gal result from those facts in Illinois the 
law of New Mexico? 
[5] In New Mexico, foreseeability is 
an element of negligence. Martin v. Board 
of Education of City of Albuquerque, 79 
N.M. 636, 447 P.2d 516 (1968); see Tapia 
v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Company, 78 
N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967). U.J.I. 12.1 
defines negligence in terms of foreseeabil-
ity. The committee comment to U.J.I. 11.-
1, citing New Mexico authority, states: 
"The violation of a statute which is 
enacted for the benefit or protection of 
the party claiming injury from the viola-
tor or for the benefit or protection of a 
class of the public to which such person 
is a member is negligence per se. 
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[6] It seems obvious to us that a traf-
fic statute such as § 64-18-49(a), supra, 
was enacted for the benefit of persons us-
ing our highways. Plaintiff, a person us-
ing the highway, had the benefit of such 
statute. Why? Because, in our opinion, it 
is foreseeable that violations of a traffic 
rule may cause accidents. "Foreseeability 
does not mean that the precise hazard or 
the exact consequences which were encoun-
tered should have been foreseen. * * *" 
Harless v. Ewmg, 80 N.M. 149, 452 P.2d 
483 (Ct.App.1969). 
Since it is foreseeable that blocking the 
highway may cause other persons to have 
accidents, a violation of the statute which 
prohibits such blocking is negligence per 
st. The rule, that violation of the statute 
is negligence per se, includes the element 
of foreseeability where, as here, plaintiff is 
a beneficiary of the statute violated. The 
holding as to foreseeability in Anderson v. 
Jones, supra, does not state New Mexico 
law, and is not applicable. 
Even without the foregoing, there is a 
factual issue as to foreseeability in this 
case. The State Police officer testified: 
«* * * there's a lot of them stops on 
the roadway, and we have a lot of acci-
dents the same way." This is evidence of 
the foreseeability of an accident from stop-
ping on the highway. 
There being factual issues as to a statu-
tory violation, there were "factual issues as 
to the negligence of each of the four de-
fendants. The factual issue of negligence 
includes the factual issue of foreseeability. 
Martin v. Board of Education of City of 
Albuquerque, supra. 
Proximate cause—independent interven-
ing cause. 
Defendants contend the act of Baumer, 
in running into the stopped vehicles, inter-
vened between any negligence on their part 
and plaintiff's injuries. The result of this 
intervening act, according to defendants, is 
to reduce their asserted negligence to a re-
mote cause, or to a condition which did no 
more than make the second accident possi-
ble. Since, according to defendants, their 
negligence is either a remote cause, or a 
condition, it is not the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries. A corollary of this 
premise is that Baumer's negligence is an 
independent intervening cause. 
The Oklahoma law, on which defendants 
rely, supports these contentions. Haworth 
v. Mosher, 395 F.2d 566 (10th Cir. 1968); 
Beesley v. United States, 364 F.2d 194 
(10th Cir. 1966); Evans v. Caldwell, 429 
P.2d 962 (Okl.1967); Transport Indemni-
ty Company v. Page, 406 P.2d 980 (Okl. 
1965); Porter v. Norton-Stuart Pontiac-
Cadillac of Enid, 405 P.2d 109 (Okl. 
1965). As stated in Beesley v. United 
States, supra: 
"The Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
developed a clear expression of the law 
of proximate cause in Oklahoma. The 
proximate cause of any injury must be 
the efficient cause which sets in motion 
the chain of circumstances leading to the 
injury. * * * Where the negligence 
complained of only creates a condition 
which thereafter reacts with a subse-
quent, independent, unforeseeable, dis-
tinct agency and produces an injury, the 
original negligence is the remote rather 
than the proximate cause thereof. This, 
is held to be true though injury would 
not have occurred except for the original 
act. * * * Thus the proximate cause 
of an event must be that which in the 
natural and continuous sequence, unbro-
ken by any independent cause, produces 
that event and without which that event 
would not have occurred. * * * " 
Is the Oklahoma view the law of New 
Mexico ? 
The Oklahoma rule, according to the 
above quotation, includes the view that the 
second accident was unforeseeable. We 
have held that foreseeability is an issue in-
cluded within the factual issue of negli-
gence. 
Also, according to the above quotation, 
the second accident was independent of the 
asserted negligence of defendants even 
though plaintiff's injury "* * * would 
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not-have occurred except for the original 
act * * * " 
[7,8] A partial definition of proximate 
cause is " * * * that which * * * 
produces the injury, and without which the 
injury would not have occurred. * * *" 
Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 
P.2d 507 (1955). For an intervening act 
to be an independent cause, Thompson v. 
Anderman, supra, states: "* * * Such 
intervening cause must be sufficient in and 
of itself to break the natural sequence of 
the first negligence * * *." 
If plaintiffs injuries would not have oc-
curred except for the alleged negligence of 
the defendants, their negligence is a proxi-
mate cause of the injuries. If, however, 
the second accident broke the natural se-
quence of defendants' asserted negligence, 
if the second accident is the one without 
which the injuries would not have oc-
curred, the second accident was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injuries. If the 
second accident did break the natural se-
quence of events resulting from the as-
serted negligence of defendants, the second 
accident would be an independent interven-
ing cause. If, however, plaintiff's injuries 
"would not have occurred except for the 
original act" of the defendants, the second 
accident was not an independent interven-
ing cause. New Mexico law on independ-
ent intervening cause is not the same as 
the quoted statement of Oklahoma law. 
[9] Nor is the Oklahoma view of re-
mote cause the New Mexico law. The 
proximate cause of an injury, in New 
Mexico, need not be the last act, or the 
nearest act to the injury, but may be one 
which actually aided in producing the inju-
ry. Proximate cause need not be the sole 
cause, but it must be a concurring cause. 
Ortega v. Texas-New Mexico Railway 
Company, 70 N.M. 58, 370 P.2d 201 (1962). 
Thompson v. Anderman, supra, states: 
"* * * Where a person by his own 
negligence produces a dangerous condi-
tion of things, which does not become 
active for mischief until another person 
has operated upon it by the commission 
of another negligent act, which might 
not unreasonably be foreseen to occur, 
the original act of negligence is then re-
garded as the proximate cause of the in-
jury which finally results." 
Thus, if defendants' asserted negligence 
became active by the negligence of anoth-
er, their negligence has greater legal effect 
than a "condition which made the second 
accident possible." Their negligence may 
be regarded as the proximate cause of the 
injury which finally results. 
Being contrary to New Mexico law, 
Oklahoma law is not authority for the 
summary judgment. 
Defendants rely on two other cases. 
Bell v. Fore, 419 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Civ. 
App.1967) applies the "remote cause'' or 
"condition" concept which is contrary to 
New Mexico law. In Copple v. Warner, 
260 N.C. 727, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963), the 
first collision between cars A and B, was 
caused by car B. This collision blocked 
the eastbound lane of the highway. Car C 
was proceeding west in the unblocked 
westbound lane. The second collision oc-
curred when car C drove across the center 
line and collided with cars A and B. It was 
held that these facts were insufficient to 
show any negligence on the part of car B 
that was a proximate or concurring proxi-
mate cause of the second collision. The 
factual situation here is different, there 
being testimony that each of the defend-
ants here, to some extent, was blocking the 
lane of travel in which the second collision 
in this case occurred. Neither case is au-
thority for the summary judgment. 
Was the asserted negligence of any, or 
each, of the four defendants a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries? Was the sec-
ond accident an independent intervening 
cause? Did the alleged negligence of any 
of the defendants concur with the alleged 
negligence • of anyone else (Kenosha or 
Baumer) in causing plaintiff's injuries? If 
reasonable minds might differ on these is-
sues, the matter is for the jury. Rivera v. 
Ancient City Oil Corporation, 61 N.M. 473, 
302P.2d953 (1956). 
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Reasonable minds could differ on these 
issues because there are disputed facts and 
because the reasonable inferences from 
those facts are contradictory. Harless V. 
Ewing, supra. For example: If it were 
practicable for each of the defendants to 
have parked their vehicles off the road be-
tween the time of the first and second col-
lisions, and they did not do so, did the sec-
ond accident result because their vehicles 
were on the pavement, or did it result 
from the speed of the Baumer truck, or the 
driver's failure to keep a proper lookout or 
his failure to properly control his truck un-
der the existing conditions of visibility? 
If the Kenosha truck, with which the Baum-
er truck initially collided, was negligent 
in blocking the highway, did the alleged 
negligence of these defendants concur with 
Kenosha? There are factual issues of 
causation as to each of the four defend-
ants. 
Burden of the party opposing summary 
judgment. 
O'Connor reviews the testimony to show 
that the presence of his vehicle had no 
bearing on the accident. He ^asserts that 
since our Supreme Court agreed with the 
trial court in Gould v. Brown Construction 
Company, supra, that the issue of causation 
in that dust storm case was for the jury, 
that here we should agree with the trial 
court that the issue i_s one of -law^ He re-
minds us, relying on Seele v. Purcell, 45 
N.M. 176, 113 P.2d 320 (1941), the plain-
tiffs have the burden of proof and that 
where defendants have acted in an emer-
gency, the burden on plaintiff "becomes 
more burdensome." He asserts this case is 
a similar situation and that plaintiff failed 
to meet that burden. 
1
 O'Connor's claims are without merit." In 
Gould v. Brown Construction Company, su-
pra, the issues were decided by the jury 
after trial. Here, the trial judge decided 
them as a matter of law. Since reasonable 
minds might differ on these issues, they 
are to be tried. In Seele v. Purcell, supra, 
plaintiff was held to have failed in the 
burden of proof after a trial. _ O'Connor 
would have us hold that plaintiff has failed} 
to meet his burden without allowing him .a ; 
trial.
 % / ' * : 
[10] The issues here were decided onja" 
motion for summary judgment. "A party '• 
moving for summary judgment has t h e ' 
burden of establishing that there is no ma-
terial issue of fact to be determined by the * 
fact finder and that he is entitled to judg-r 
ment as a matter of law. * * * The
 s 
burden is not on the opposing party', to 
prove a prima iacie case. * * *'\ Bar-
ber's Super Markets, Inc. v. Stryker,
 r81 
N.M. 227, 465 P.2d 284 (1970). Plaintiff 
did not have the burden in the summary 
judgment proceeding. O'Connor, and the 
other three defendants, did. They failed to 
meet it. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. . _ " 
It is so ordered. 
••.'// 
HENDLEY, J., concurs. , . . 
OMAN, Judge (dissenting). 
I agree with the majority concerning the 
law applicable in ruling on a motion, for 
summary judgment. I also agree that in 
the light of this law there are factual -is-t 
sues as to whether the defendants here in-
volved violated § 64-18-49(a), N.M.S.X. 
1953 (Repl. 9, pt. 2). The essential portion 
of this section of our statutes is quoted in
 ; 
the majority opinion. .. i"~5 
I also agree "foreseeability" is one/jqf 
the tests ordinarily to be considered and 
applied in determining the factual question 
of negligence, and that the violation of a 
statutory rule of the road constitutes negli : 
gence per se. However, I disagree with 
the majority's disposition of the "foreseea^ 
bility" issue in this case, insofar as it re-
lates to the questions of "proximate cause'* 
and "independent intervening cause," and-I 
disagree with the majority holding that 
there is a question of fact as to whethe^ 
the negligence of these defendants was a 
proximate cause of the second accident and 
plaintiff's resulting injuries. 
I agree with the following statements of 
the majority concerning the law of "proxi-
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mate cause" and ''independent intervening 
cause": 
"A partial definition of proximate 
cause is '* * * that which * * * 
" produces the injury, and without which 
the injury would not have occurred. 
' * * *' Thompson v. Anderman, 59 
N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955). For an 
intervening act to be an independent 
cause, Thompson v. Anderman, supra, 
states: '* * * Such intervening 
cause must be sufficient in and of itself 
to break the natural sequence of the first 
negligence * * *.' 
"If plaintiff's injuries would not have 
occurred except for the alleged negli-
gence of the defendants, their negligence 
is a proximate cause of the injuries. If, 
however, the second accident broke the 
natural sequence of defendants' asserted 
negligence, if the second accident is the 
one without which the injuries would not 
have occurred, the second accident was 
the proximate cause of plaintiff's in-
juries. If the second accident did break 
the natural sequence of events resulting 
from the asserted negligence of defend-
ants, the second accident would be an in-
dependent intervening cause. If, how-
ever, plaintiff's injuries 'would not have 
occurred except for the original act' of 
the defendants, the second accident was 
• not an independent intervening cause. 
* * *» 
I disagree with the majority statement 
that the opinion of the Illinois Court in 
Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill.App.2d 407, 213 
N.E.2d 627 (1966) " * * * does not state 
New Mexico law, and is not applicable," 
and with the majority conclusion that un-
der New Mexico law, as above quoted 
from the majority opinion, reasonable 
minds could differ on the question of 
whether the negligence of defendants could 
have proximately concurred in causing the 
second accident. 
I have already stated I agree the evi-
dence here is sufficient on the issue of the 
defendants' negligence to avoid summary 
judgment. As I understand the opinion of 
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the Illinois court in Anderson v. Jones, su-
pra, the negligence of Jones was conceded. 
The concern of the Illinois court with 
"foreseeability" was whether the second 
accident, precipitated by the "intervening 
cause"—the conduct of Zehr in running 
into the rear of plaintiff's vehicle—could 
have been reasonably foreseen as a result 
of the original act of negligence—the 
conduct of Jones in causing the first colli-
sion. If it could have been so reasonably 
foreseen, then the negligence of Zehr was 
not an "independent intervening cause," 
which could have broken the chain of cau-
sation between the negligence of Jones and 
the injury to plaintiff. This is consistent 
with the law of New Mexico. U.J.I. 13.-
15; Thompson v. Anderman, supra, cited 
in the above quotation from the majority 
opinion. See also, Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 270 
(1958), and particularly § 2 [b] and cases 
cited therein as showing that "foreseeabil-
ity" is a test to be applied in determining 
whether another's negligence constitutes an 
"intervening cause" or merely a "concur-
ring cause." 
The majority "* * * agree that An-
derson v. Jones, supra, is factually similar 
to our case." However, they distinguish 
the result reached therein from their result 
in the present case on the basis that 
"*_ * * the holding as to foreseeability 
* * * " by the Illinois court * * * 
does not state New Mexico law, and is not 
applicable." As above stated, I disagree 
with this and can see no reason to arrive 
at a result directly opposite that reached by 
the Illinois court in a concededly similar 
factual situation now before us. 
The majority, however, also seek to sup-
port their result by asserting that a factual 
issue as to foreseeability is presented by 
the statement of the State Police Officer 
that "* * * there's a lot of them stops 
on the roadway, and we have a lot of acci-
dents the same way." 
In my opinion this statement by the 
State Police Officer cannot reasonably be 
said to raise a question on the issue of 
proximate causation under the undisputed 
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facts before us. It may possibly, as the 
majority suggest, raise a question as to the 
negligence of defendants in stopping on 
the highway, but this is not the issue in the 
case as I see it and as I have above stated. 
An examination of the evidence, in the 
light of the above quoted law from the ma-
jority opinion as to "proximate cause" and 
"independent intervening cause," demon-
strates clearly to me that the negligence of 
the defendants in stopping or parking on 
the main travelled portion of the highway 
could not constitute a proximate cause of 
the second collision from which plaintiff's 
injuries resulted. 
' Here the evidence is that Kenosha (Ke-
nosha Auto Transport Corporation and its 
driver Woodburn) brought its tractor and 
trailer to rest on the highway behind the 
O'Connor automobile. Woodburn re-
mained in the vehicle about 30 seconds, 
and then got out, where he remained for 
about another 30 seconds. He heard a ve-
hicle approaching and started to get back 
inside the cab of his vehicle when the 
Baumer vehicle collided with the rear of 
the Kenosha vehicle. 
The Kenosha vehicle consisted of a trac-
tor and a transport trailer on which were 
loaded six automobiles. Across the rear of 
this trailer there were a cluster of three 
red lights in about the center thereof and 
about four feet above the ground or road 
surface, a red clearance light on each side 
about 3/6// above the road surface, and two 
red flashing lights which were about 6" 
from the top of the trailer. All of these 
lights were burning and visible from the 
rear, except as their visibility may have 
been obscured by the dust. 
Woodburn's visibility was about 200 feet 
ahead as he approached the O'Connor 
automobile, and during the time he re-
mained stopped on the highway prior to 
the accident. He saw the O'Connor auto-
mobile and the Richins truck ahead. He 
admitted he could probably have driven off 
the highway. 
The Baumer vehicle (driven by Logan), 
which collided with the rear of the Keno-
sha vehicle, had a gross weight of between 
60,000 and 65,000 lbs. Logan was familiar 
with the highway and was driving at about 
55 miles per hour. He saw the dust ahead, 
but made no effort to slow down, other 
than to take his foot off the accelerator, 
until he was inside the dust and through 
which he could not see. He then applied 
his brakes and the collision with the rear 
of the Kenosha vehicle occurred almost im-
mediately. He has no recollection of 
seeing the Kenosha vehicle prior to the 
collision. He alone i ailed to react as had 
all those who preceded him, in that he did 
not bring his vehicle to a stop before col-
liding with another vehicle. 
Woodburn, driver of the Kenosha vehi-
cle, admittedly had sufficient visibility and 
sufficient time in which to remove his ve-
hicle from the highway. 
In my opinion, the negligence of these 
two drivers was not only sufficient to 
break the natural sequences of the negli-
gence of the other defendants in stopping 
on the highway, but in fact did so, and was 
the proximate cause of the second collision. 
If the negligence of Ihe remaining defend-
ants could be said to have proximately 
caused Woodburn to stop on the highway, 
their negligence was at rest once Wood-
burn had stopped and had sufficient time 
to remove his vehicle from the highway. 
So long as he remained stopped or parked 
on the highway, when he could admittedly 
have gotten off the highway, the presence 
of his vehicle prevented a direct collision 
by an approaching vehicle with the vehi-
cles ahead, and his negligence in so "re-
maining on the highway interrupted the 
natural sequence of events which might 
have followed from the negligence of those 
stopped ahead of him. His negligence and 
the negligence of Logan, which, as already 
stated, consisted of conduct unlike that fol-
lowed by all the other drivers in approach-
ing the dust, produced a result different 
than that which could reasonably have 
been foreseen by the other defendants. 
The negligence of Woodburn and Logan 
was not only the immediate cause of the 
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second collision, but was the efficient pro-
ducing cause thereof, and without which 
the plaintiff would not have been injured. 
As already stated, I believe the New 
Mexico law compels the same result 
reached by the Illinois court in the factual-
ly similar case of Anderson v. Jones, su-
pra. I agree with the majority that the 
Oklahoma rule, as quoted from Beesley v. 
United States, 364 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 
1966), appears to be somewhat different 
from the New Mexico rule, in that it is 
stated the original act is not a proximate 
cause of the injury even though the injury 
would not have occurred except for the 
original act. However, the New Mexico 
and Oklahoma definitions of proximate 
cause are almost identical in their wording. 
See U.J.I. 12.10; Haworth v. Mosher, 395 
F.2d 566 (10th Cir. 1968); Beesley v. 
United States, supra. Proximate cause is 
defined in U.J.I. 12.10 as follows: 
"The proximate cause of an injury is 
that which in a natural and continuous 
sequence [unbroken by any independent 
intervening cause] produces the injury, 
and without which the"injury would not 
have occurred. [It need not be the only 
cause, nor the last nor nearest cause. It 
is sufficient if it occurs with some other 
cause acting at the same time, which in 
combination with it, causes the injury]." 
Regardless of whether negligently stop-
ping on a highway be called "negligence" 
or a "condition/* the stopping must be a 
proximate cause of the resulting injuries 
before there can be liability for the stop-
ping. Here we are concerned only with 
the issue of negligence in stopping on the 
highway, when it was practicable to stop 
off the highway. There are factual issues 
as to whether the different defendants now 
before us were on or off the highway, and, 
if on the highway, whether it was practica-
ble for them to have gotten off the high-
way. However, the negligence of Wood-
burn in not removing the Kenosha vehicle 
from the highway, when it was practicable 
for him to do so, and the negligence of Lo-
gan, in his operation of the Baumer vehi-
cle, were the concurring proximate causes 
of this second accident. This second acci-
dent would not otherwise have occurred. 
The negligence of each of the defendants 
in this appeal in stopping on the highway 
was at most a remote cause, which in no 
way proximately contributed to the second 
accident and plaintiff's resulting injuries. 
In addition to the foregoing cited cases, 
compare § 4, and cases therein cited, of 
Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 270 at 284. 
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dis-
sent. 
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exception to the hearsay rule. The state-
ment was not an admission which could be 
used against the defendant, but a self-serv-
ing statement made by the defendant long 
after the crime was committed and of ques-
tionable reliability. 
Utah 217 
Matthew C. HARRIS and Gary C. 
Harris, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
[3] Defendant also urges that the trial 
court erred in failing to give a requested 
instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser 
included offense of burglary. The Court 
has recently fully explored the lesser includ-
ed offense doctrine in State v. Baker, Utah, 
671 P.2d 152 (1983). Since all the evi-
dence in this case is consistent only with 
the burglary charge and there is no evi-
dence consistent with criminal trespass, we 
affirm on the basis of State v. Baker, 
supra. 
Affirmed. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I agree with the Per Curiam opinion as to 
the exclusion of defendant's statement. I 
cannot agree however that "all the evidence 
in this case is consistent only with the bur-
glary charge and there is no evidence con-
sistent with criminal trespass." The only 
evidence which the majority opinion relies 
on is that a security box had been moved 
from the head of a bed to the center and 
the lock on the box was exposed. Nothing 
was taken. I do not think that evidence 
necessarily shows an attempt to commit 
theft and excludes trespass. The instruc-
tion on the lesser included offense of crimi-
nal trespass should have been given. 
(o E KEY NUMBER SYSTEM r EM> 
The UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
Lester Lorenzo Loosemore, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 17042. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 7, 1983. 
Action was brought against bus driver 
and bus company for personal injuries sus-
tained in collision between bus and another 
vehicle. The Second District Court, Weber 
County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., entered judg-
ment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that: (1) instruction to jury that driver of 
other vehicle was negligent as a matter of 
law and that if jury found that he saw bus 
stopped on highway or if he negligently 
failed to see bus, then his negligence was 
sole proximate cause of collision, was erro-
neous; (2) exclusion of bus company main-
tenance records, made subsequent to acci-
dent, introduced to show that taillights. 
were defective at time of accident was erro-
neous; and (3) combined errors warranted 
reversal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Negligence <s=>62(3) 
A person's negligence is not superseded 
by the negligence of another if the subse-
quent negligence of another is foreseeable. 
2. Automobiles <@=>245(15, 50) 
In action for injuries sustained by jeep 
passenger in collision between jeep and rear 
end of bus, issue of whether jeep driver was 
negligent and issue of proximate cause of 
the accident were for the jury. 
3. Trial <s=>142, 143 
Where evidence is in dispute, including 
inferences from evidence, issue should be 
subm ed to jury. 
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4. Negligence <s=>136(25) 
Whether the negligence of an actor 
who observes, or negligently fails to ob-
serve, a dangerous condition created by a 
prior actor's negligence and who negligent-
ly fails to avoid the dangerous condition 
supersedes the negligence of the prior actor 
is a question for the jury; overruling Hill-
yard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 
143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953); McMurdie v. Un-
derwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711 
(1959); Valesquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
12 Utah 2d 379,366 P.2d 989 (1961); Ander-
son v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970). 
5. Negligence <s=>131 
Evidence of repairs made after an acci-
dent is inadmissible to prove negligence; 
however, evidence of subsequent repairs is 
admissible for other purposes, such as prov-
ing physical conditions that existed at time 
of accident, if defendant disputes the earli-
er condition, and if only way of establishing 
the earlier condition is by evidence of subse-
quent repairs. 
6. Evidence <^351 
Bus maintenance records made subse-
quent to collision between another vehicle 
and rear end of bus were admissible to 
show that bus taillights were defective pri-
or to accident. 
7. Appeal and Error e=»1027 
An error is reversible if there is reason-
able likelihood that a more favorable result 
would have been obtained by complaining 
party in the absence of the error. 
8. Appeal and Error <s=> 1056.1(3), 1064.1(3) 
In action for injuries resulting from 
collision with bus based on theory that bus 
driver negligently drove bus and that bus 
company negligently maintained taillights, 
erroneous instruction to jury that driver of 
jeep that collided with bus was negligent as 
a matter of law and that, if jeep driver saw 
bus or should have seen bus, his negligence 
was superseding cause of accident, together 
with erroneous exclusion of bus mainte-
nance record introduced to show defect in 
lights prior to accident, were sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal. 
Merlin R. Lybbert, Paul C. Droz, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Timothy R. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Matthew Harris brought this ac-
tion for personal injuries sustained in a 
collision between a bus owned and operated 
by defendant Utah Transit Authority 
(UTA) and a jeep in which the plaintiff was 
a passenger. The driver of the bus, Lester 
Loosemore, is also a defendant. The trial 
court ruled as a matter of law that Rodney 
Talbot, the driver of the jeep, was negli-
gent, and the jury found that UTA and 
Loosemore were not negligent and that Tal-
bot was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. Judgment was entered for the 
defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. 
The accident occurred on the morning of 
March 7, 1977. Talbot, Harris, and Kevin 
Lucia, another passenger of Talbot, were on 
an errand for their high school teacher. 
The collision occurred at the "^-intersec-
tion of 1700 North and Washington Boule-
vard in North Ogden, Utah. At the point 
of the collision, Washington Boulevard Jias 
four traffic lanes, two north bound and two 
south bound. The impact occurred in the 
outside south-bound lane. A bus of defend-
ant UTA stopped to pick up a passenger, 
and was positioned with its right rear outer 
wheel four inches off the pavement and 
was obstructing a portion of the outside 
travel lane. The day was dry and clear, 
and the driving conditions were good. The 
jeep was in good mechanical condition and 
traveling within the speed limit and with 
the flow of traffic at between 40 and 50 
miles per hour. 
Talbot did not recall seeing the bus ahead 
of him until just before the collision oc-
curred. Upon seeing the bus, he glanced in 
his rear-view mirror, swerved left and 
braked to avoid the bus. In the course »of 
this maneuver, the right side of the jeep 
struck the left rear corner of the bus and 
HARRIS v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY Utah 219 
Cite as 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) 
pinched Harris' right arm between the bus 
and the jeep, effectively severing the arm 
between the shoulder and the elbow. 
A. 
I. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Cause and Superseding Proximate 
Cause 
Plaintiffs urge that the trial court erred 
in directing the jury to find as a matter of 
law that Talbot, the driver of the jeep^was 
negligent and that if because of his negli-
gence he failed to observe the bus, then he 
was the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent. Instruction no. 14 stated in part: 
[Y]ou are instructed that the driver of 
the Jeep, Rodney Talbot, was negligent 
as a matter of law, and if you find that 
he observed the bus stopped upon the 
highway, or, under the circumstances 
should have observed the bus, but be-
cause of his negligence failed to do so in 
time to avoid the accident, then you are 
instructed that the negligence on his part 
was the sole proximate cause of the colli-
sion. 
The instruction directed a verdict on two 
crucial contested issues of fact and in addi-
tion was confusing. First, the instruction 
directed the jury that Talbot was negligent 
as a matter of law. In addition, even 
though the instruction did not specify in 
what manner Talbot was negligent as a 
matter of law, it nevertheless stated that 
if Talbot: (1) knew the bus had stopped or 
(2) should have observed that the bus was 
stopped and failed to do so in time to avoid 
the accident, then Talbot's negligence was 
the "sole proximate cause of the collision." 
Second, the instruction in effect directed a 
verdict on proximate cause, apparently on 
the theory that Talbot's negligence was a 
superseding cause. ' 
[1] The law of superseding causation is, 
as a general proposition, more easily stated 
than applied. A person's negligence is not 
superseded by the negligence of another if 
the subsequent negligence of another is 
foreseeable. This Court in Jensen v. Moun-
tain States Telephone and Telegraph, Co,, 
Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980), adopted the rule 
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 447 (1965): 
The fact that an intervening act of a 
third person is negligent in itself or is 
done in a negligent manner does not 
make it a superseding cause of harm to 
another which the actor's negligent con-
duct is a substantial factor in bringing 
about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his negli-
gent conduct should have realized that a 
third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situ-
ation existing when the act of the third 
person was done would not regard it as 
highly extraordinary that the third per-
son had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal con-
sequence of a situation created by the 
actor's conduct and the manner in which 
it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. 
The same general rule is stated by Profes-
sor Prosser as follows: 
The risk created by the defendant may 
include the intervention of the foreseea-
ble negligence of o thers . . . . [T)he stan-
dard of reasonable conduct may require 
the defendant to protect the plaintiff 
against 'that occasioned negligence which 
is one of the ordinary incidents of human 
life and therefore to be anticipated.' 
Prosser, The Law of Torts § 44 at 274 (4th 
ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). 
This Court has applied that rule on sever-
al occasions. E.g., Jensen v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Co,, supra; 
Watters v. Querry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702 
(1978), appeal from proceedings after re-
mand, 626 P.2d 455 (1981). See Skollings-
berg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P.2d 
1177 (1971). Cf. Collier v. Frerichs, Utah, 
626 P.2d 476 (1981). Accord Hennigan v. 
Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F.Supp. 667 (E.D. 
Pa.1967); Grainy v. Campbell, 493 Pa. 88, 
425 A.2d 379 (1981); Strobel v, Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific RR. Co,, 255 Minn. 
201, 96 N.W.2d 195 (1959). See also Annot, 
Negligence Causing Automobile Accident, 
or Negligence of Driver Subsequently Ap-
proaching Scene of Accident, As Proximate 
Cause of Injury by or to the Approaching 
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Car or to Its Occupants, 58 A.L.R.2d 270, 
§ 2[b] (1958). 
In Watters v. Querry, supra, the defend-
ant Hemingway slowed abruptly on the 
freeway while changing lanes. Plaintiff 
Watters slowed to avoid hitting Heming-
way, and was in turn rear-ended by defend-
ant Querry. On appeal, this Court held 
that an instruction, essentially similar to 
instruction 14 in the instant case, constitut-
ed reversible error. The instruction stated 
that if the driver of a cr should have ob-
served and avoided a dangerous condition 
created by another car in front of him and 
did not, that driver's negligence was an 
" 'independent intervening cause, and, 
therefore the first driver cannot be a proxi-
mate cause of the collision.'" 588 P.2d at 
703 (emphasis in original). This Court held: 
The more fundamental test is whether 
under the particular circumstances he 
should have foreseen that his conduct 
would have exposed others to an unrea-
sonable risk of harm; and this includes 
situations where negligent or other 
wrongful conduct of others should rea-
sonably be anticipated.... The difficul-
ty with the instruction about which plain-
tiff complains is that, as applied to the 
instant situation, it would seem to excul-
pate defendant Hemingway (who created 
a dangerous situation) if it is found that 
the defendant Querry (the latter actor) 
was negligent, whether or not the latter's 
conduct was foreseeable. If the principle 
of law just discussed is properly applied 
to the evidence in this case, it appears to 
us that there is a legitimate question as 
to whether a jury could reasonably find 
that defendant Hemingway, in making 
the alleged abrupt stop, should have fore-
seen that, in traffic such as there was on 
that highway, some momentarily inatten-
tive driver following her would not have 
been able to react and brake quick 
enough to avoid collision with her car or 
the car behind hers. 
588 P.2d at 704. 
Later, when Watters was again appealed 
from an order entered after the remand in 
the first case, we reaffirmed the rule. Cit-
ing Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Co., supra, this Court stated: 
[T]he first actor cannot excuse himself 
from liability arising from his negligent 
acts merely because the later negligence 
of another concurs to cause injury, if the 
later act were a foreseeable event. 
626 P.2d at 458. 
[2] In the present case, the disputed in-
struction was erroneous because it failed to 
submit the proximate cause issue to the 
jury for determination. Jensen v. Moun-
tain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
supra. In other words, the jury should 
have decided whether Loosemore stopped 
the bus in such a way that it was foreseea-
ble that "some momentarily inattentive 
driver following [him] would not be able to 
react and brake quick enough to avoid colli-
sion." Watters v. Querry, supra, 588 P.2d 
at 704. 
[3] Where the evidence is in dispute, 
including the inferences from the evidence, 
the issue should be submitted to the jury. 
Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, Utah, 
641 P.2d 112 (1982); FMA Acceptance Co. 
v. Leatherby Insurance Co., Utah, 594J?.2d 
1332 (1979). See also Bowen v. Riverton 
City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434 (1982); Jensen v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Co., Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980). 
We do not mean to imply that rulings by 
the trial court which decide a factual conten-
tion as a matter of law are never appropriate. 
But the right to trial by jury is a basic 
principle of our system that cannot be al-
lowed to be eroded by improper intrusions 
on the jury's prerogative. In the instant 
case, the issue of Talbot's negligence and 
proximate cause should have gone to the 
jury. If, as plaintiff contends, Loosemore 
stopped the bus too rapidly, or failed to 
drive out of the lane of traffic, or had 
faulty brake lights, he may have contribut-
ed to a rear-end collision by a momentarily 
inattentive driver, which would not have 
been so "extraordinary" as to be unforesee-
able. 
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B. The Rule in Hillyard v. Utah By-Prod- becomes confronted with an emergency 
ucts Co. situation. 
[4] Instruction no. 14 appears to have 
been based on the rule stated in Hillyard v. 
Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 151, 
263 P.2d 287, 292 (1953); and restated in 
McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400,346 
P.2d 711 (1959); Valesquez v. Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 
(1961); Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Pav-
ing Co., 2A Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970). 
Hillyard, supra, stated the rule as follows: 
In applying the test of foreseeability to 
situations where a negligently created 
pre-existing condition combines with a 
later act of negligence causing an injury, 
the courts have drawn a clear-cut distinc-
tion between two classes of cases. The 
first situation is where one has negligent-
ly created a dangerous condition [such as 
parking the truck] and a later actor ob-
served, or circumstances are such that he 
could not fail to observe, but negligently 
failed to avoid it. The second situation 
involves conduct of a later intervening 
actor who negligently failed to observe 
the dangerous condition until it is too late 
to avoid it. In regard to the first situa-
tion it is held as a matter of law that the 
later intervening act does interrupt the 
natural sequence of events and cut off 
the legal effect of the negligence of the 
initial actor. This is based uponjthe rea-
soning that it is not reasonably to be 
foreseen nor expected that one who actu-
ally becomes cognizant of a dangerous 
condition in ample time to avert injury 
will fail to do so.17 On the other hand, 
with respect to the second situation, 
where the second actor fails to see the 
danger in time to avoid it, it is held that a 
jury question exists, based on the ration-
ale that it can reasonably be anticipated 
that circumstances may arise wherein 
others may not observe the dangerous 
condition until too late to escape it.18 
The distinction is basically one between a 
situation in which the second actor has 
sufficient time, after being charged with 
knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and 
one in which the second actor negligently 
17Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, 111 
A.L.R. 406 (1937). 
18 Ibid. 
1 Utah 2d at 151, 263 P.2d at 292 (emphasis 
in original). In other words, the test in 
Hillyard is two-pronged: (1) where a mo-
torist sees a stationary object in the road 
and negligently fails to avoid it, his negli-
gence is, as a matter of law, a superseding 
cause, but (2) if the motorist negligently 
fails to see the stationary object in time to 
avoid it, the issue of whether the motorist's 
negligence is a superseding cause is for the 
jury. 
The case most heavily relied on in Hill-
yard to support the first prong of the rule 
there stated has been overruled. Kline v. 
Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43 (1937), was 
expressly overruled by Grainy v. Campbell, 
493 Pa. 88, 425 A.2d 379 (1981), which re-
jected the rule of superseding cause in 
Kline and adopted the rule stated in § 447 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See 
also Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 
F.Supp. 667, 678-79 (E.D.Pa.1967) (explain-
ing Pennsylvania's modifications to Kline v. 
Moyer). 
The strong drift away from deciding the 
issue of superseding causation in automo-
bile accidents as a matter of law is evident 
in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980), 
and Watters v. Querry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702 
(1978). Indeed, Jensen all but overruled the 
first prong of Hillyard sub silento. The 
approach taken in Jensen and Watters is 
also consistent with a number of other Utah 
cases in which this Court has held that a 
motorist who collides with a stationary ve-
hicle on the highway is not guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law without respect to 
the totality of the circumstances. See Col-
lier v. Frerichs, Utah, 626 P.2d 476 (1981); 
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 R2d 
642 (1956); Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 
401, 62 P.2d 117 (1936). 
Finally, the first prong of Hillyard cannot 
stand analysis from a theoretical point of 
view. There is no valid distinction between 
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one who negligently fails to keep a proper 
lookout and rear-ends another car and one 
who keeps a proper lookout but negligently 
fails to avoid a collision. The two situations 
are similar to the doctrines of assumptions 
of risk and contributory negligence—which 
are now treated for the most part simply in 
terms of whether a defendant failed to act 
as a reasonably prudent person under the 
circumstances. Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Co., Utah, 631 P.2d 865 (1981); 
Jacobsen Construction Co. Inc. v. Structo-
Lite Engineering, Inc., Utah, 619 P.2d 306 
(1980). Although Moore and Jacobsen did 
not deal with proximate cause, that is not 
significant. What is significant is that the 
distinction between the first and second 
prongs of Hillyard is artificial and unjusti-
fiable basically for the reasons stated in 
Moore. In addition, whether a defendant's 
conduct fits under the first or second prong 
in Hillyard, conduct under either prong is 
generally foreseeable from the point of 
view of the person who first creates the 
hazard. 
Finally, the unsound distinction made in 
Hillyard serves to frustrate the purpose of 
the Comparative Negligence Statute by 
precluding the kind of comparison of fault 
that a jury ought to make. The allocation-
of liability should be made on the basis of 
the relative culpability of both parties. To 
do that the jury must assess the reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness of the second driv-
er's actions in light of all the circumstances, 
including whatever action it takes to avoid 
a collision, his initial speed, the initial spsed 
of the first car, road conditions, traffic con-
ditions, and the like. 
To avoid further confusion in the doctrine 
of superseding causation in cases such as 
this, we hereby overrule the first prong of 
the Hillyard test as stated in Hillyard, 
McMurdie, Valesquez, and Anderson. 
II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Plaintiffs also urge that the court erred 
in excluding the bus maintenance records 
made subsequent to the accident. The rec-
ords were offered for the purpose of dem-
onstrating that the tail lights of the bus 
were not functioning at the time of the 
accident and that UTA was therefore negli-
gent. 
[5] The law is well settled that evidence 
of repairs made after an accident is inad-
missible to prove negligence. Rule 51, Utah 
R.Evid.; Potter v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-
day Saints Hospital, 99 Utah 71, 103 P.2d 
280 (1940). However, evidence of subse-
quent repairs is admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proving the physical condi-
tions that existed at the time of an acci-
dent, if the defendant disputes the earlier 
condition, and if the only way of establish-
ing the earlier condition is by evidence of 
subsequent repairs. Lawlor v. County of 
Flathead, 177 Mont. 508, 582 P.2d 751 
(1978); Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio 
App.2d 21, 371 N.E.2d 557 (1977); Leeth v. 
Roberts, 295 Ala. 27, 322 So.2d 679 (1975) 
(dictum); McCormick on Evidence § 295 at 
668 & n. 23 (2d ed. 1972); Annot, Admissi-
bility of Evidence of Repairs, Change of 
Conditions, or Precautions Taken After Ac-
cident, 64 A.L.R.2d 1296, § 6[d] (1959). See 
also 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 283 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1979) 
[6] Although the alleged malfunctioning 
of the brake lights of the bus might have 
been caused by the accident itself, the 
plaintiffs theory was that the lights were 
defective prior to the accident and that that 
defect was a causative factor. Under the 
circumstances, whether the lights were mal-
functioning and whether they contributed 
to the accident were questions of fact for 
the jury. In short, it was error to exclude 
the proffered evidence. 
III. REVERSIBLE ERROR 
[7,8] Since instruction no. 14 and the 
exclusion of UTA's maintenance records 
were erroneous, the issue must be addressed 
whether those errors were sufficiently prej-
udicial to constitute grounds for reversal. 
An error is reversible if there is a reasona-
ble likelihood that a more favorable result 
would have been obtained by the complain-
ing party in the absence of the error. 
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 
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Utah, 631 P.2d 865 (1981); Shurtleff v. Jay 
Tuft & Co., Utah, 622 P.2d 1168 (1980); 
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 
2d 448,491 P.2d 1209 (1971). See also Rivas 
v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 
P.2d 990 (1964); Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 
2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961). 
Plaintiffs tried the case on the theory 
that Loosemore was negligent in five dif-
ferent respects in the manner in which he 
drove the bus. Plaintiff also contended 
that UTA was negligent in its maintenance 
of the bus* electrical system. The error in 
instruction no. 14 in directing a verdict on 
proximate cause combined with the exclu-
sion of evidence was clearly prejudicial on 
the theory based on improper maintenance 
of the bus. 
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that 
the errors in instruction no. 14 relating to 
Talbot's negligence and to proximate cause 
and the error in the exclusion of evidence 
were harmless in assessing whether there 
was negligence in the operation of the bus, 
even though the jury found Loosemore not 
negligent. Absent those errors it is reason-
ably possible that the jury would have 
found Loosemore's operation of the bus 
negligent in view of instruction no. 11, 
which is set out in the margin, and a proxi-
mate cause of the accident.1 Whether the 
brake and turn lights were working clearly 
bore on the reasonableness of-the mannerln 
1. Instruction no. 11 stated: 
It was the duty of the defendant, Lester 
Lorenzo Loosemore, to use reasonable care, 
under the circumstances, in driving the bus, 
to avoid danger to himself and others, and to 
observe and be aware of the condition of the 
highway, including its width and shoulders, 
the traffic thereon, and other existing condi-
tions; in that regard, he was obligated to use 
reasonable care in respect to: 
(a) To use reasonable care to keep a look-
out for persons, other vehicles and other con-
ditions reasonably to be seen or anticipated; 
(b) To keep the bus under reasonably safe 
and proper control; 
(c) Not to stop the bus upon the paved or 
main traveled part of the highway when it is 
practical to stop the bus off such paved or 
main traveled part of the highway; 
(d) Not to suddenly stop or decrease his 
speed without first ascertaining that he could 
do so with reasonable safety, and, if other 
which Loosemore stopped the bus and 
where he stopped. 
Plaintiff adduced evidence which made 
the reasonableness of Talbot's conduct and 
that of defendants turn to a significant 
degree upon whether the rear bus lights 
were malfunctioning as well as upon wheth-
er Loosemore stopped too swiftly and failed 
to pull completely out of the traffic lane 
when he stopped. 
Although there was much disputed testi-
mony concerning the operation of the rear 
signal and tail lights, no witness saw the 
brake lights at the time of the accident or 
immediately thereafter. The evidence re-
vealed that the bus had experienced several 
electrical failures in the lighting and relat-
ed systems prior to the accident, and the 
proffered evidence indicated that there had 
been numerous and continued problems 
with the electrical system after the acci-
dent. 
One of Harris' witnesses, an expert in the 
field of accident reconstruction, testified 
that without functioning brake lights a 
slowing or stopping maneuver is very diffi-
cult to perceive in the rear driver's "cone of 
perception" until he is relatively close to the 
stopping vehicle. The expert testified that 
from the point Talbot perceived the bus and 
reacted, he made the best possible effort to 
avoid the accident. A driver of a vehicle 
behind Talbot testified that she was not 
vehicles are to be affected by such move-
ment, not without first giving an appropriate 
signal to the driver to the rear that such 
movement is to be made; either by the exten-
sion of the hand and arm downward or by 
appropriate signal lamps, either such signal 
to be given continuously; 
(e) Not to turn from a direct course or 
from one lane to another without first as-
certaining that such movement can be made 
with reasonable safety, and, if other vehicles 
are to be affected by such movement, not 
without giving an appropriate signal continu-
ously for at least the last three seconds pre-
ceding the beginning of the turn or change, 
either by the appropriate extension of arm 
and hand or by appropriate signal lamps. 
Failure of the defendant, Loosemore, to op-
erate the bus in accordance with any of the 
foregoing requirements of law would consti-
tute negligence on his part. [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
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aware that the bus had stopped until "sud-
denly the space between the jeep and the 
bus, and myself and the jeep was getting 
narrow." Another driver of a vehicle be-
hind Talbot stated, "I didn't realize the bus 
was slowing down or stopping. We didn't 
have any indication it was stopping." 
In sum, the exclusion of the maintenance 
records bore directly on whether the turn 
and brake lights were properly functioning 
and may have been of critical importance 
with respect to plaintiff's theories of negli-
gence, both as to maintenance and manner 
of operation of the bus, and with respect to 
proximate cause. The errors were not 
harmless because there is a reasonable like-
lihood that the jury's verdicts would have 
been different in the absence of error. 
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
Costs to appellants. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, J.T., concur. 
Calvin N. HALL and Rita M. Hall, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. - — 
Perry C. FITZGERALD, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 18371. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 7, 1983. 
Vendors brought action against pur-
chasers to foreclose real estate contract. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
Allen B. Sorensen, J., granted summary 
judgment in favor of vendors, and purchas-
ers appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., 
held that: (1) vendors fulfilled their con-
tractual responsibility to convey "title" to 
purchasers by delivering warranty deed to 
subject property, even though vendors were 
themselves purchasing property under real 
estate contract and therefore never pos-
sessed legal title; (2) denial of purchasers' 
motion to set aside judgment on ground of 
newly discovered evidence was not abuse of 
discretion; and (3) questions as to whether 
remand was required because, prior to fore-
closure sale, trial court entered personal 
judgment against purchasers for any defi-
ciency owing after sale and whether ven-
dors would be unjustly enriched if there 
was deficiency judgment were moot and 
would not be adjudicated. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <s=>181(ll) 
Allegations or denials m pleadings are 
not sufficient basis for opposing summary 
judgment. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>128 
Although, in real estate transaction, 
"title" most often refers to estate in fee 
simple, clear of all encumbrances or inter-
ests of any other person, contract by its 
terms, or circumstances leading up to and 
surrounding transaction, may show that 
parties intended another meaning; under 
such circumstances, "title" can refer to 
wide array of estates or interests, including 
legal title, equitable title, or mere right of 
possession 
3. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»128 
Where, under uniform real estate con-
tract, equitable title would have been 
passed to purchasers when contract was 
signed, "title" required to be passed to pur-
chasers by paragraph of contract was not 
usual unencumbered fee simple estate with 
participation by no other person, inasmuch 
as vendors would have no such title to give, 
but would, at most, refer to legal title re-
tained by vendor. 
4. Vendor and Purchaser ®=> 129(1) 
Although vendors, who were them-
selves purchasing property under real es-
tate contract, never possessed legal title to 
property sold to purchasers, vendors ful-
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panion were apprehended. The juvenile 
was then taken to the Provo Police Station, 
and his mother notified at 12:05 a. m. The 
mother had no transportation and asked the 
juvenile's aunt to go to the Police Station. 
A Detective Baum investigated the cir-
cumstances at the school, and then interro-
gated the juvenile at the Police Station, 
having arrived there at approximately 1:00 
a. m. He there read the juvenile his "Mi-
randa "2 rights, and wrote~down the juve-
nile's statement. The juvenile signed the 
statement at 2:45 a. m., January 6, 1979, 
and was released. 
At the hearing in Juvenile Court, defense 
counsel objected to the admission of the 
written statement and to Detective Baum's 
testimony concerning the juvenile's state-
ment on the ground that a juvenile is incap-
able of voluntarily waiving his constitution-
al rights. The Court overruled this objec-
tion, saying: 
Pending a ruling by the Appellate 
Courts on this question in Utah, there has 
been a fairly uniform position of the trial 
courts of the juvenile system, so if the 
evidence appears to show a knowledge-
able understanding of the rights being 
given and that there's no evidence show-
ing involuntariness, that the simple fact 
of minority, at least at the age of this 
respondent, does not automatically inca-
pacitate him from the legal waiver or a 
separate waiver. So I will overrule your 
objection, but note it for the record. 
On appeal, the juvenile cites this ruling 
as error, and urges this Court to adopt a 
rule which would exclude a juvenile's ad-
missions or confessions made without the 
counsel of his attorney or his parents. In 
addition, the juvenile contends that the po-
lice interrogation was in violation of Sec-
tion 78-3a-29, and that such violation ren-
ders the juvenile's statements inadmissible. 
[1] We have dealt with both of these 
questions at length in State v. Hunt, 607 
P.2d 297 (1980). We there held that the 
purpose of Section 78-3a-29 was not to 
govern police interrogation of juveniles, and 
that the admissibility of the juvenile's con-
fessions or admissions depends upon wheth-
er the juvenile made a knowing and volun-
tary waiver of his constitutional rights in 
light of the total circumstances of his case. 
[2] Here, the Judge determined that 
this confession was voluntary, and that the 
juvenile had waived his rights. The evi-
dence supports this determination. The ju-
venile testified in his own behalf, but the 
only evidence he gave of any "coercive" 
tactics on the part of the police was that 
the officer told him to sign the confession 
because he (the officer) wanted to go home 
and go to bed. The juvenile admitted, how-
ever, that he knew the statement would be 
used against him in court. We do not be-
lieve any coercion existed here which would 
render this confession involuntary. It was 
given by a juvenile, 17 years of age, who, 
according to the record was not unfamiliar 
with the process of the criminal law. 
Affirmed. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
Kerby R. ANDERTON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Terry MONTGOMERY and Tom Mont-
gomery, dba Vernal Hide & Fur Com- -
pany, Defendant and Respondents.. s 
No. 15980. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Peb. 15, 1980. 
Action was brought to recover against 
owners and operators of business for inju-
ries sustained when side of device, which 
2. Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966) 
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was used to exhibit sheet metal samples, 
collapsed and caused samples to crash down 
on plaintiff. The Fourth District Court, 
Uintah County, David Sam, J., dismissed 
action, and plaintiff appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) certain 
instruction did not contradict res ipsa loqui-
tur instructions given, but, rather, merely 
constituted a clarification thereof; (2) in-
struction dealing with unavoidable accident 
did not contradict the theory of res ipsa 
loquitur; (3) unavoidable accident instruc-
tion was not superfluous, confusing, or mis-
leading; and (4) fact that attorney-client 
relationship existed between defense coun-
sel and corporation, of which a juror had 
once been an officer, and that such relation-
ship was not disclosed at voir dire examina-
tion did not result in prejudicial error. 
Affirmed. 
1. Negligence <s=> 121.2(2) 
Purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to permit 
one suffering injury from something which 
was under control of another and which 
ordinarily would not cause injury except for 
the other's negligence, to present grievance 
to a court or jury on basis that an inference 
of negligence may reasonably be drawn 
from such facts, and cast the burden on the 
other to make proof as to what happened. 
2. Negligence <s=> 121.2(3) 
Circumstances which, under doctrine~of 
res ipsa loquitur, would permit trier of fact 
to infer that defendant has engaged in neg-
ligent conduct to injury of the plaintiff, 
are: that the accident was a kind which, in 
the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had due care been observed; 
that plaintiff's own use or operation of the 
agency or instrumentality was not primari-
ly responsible for the injury; and that the 
agency or instrumentality causing the inju-
ry was under exclusive management or con-
trol of the defendant 
3. Negligence <s=> 136(6) 
Weighing of evidence presented to es-
tablish the elements which must be estab-
lished before doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
can be applied is within province of the 
jury. 
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4. Negligence <s=> 136(6), 138(3) 
Where trial court determines that the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to plaintiff, could have established prerequi-
sites to the application of doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, an instruction to that effect is 
proper, and it then becomes jury's responsi-
bility to apply or refuse to apply the doc-
trine, based on its factual findings regard-
ing the circumstantial prerequisites. 
5. Negligence &=> 121.2(9) 
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doc-
trine aiding in proof of negligence; it has 
no bearing on issue of causation, which 
must be separately and independently es-
tablished. 
6. Negligence <&=» 121.5 
Res ipsa loquitur does not relieve plain-
tiff of his obligation of establishing causal 
link between defendant's act or omission 
and plaintiff's injury, but permits plaintiff, 
in lieu of linking his injury to specific act on 
defendant's part, to causally connect it with 
agency or instrumentality, under exclusive 
control of defendant, functioning in manner 
which, under the circumstances, would pro-
duce no injury absent negligence; if agency 
or instrumentality is not established to be 
cause of plaintiff's injury or if it is not 
shown to be under exclusive control of de-
fendant, causal connection is not estab-
lished, and inference of negligent conduct 
giving rise thereto is nullified. 
7. Trial <®=>243 
In action to recover against owners and 
operators of business for injuries sustained 
when side of device, which was used to 
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and 
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff, 
certain instruction, by informing jury that 
"where the precise cause of an accident on 
the whole evidence is left to conjecture or 
speculation, and may be attributed to caus-
es over one or more of which the defend-
ants have no control, as to a cause for which 
the defendant would be responsible " liabili-
ty should not be found, did not contradict 
res ipsa loquitur instructions given by trial 
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court, but, rather, merely constituted a clar-
ification thereof. 
8. Negligence <s=»63 
Where injury arises from a set of cir-
cumstances which do not reflect a lack of 
due care on anyone's part, the accident has 
been "unavoidable" and no recovery may be 
had under a theory of negligence. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
9. Negligence <3=»140 
In action to recover against owners and 
operators of business for injuries sustained 
when side of device, which was used to 
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and 
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff, 
instruction dealing with unavoidable acci-
dent did not contradict plaintiff's theory of 
res ipsa loquitur. 
10. Trial <s=>244(4) 
Though an instruction on unavoidable 
accident amounts to a reemphasis of princi-
ples implicit in other instructions, giving of 
an unavoidable accident instruction is not 
error if it clearly and concisely states the 
principle involved and does not create an 
imbalance in the jury instructions. 
11. Negligence <s=>140 
Trial <s=*229 
In action to recover against owners and 
operators of business for injuries sustained 
when side of device, which was used to 
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and 
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff, 
giving of "unavoidable accident" instruction 
was not superfluous, confusing or mislead-
ing under certain circumstances. 
12y Appeal and Error <s=»233(2) 
Where jury's question in regard to pos-
sibility of assessing 60% of injury to una-
voidable accident and 40% to negligence 
was answered to satisfaction of both par-
ties, plaintiff could not complain on appeal 
that the question posed remained as evi-
dence of the inadequacy of trial court's 
instruction on unavoidable accident. 
13. Constitutional Law <s=>267 
Requirements of due process dictate 
that jury be impartial and unbiased. U.S.C. 
A.Const. Amend. 14; Const, art. 1, §§ 7,10. 
14. New Trial <s=>42(2) 
Trial court may order new trial if it 
appears that juror bias has crept into the 
proceedings notwithstanding voir dire ques-
tioning. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const, 
art. 1, §§ 7, 10; Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 61. 
15. Appeal and Error o=>1170.1 .,•
 { 
Where, in sound discretion of trial 
court, an infraction of a party's rights at 
voir dire questioning has no material impact 
on party's right to impartial jury trial, no 
prejudicial error has occurred. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14; Const, art. 1, §§ 7, 10; 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61. 
16. Appeal and Error <^ =>1170.1 
In action to recover against owners and 
operators of business for injuries sustained 
when side of device, which was used to 
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and 
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff, 
fact that attorney-client relationship exist-
ed between defendant's counsel and corpo-
ration, of which a juror had once been an 
officer, and that such relationship was not 
disclosed at voir dire examination did not 
result in prejudicial error where neither 
counsel nor juror were aware of such rela-
tionship until after the trial had finished. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61. 
George E. Mangan, Roosevelt, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
Stephen B. Nebeker and Paul S. Felt, of 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and respondents. r ^ ^ 
HALL, Justice: yj 
This appeal is taken from the dismissal ,of 
a personal injury action pursued by plain-
tiff Kerby R. Anderton against defendants 
Terry and Tom Montgomery, owners and 
operators of the Vernal Hide and Fur Com-
pany. , * 
ANDERTON v 
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Defendants' business, located in Vernal, 
Utah, deals, among other things, in com-
mercial sale of sheet metal. Plaintiff, a 
part-time welder, visited defendants' place 
of business on September 26, 1975, for the 
purpose of purchasing sheet metal for the 
construction of a metal box. Plaintiff was 
conducted into defendants' business yard by 
defendant Terry Montgomery, and shown a 
display device used to exhibit sheet metal 
samples. The display consisted of a rack, 
set on a pipe frame and holding sheet metal 
samples vertically, such that they could be 
turned from one side to the other, like the 
pages of a book. As plaintiff and another 
individual who had accompanied him began 
turning through the samples, defendant 
Terry Montgomery was called away by a 
telephone call. While plaintiff, assisted by 
his friend and another employee of defend-
ants, continued to examine the samples on 
the rack, the right -side of the pipe frame 
supporting the display collapsed, causing 
the rack bearing the samples to crash down 
onto plaintiff, driving the pipe through the 
flesh of his right hip and buttock. The 
accident resulted in partial, permanent im-
pairment of plaintiff's right hip and leg. 
Plaintiff thereupon instituted suit against 
defendants. At trial, defendants asserted 
that they had used the display device for 
some six months without any prior difficul-
ty, but were unable to point to any specific 
factor which could have been responsible 
for the frame's collapse. Plaintiff was like-
wise unable to establish any specific con-
duct on defendant's part giving rise to the 
collapse. Consequently, plaintiff requested 
that the court instruct the jury regarding 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which in-
struction was given, over defendants' objec-
tion. Defendants requested an instruction 
explaining the nature of an "unavoidable 
accident" under the law, which was also 
given, over plaintiff's objection. The jury 
found neither party negligent and plaintiff 
was therefore denied recovery for his inju-
ries. 
Sometime subsequent to the entry of 
judgment, Mr. Stephen B. Nebeker, counsel 
for defendants, while preparing for the de-
fense of a separate action involving a com-
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pany by the name of H & S Trucking, 
learned that a former owner of that compa-
ny, one LeRoy Dean Huber, had served on 
the jury in the instant case. Neither Mr. 
Nebeker nor Mr. Huber had been aware of 
their connection in this regard at the time 
of the former trial; Mr. Huber had denied, 
on voir dire, any connection or acquaintance 
with either counsel, and Mr. Nebeker had 
never dealt with Mr. Huber pursuant to his 
dealings with H & S Trucking, as Huber 
had sold his interest therein in 1973, while 
the litigation involving the services of Mr. 
Nebeker did not arise until 1974. Mr. Ne-
beker, however, notified the trial court im-
mediately regarding the relationship thus 
discovered, whereupon a hearing was held. 
The trial court ruled that plaintiff's inter-
ests had not been prejudiced by reason of 
the relationship since, at the time of the 
trial, neither Mr. Nebeker nor Mr. Huber 
was aware that it existed 
On appeal, plaintiff first claims prejudice 
by reason of conflict and inconsistency in 
the jury instructions given by the trial 
court below. As previously mentioned, 
plaintiff requested and received instruc-
tions relating to the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, and to its application in the 
present case. The instructions given were 
as follows: ^ 
Instruction No. 4 
Our law recognizes a doctrine known as 
res ipsa loquitur which means: The thing 
speaks for itself. By reason of it, under 
certain circumstances, one who is injured 
may hold another responsible without 
showing the exact conduct of the other 
party that caused or set in motion the act 
that caused the injury. The doctrine of 
law may be applied only under special 
circumstances, they being as follows: 
First: That the rack of sheet metal and 
the stand pipe that broke and collapsed 
upon the plaintiff, Kerby Anderton, 
which proximately caused the injury to 
him, was in the possession and exclusive 
control of the defendants Terry Mont-
gomery and Tom Montgomery at the 
time the cause of injury was set in mo-
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r tion, and that it appears that the injury 
resulted from some act or omission inci-
dent to the manner in which the defend-
ants maintained or constructed or exer-
cised due care in the use of the said rack 
of sheet metal. This does not mean that 
defendants had to be present at the time 
of the injury or that the plaintiff could 
not be engaged in assisting the defend-
ants agents in locating the desired piece 
of .sheet metal. 
Second: That the incident was one of 
such nature as does not or would not have 
happened in the ordinary course of 
things, if those who have control of or are 
responsible for the rack of sheet metal, 
use ordinary care. 
Third: That the circumstances sur-
rounding the causing of the occurrence 
were such that the plaintiff is not in a 
position to know what specific conduct or 
act or omission or failure to act, was the 
cause, whereas the defendants, being 
those in charge of their yard and the rack 
of sheet metal, may be reasonably expect-
ed to know, and thus to be able to explain 
their lack of negligence. (See Sanone v. 
J. C. Penny [sic] Company, 17 Utah 2d 46, 
404 P.2d 248). 
If you find all of the above conditions 
to exist, they may give rise to an infer-
ence by you that the defendants were 
negligent, which inference will support a 
verdict for the plaintiff, in the absence of 
evidence of non-negligence on the part of 
the defendants. 
Instruction No. 4a 
If you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the sheet metal which 
collapsed on Kerby Anderton when the 
stand pipe holding the same broke, was in 
the possession and exclusive control of 
the defendants, as I have explained the 
* same to you; and, if you further find 
that the incident causing such an injury is 
of such a nature as . would [not] 
have happened in the ordinary course of 
events if the rack of sheet metal had been 
properly constructed and or maintained; 
and, if you shall further find that the 
plaintiff is not in a position to know what 
was the specific reason for the breaking 
of the stand pipe and the collapse of the 
sheet metal, whereas the defendants as 
the possessors of said yard, and have the 
exclusive right to the control of the same, 
may be reasonably expected to know the 
reason for the same, and to thus explain 
their lack of negligence; then upon your 
making such findings, there arises an in-
ference that the proximate cause of the 
occurrence was some negligent conduct 
on the part of the defendants. The infer-
ence is a form of evidence, and if there is 
none other tending to overcome it, or if 
the inference, to your minds, preponder-
ates over contrary evidence, it would 
warrant a verdict for the plaintiff. 
Therefore, you should consider this inf er-
ence together with all of the other evi-
dence in the case in determining your 
verdict. 
Defendants, over plaintiff's objection, se-
cured the submission of an instruction relat-
ing to causation, which read as follows: 
Instruction No. 17 
You are instructed that where the pre-
cise cause of an accident on the whole 
evidence is left to conjecture or specula-
tion, and may be as reasonably attributed 
to causes over one or more of which the 
defendants has no control, as to a cause 
for which the defendants would be re-
sponsible, then, and in that event, there 
has been a failure in the required burden 
of proof. If you find from the evidence 
in this case that it is just as likely that 
the accident resulted from causes beyond 
the control of defendants as from negli-
gence or fault, then the burden of proof 
as against such defendants have not been 
met, and such defendants are entitled to 
your verdict in their favor, no cause of 
action. 
Defendants likewise requested and se-" 
cured (again over plaintiff's objection) the 
reading of an instruction relating to the 
doctrine of "unavoidable or inevitable acci-
dent." The instruction stated that, 
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Instruction No. 19 \ * 
In law we recognize what we term as 
unavoidable or inevitable accidents. 
These terms do not mean literally that it 
was not possible for such an accident to 
be avoided. They simply denote an acci-
dent that occurred without having been 
proximately caused by negligence. Even 
if such an accident could have been avoid-
ed by the exercise of exceptional fore-
sight, skill or caution, still no one may be 
held liable for injuries resulting from it. 
Both negligence and proximate cause, as 
defined in these instructions, are requi-
sites for [finding] liability. If you find 
from the evidence in this case that the 
accident occurred without negligence on 
the part of defendants or was not proxi-
mately caused by any negligence on the 
part of defendants, you should answer 
interrogatory No. 3 "No". 
It is plaintiff's contention that instruc-
tions 17 and 19 conflict with and contradict 
instructions 4 and 4a, dealing with res ipsa 
loquitur, in that they suggest the incumben-
cy, upon plaintiff, of producing evidence of 
specific acts of negligence on the part of 
defendants, where res ipsa loquitur specifi-
cally obviates the necessity of doing so, 
permitting plaintiff to establish negligence 
on defendants' part by inference drawn 
from circumstantial evidence. 
[1-4] Turning first to plaintiff's conten-
tion that instruction 17 was inconsistent 
with the application of res ipsa loquitur, we 
note that he correctly characterizes the un-
derlying function and purpose of that doc-
trine. As previously stated by this Court, 
the purpose of res ipsa loquitur is "to per-
1. Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co, 10 Utah 2d 
276, 351 P 2d 952 (1960), see also Joseph v. W. 
H Groves Latter Day Saint Hospital, 10 Utah 
2d 94, 348 P 2d 935 (1960), White v Pinney, 99 
Utah 484, 108 P 2d 249 (1940) 
2. This is not to say that any contributory negli-
gence on plaintiff's part prevents the applica-
tion of the doctrine, such that it may not be 
used in those cases where plaintiff is seeking 
partial recover/ under Utah's comparative neg-
ligence statute (U C A , 1953, 78-27-37) The 
requirement here is that plaintiffs use of the 
agency or instrumentality not be primarily re-
mit one who suffers injury from something 
under the control of another, which ordinar-
ily would not cause injury except for the 
other's negligence, to present his grievance 
to a court or jury on the basis that an 
inference of negligence may reasonably be 
drawn from such facts; and cast the burden 
upon the other to make proof of what hap-
pened." l It is often the case that a plain-
tiff, while suffering injury which was 
caused by a force or agency allegedly insti-
gated by defendant's conduct, is .unable to 
produce evidence pinpointing a given act or 
omission on the part of defendant which 
breached a legally imposed standard of 
care. Where this is the case, the law per-
mits plaintiff to withdraw from the specific 
conduct constituting negligence, and con-
centrate upon presenting evidence proba-
tive of circumstances which would permit 
the trier of fact to infer that defendant had 
engaged in negligent conduct to the injury 
of the plaintiff. Such circumstances, which 
have been defined by law, are (1) that the 
accident was of a kind which, in the ordi-
nary course of events, would not have hap-
pened had due care been observed; (2) that 
the plaintiff's own use or operation of the 
agency or instrumentality was not primari-
ly responsible for the injury;2 and (3) that 
the agency or instrumentality causing the 
injury was under the exclusive manage-
ment or control of the defendant.3 It is to 
be noted that the weighing of evidence 
presented to establish the above elements, 
like all other questions of fact, is within the 
province of the jury; where the trial court 
determines that the evidence, viewed in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, could 
establish the prerequisites to the application 
sponsible for the injury, not that his actions be 
free from negligence of any kind (Note that 
the comparative negligence provision bars par-
tial recovery under any type of proof where 
plaintiffs negligence equals oi exceeds that of 
the defendant) See 58 Am.Jur 2d Negligence, 
§ 481, p 58 -
3. Wightman v Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5 
Utah 2d 373, 302 P 2d 471 (1956), Moore v 
James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P 2d 221 (1956), Loos 
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 
P.2d 254 (1940) 
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of the doctrine, an instruction to that effect 
is proper. It then becomes the jury's re-
sponsibility to apply, or refuse to apply, the 
doctrine based on its factual findings re-
garding the circumstantial prerequisites.4 
[5-7] With regard to instruction 17 in 
the present case, however, we must observe 
that res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doc-
trine aiding in the proof of negligence; it 
has no bearing on the issue of causation, 
which must be separately and independent-
ly established.5 As in any negligence ac-
tion, a legally-recognizable causal link must 
be established between defendant's act or 
omission and plaintiff's injury. Absent 
such a causal relationship, defendant's con-
duct, negligent or otherwise, gives rise to 
no liability.6 Res ipsa loquitur does not 
relieve plaintiff of this obligation; rather, 
it permits him, in lieu of linking his injury 
to a specific act on defendant's part, to 
causally connect it with an agency or in-
strumentality, under the exclusive control 
of the defendant, functioning in a manner 
which, under the circumstances, would pro-
duce no injury absent negligence. How-
ever, where the agency or instrumentality 
is not established to be the cause of plain-
tiff's injury, or where it is not shown to be 
under the exclusive control of the defend-
ant, the causal connection is not established, 
and the inference of negligent conduct, giv-
ing rise thereto is nullified. Instruction 17, 
by informing the jury_that "where the pre-
cise cause of an accident on the whole evi-
dence is left to conjecture
 j or speculation, 
and may be attributed to causes over one or 
more of which the defendants has no con-
trol, as to a cause for which the defendant 
would be responsible," liability should not 
be found, was simply specifying that, under 
such circumstances, the prerequisites of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would thereby 
be lacking. As such, instruction 17 does not 
contradict the res ipsa loquitur instructions 
4. Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, foot-
note 1. 
5. See Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, 
§ 12.03[1], p 284. 
given, but constitutes merely a clarification 
thereof. 
[8,9] For similar reasons, we are unper-
suaded that jury instruction 19, dealing 
with unavoidable accident, contradicts the 
theory of res ipsa loquitur. Unavoidable 
accident, rather than being a separate legal 
doctrine, is simply a recognition of the fact 
that an incident causing injury to the plain-
tiff does not necessarily give rise to liability 
in the defendant. Where the injury arises 
from a set of circumstances which do not 
reflect a lack of due care on anyone's part, 
no recovery may be had under a theory of 
negligence, the accident having been "una-
voidable."7 Instruction 19, therefore, 
merely cautioned the jury that, absent per-
suasive proof presented by the plaintiff (by 
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or 
otherwise) that defendant had engaged in 
negligent conduct which resulted in an inju-
ry to the plaintiff, no liability was to be 
found, the injury arising from an unavoida-
ble accident. ; 
Plaintiff next focuses on the allegedly 
improper use of the "unavoidable accident" 
instruction under any circumstances. It is 
plaintiff's contention that the unavoidable 
accident instruction, by expressly restating 
what is no more than a legal truism implied 
in instructions relating to negligence and 
causation, is at best superfluous,jand at 
worst confusing and misleading to the jury. 
[10] As explained above, a properly-
drafted unavoidable accident instruction 
punctuates the necessity of finding both 
negligence and causation prior to assigning 
liability. It is true that such an instruction 
amounts, in essence, to a reemphasis of 
principles already implicit in other instruc-
tions. Such fact, in and of itself, is not 
prejudicial, however, unless it results in the 
instructions given being weighted, as a 
7. Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 
(1970); Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 
210, 436 P.2d 442 (1968); Porter vrPrice, 11 
Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66 (1960). 
6. Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 
664 (1966). 
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whole, in favor of the defendant.8 As such, 
an unavoidable accident instruction is not 
error if it clearly and concisely states the 
principle involved, and does not create an 
imbalance in the jury instructions.9 
[11,12] Instruction 19 adequately ex-
plains the concept of unavoidable accident. 
The final sentence thereof, stating, "If you 
find from the evidence in this case that the 
accident occurred without negligence on the 
part of defendants or was not proximately 
caused by any negligence on the part of the 
defendants, you should answer interrogato-
ry No. 3 'No,'" sufficiently links the in-
struction to those other theories presented 
to the jury to enable them to perceive its 
significance in context.10 It is to be noted, 
moreover, that the giving of instruction 19 
in no way created an unfair imbalance of 
the instructions given to the jury. In light 
of the instructions already given regarding 
the use of circumstantial evidence under 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, we deem it 
not only permissible but indeed proper that 
the need to find negligence, by one means 
or another, be reemphasized prior to the 
beginning of deliberations. 
Plaintiff's final point on appeal deals 
with the relationship existing between juror 
Huber and defense counsel Nebeker. Plain-
tiff's theory runs as follows: Mr. Huber's 
failure to disclose his relationship with Mr. 
Nebeker, even though based on total igno-
tunity to challenge Mr. Huber, either for 
cause or peremptorily. As such, plaintiff 
was denied the right of full information and 
selective processes in jury selection, and 
was therefore denied trial by an impartial 
jury. We cannot agree with plaintiff's 
analysis. 
[13-15] Trial by jury in civil cases is 
guaranteed under the Utah Constitution.11 
Moreover, the requirements of due process 
dictate that the jury be impartial and unbi-
ased.12 It is in furtherance of these rights 
that voir dire examination of prospective 
jurors before the beginning of trial is en-
gaged in. For the same reason, a trial 
court may order a new trial should it ap-
pear that juror bias crept into the proceed-
ings notwithstanding voir dire question-
ing.13 This is not to say, however, that it is 
incumbent upon a trial court to order a new 
trial whenever information is revealed 
which was not discovered by voir dire ques-
tioning addressed thereto. It is impartial 
jury trial, not complete voir dire question-
ing, that is the ultimate right involved. 
Where, in the sound discretion of the trial 
court, an infraction of the latter has no 
material impact upon the former, no preju-
dicial error has occurred.14 
[16] Given, in the present case, that an 
attorney-client relationship existed between 
Mr. Nebeker and the corporation of which 
ranee of that relationship, denied plaintiff's , Mr. Huber had at one time been an officer, 
counsel full opportunity to question regard- and that such relationship was not disclosed 
ing the matter during voir dire. As such, upon voir dire examination, we are none-
plaintiff's right to voir dire was improperly theless constrained to agree with the trial 
curtailed, resulting in an inadequate oppor- court that no prejudicial error resulted 
8. Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 
(1955). 
9. Calahan v. Wood, supra, footnote 7. 
10. Plaintiff, attempting to show that the una-
voidable accident instruction was confusing to 
the jury, points to a note delivered to the court 
inquiring after the possibility of assessing 60 
percent of the injury to unavoidable accident 
and 40 percent to negligence. Such evidence 
would be more persuasive had not the trial 
court, in concert with counsel of both parties 
and by their express approval, submitted a 
clarifying instruction to the jury regarding the 
proper use of unavoidable accident. The jury's 
question having been answered to the satisfac-
tion of both parties, plaintiff may not now be 
heard to state that the question posed remains 
as evidence of the inadequacy of the instruc-
tion. 
11. See Article I, Section 10, Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
12. See Article I, Section 7, Constitution of the 
State of Utah; Amendment 14, Constitution of 
the United States. 
13. Rule 59(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
14. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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therefrom. The evil to be avoided in any 
relationship between juror and counsel is 
that of improper bias or prejudice, which 
arises, not from the fact of the relationship 
itself, but only from an awareness thereof. 
Mr. Huber can hardly be suspected of in-
clining toward the representations of Mr. 
Nebeker due to a relationship existing be-
tween the two of them of which neither 
was aware until after the trial had finished. 
For this reason, impartiality of the jury was 
undiminished by the relationship, and no 
prejudicial error occurred. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
Costs awarded to defendants. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
( o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Torval ALBRECHT, Sherwood Albrecht, 
Maurice Albrecht, M. Steve Albrecht 
and Carl Albrecht & Sons, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
URANIUM SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 15996. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 15, 1980. 
Summary judgment entered by the 
Seventh District Court, Emery County, 
Boyd Bunnell, J., quieting title to certain 
mining claims in plaintiffs was affirmed on 
appeal, 596 P.2d 1025, and petition by de-
fendants for rehearing was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that a 
dispute of material facts was presented so 
as to preclude entry of summary judgment 
in case. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Judgment <s=> 181(15) 
A dispute of material facts on issue of 
whether mining operations had been con-
ducted on mining claims was presented so 
as to preclude entry of summary judgment 
in suit to quiet title to certain mining 
claims. 
Leonard W. Burningham, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant. 
Tex R. Olsen, Richfield, for plaintiffs and 
respondents. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
A petition for rehearing was granted by 
this Court after its opinion, Utah, 596 P.2d 
1025 (1979), was rendered on May 29, 1979. 
Petitioner, Uranium Services, Inc. asserts 
the same point on rehearing as it asserted 
on appeal; to wit: that genuine issues of 
material facts have been raised by the 
pleadings including affidavits filed by both 
parties, and that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment. Respondents 
Albrecht again contend that the appeal was 
not timely filed. 
This Court is still of the opinion that the 
appeal was timely filed, as discussed by Mr. 
Justice Maughan in the original opinion. 
Upon reconsideration, however, this 
Court is of the view that a dispute of mate-
rial facts has been presented and on that 
issue we adopt the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Stewart, concurred in by Mr. Chief 
Justice Crockett, in the original decision of 
this case, Albrecht, ante, 596 P.2d at 1027-
28. 
The summary judgment entered by the 
District Court of Emery County is therefore 
reversed and this case is remanded for trial 
on the merits. Costs to defendant, Ura-
nium Services, Inc. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
Maughan, J., dissented. MAUGHAN, J., dissents. 
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Elsa H. NIXDOBF, Plaintiff 
"'• ' • and Appellant, 
^ ', ' 
N I rederick.HICKEN and A. Ja 
McAllister, Defendants and 
.Respondents. 
No. 16151 
('-our 
M 
Patient brought medical malpractice 
i '" i\ based on allegatior that surgeon 
•ned his duty when h<- left a surgical 
15* needle in the patient's body and 
1
 omitted to inform the patient 
,..«- . , xieedle "had been left in "her body. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
James S. Sawaya, J.,, granted a directed 
verdict in favor of defendants, and the 
patient. appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Maughan, J., held that: (1) while the Su^ 
preme Court would not say that the sur-
geon's initial loss of the needle was negligent 
as a matter of law, the patient was not re-
quired to present expert testimony to estab-
lish that the continued presence of the needle 
in the patient's body more probably than not 
resulted from negligence; (2) under the cir-
cumstances, the application of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur created a rebuttable 
inference of negligence sufficient to carry 
the patient's case past the motion for non-
suit; (3) the evidence presented a question 
for the jury as to whether the defendants 
were negligent in failing to disclose the 
presence of the needle; and (4) the trial 
court erred in granting a directed verdict 
against the patient. 
Reversed and remanded, 
Stewart, J., dissented in part and con-
curred in part and filed opinion.- . 
I I' itysidans and. Surgeons. <e=» 14(4) 
In malpractice actions generally, a ph> 
sit'ian is held to the standard of skill that is 
employed by his contemporaries in the same 
or similar communities. 
2. Physicians • and Surgeons <s=> 18.6(1
 11.-,;: > 
"
:iln 'Order for plaintiff to prevail, in-a 
medical malpractice action, plaintiff must 
establish both the standard of care require*1 
of the defendant as a practicing physicia 
in the community and that, the defenda; 
did not employ ..that standard, • 
3. Physicians and Surgeons '<s=» 18.80(9) 
Although, in the majority of medk 
malpractice cases, the plaintiff must intro-
duce expert testimony to establish the stan-
dard of care, such testimony is unnecessary 
to establish the standard of care when the 
propriety of the treatment received is with-
in the common knowledge and exp< 
of the layman; the loss of a surgical instr 
ment or other paraphernalia in the opert 
ing site exemplifies such treatment. 
4. Phy sicians and. Surgeons <s=» 18.80(8) 
W here surgeon lost a curved cutting 
needle in the operating site while repairing 
"patient's rectocele, patient-was not required,' 
to introduce expert testimony to establish? 
the applicable professional standard of care? 
5. Physicians and Surgeons *s=> 15(12) 
Where curved cutting needle became^ 
disengaged from needle holder while'$ur| 
geon was repairing a rectocele, the fact that| 
the' surgeon realized that the needle waS 
lost arid attempted to locate it by palr»Qfl'n°" 
the suspect area did not obviate the 
quences of the loss or relieve the surg 
liability for any breach of duty arising 
the initial loss of the needle. 
-oifc 
6. Phj sicians and,"Surgeons <s=> 15(14)^ 
Whether or not surgeon acted rieglig 
gently in leaving lost surgical needled 
patients body after unsuccessfully attemp 
ing to locate the needle was a separ^ 
question from the question whether theffin 
tial loss of the needle was a breach of du| 
7. Physicians and Surgeons «=» 18.60 ?•*?« 
When the appropriate evidentiarjMja^ 
is presented, a patient may employ t hem 
trine of res ipsa loquitur in order-to'm| 
his burden to prove that a physician| 
surgeon did not exercise the level of sK 
required by the applicable community, st| 
dard of care. 
8. Negligence <s=> 121.2(2) 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a 
procedural rather than a substantive rule! of 
law which carries the plaintiff past a mo-
tion for nonsuit when the circumstantial 
evidence presented by the plaintiff is suffi-
cient to support the application of the doc-
trine and the inference of negligence. 
9. Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60 
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was more probably than not the result of 
negligence and, therefore, expert testimony 
was not required to establish that element 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
13. Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60 
Evidence that cutting needle became 
disengaged from needle holder while sur-
geon was repairing patient's rectocele, that 
Generally, utilization of the doctrine oL__ the needle thereafter remained present in 
f res ipsa loquitur in a medical malpractice 
| case requires introduction of expert medical 
"" testimony to establish that the outcome 
I "more likely resulted from negligence than 
^from some other cause. 
; 10. Physicians and Surgeons &=> 18.80(9) 
. {* In certain situations, a medical proce-
? '(lure is so common or the outcome to the 
patient so affronts notions of medical pro-
priety that expert testimony is not required 
Ho establish what would occur in the ordi-
na ry course of events and, in this type of 
[Situation, the patient can rely on the com-
| mon knowledge and understanding of lay-
~;;inen to establish that the outcome would 
ynot have happened had the physician or 
^urgeon utilized due care. 
1}K Negligence <s=> 121.2(8) 
pCu When the instrumentality which caused 
Ih©} injury was in the exclusive control of 
pendant and plaintiff did not participate 
Ifthe acts causing the injury, negligence 
fiy be inferred from the injury alone if the 
l&U8e of injury is so obviously negligent 
&t negligence may be inferred as a matter 
^ law or if people would know from com-
mon experience that the result would not 
*Ve happened without negligence or if 
|Cfe..is expert testimony that the injury 
|£Ujd not have occurred if proper care had 
"Bri^ used. 
^Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60 
^Though the Supreme Court declined to 
JUhat surgeon was negligent as a matter 
|yaw when he allowed a needle to become 
^gaged from its needle holder during 
ery, the ultimate fact that the needle 
gained present in the body of the patient 
'
r 8Uc
" that laymen could know from 
amon knowledge and experience that it 
the patient's body, that the instrumientality 
which caused the ultimate bad result was in 
the exclusive control of the surgeon and 
that the patient was under a general anes-
thetic and could not participate in or con-
tribute in the act causing the injury provid-
ed a sufficient evidentiary foundation for 
applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and 
created a rebuttable inference of negligence 
sufficient to carry patient's case against 
surgeon past motion for nonsuit. 
14. Physicians and Surgeons <&=> 18.60 
In a medical malpractice action, the 
defendant may introduce evidence to rebut 
an inference of negligence arising from the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
15. Physicians and Surgeons <s=» 18.90 
While the defendant may introduce 
conflicting medical testimony on the cause 
of the injury after the patient has present-
ed evidence creating a rebuttable inference 
of negligence, this conflicting medical testi-
mony should not be relied on by the tnal 
judge to remove the case from the jury; 
rather, such testimony establishes a conflict 
in the evidence which it is the jury's duty to 
resolve. 
16. Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60 
In a medical malpractice action, the 
plaintiff has the burden to prove that the 
negligence of defendant proximately caused 
the injury. 
17. Physicians and Surgeons <e» 18.80(7) 
Proof that the negligence of defendant 
proximately caused the patient's injury re-
quires some expert testimony. 
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. * * *! *' *<t 11 > a rid Surgeons *=> 18.90 
• -nony of defendant surgeon, an ac-
j>A expert, that needle that was 
*^^ aw
 F.ain tiff's body after surgical proce-
dure was in a position such that it could 
- " • ice pain was sufficient to render causa-
question of fact for the jury,'even 
h there was conflicting evidence that 
patient's pain was due to other medical 
abnormalities. 
19. 'Physicians and Surgeons <e=> 18.90 
• In :a medical .malpractice action, it Is 
not necessary that the proximate cause of 
injury sustained through a physician's neg-
ligence be proved with exactitude; if the 
injury could be attributed to two or more 
causes, one of which was the negligence of 
a doctor, it is for the jury to determine 
which was the proximate cause of the inju-
ry 
20. Physicians and Surgeons <s=» 18.90 
Evidence in medical malpractice action 
presented a jury question whether surgeon 
was negligent in failing to disclose to pa-
tient that a needle had been left in the 
.patient's body during a surgical procedure. 
21. Ph.) sicians and. Surgeons .<s=»15(8) 
Relationship between a doctor and a 
patient creates a duty in the physician to 
•disclose to the patient'any .material infor-
mation concerning -the ,patient's, physical, 
condition. 
22. Physicians and Surgeons • <3=>15(8) 
• The physician's duty to disclose to his 
patient any material information concern-
ing the patient's physical condition stems 
from the fiduciary nature of the physician-
patient relationship and from the patient's 
right to determine what shall or shall not 
be done with his body. 
23. Physicians and Surgeons <@»15(8) 
Scope of a'" physician's duty to inform 
the patient is defined by the materiality of 
the information in the decisional process of 
an ordinary individual; if a reasonable per-
son in the position of the patient would 
consider the information important in 
choosing a course of treatment, then the 
information is material and disclosure is 
required. ; ; 
24. phy8 i c i a n 8 a n d Surgeons -<8=> 18.90 
In a medical malpractice action where-
in plaintiff alleges that physician was negli-
gent'in failing to disclose certain material 
information to the patient, it is for the jury 
to determine what a reasonable 'person 
would consider material information in"*>a 
decision concerning his well being. "'•'<•} 
25. Physicians and Surgeons «=» 18.90 ^ 
Once the duty to disclose certain info 
mation to the patient is est 
the physician's total breach 
presents a jury question as to whai dar 
ages were proximately cause-1 ^ 4h, 
breach. 
.26. Physicians and Surgeons «=»ll 
When a physician fails to disclose to his 
<^ieni any information concerns 
fa*, i, there is no question ^ 
judgment and no question of practue J> 
yond the knowledge of laymen which mm 
be established through expert testimony i 
.order to prove liability ^ _
 ::V 
27. Evidence <s=»574 " : w ^ 
In determining the existence an^ 
tent of a physician's duty to disclose in 
particular situation, the jury need not d< 
pend solely on expert testimony , : 
- •
 ; : . ' • ' _ ; . , • > & . 
28. Physicians and Surgeons 0=^15(8) A>K3 
When a physician has knowledgej.ofj'B/ 
fact'concerning the patient's physical condi-
tion which is material to that; patient-an/ 
when the physician fails to disclose the fact, 
the relationship between the physician:and 
patient may render the physician's silenc 
fraudulent. 
29.' Physicians and Surgeon** <s=> 18.110 > 
Damages which may u sh«>wn tcrfig 
low as a proximate result of physician* 
nondisclosure to patient of material -fact 
concerning patient's condition include res 
sonable charges for discovery and repai r^ 
any resultant injury and monetary compejg 
' sation for mental anguish ' **" - :1£""§| 
'••''" - * '-rfitfwSI 
Edward M. Garrett, Salt Lake City; '^ | 
plaintiff and appellant . - •:';"lr;!0?I 
NIXDORF v. HICKEN 
Cite as, Utah, 612 P.2d 348 
. John H. Snow, Salt Lake City, for de- the plaintiff as his patient.3 
fendants and respondents. 
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MAUGHAN, Justice: 
? The plaintiff appeals the district court's 
granting of a directed verdict in favor of 
the defendants. Following the preservation 
of the plaintiff's case the defendants moved 
pursuant to Rule 50 for a directed verdict. 
The court granted the motion and entered 
its judgment thereon. We reverse and re-
mand the action for a new trial. All statu-
tory references are to Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953, as amended. 
For a period of approximately ten years, 
the plaintiff, Elsa H. Nixdorf, suffered 
-from a cystocele and rectocele.1 In June 
1964 she contacted the defendant, Dr. N. 
Frederick Hicken, concerning the allevia-
tion of these problems.2 Although Dr. 
Hicken initially counseled the plaintiff on 
the necessity of a hysterectomy, during the 
subsequent operation which he performed 
'on June 5, 1964, he elected instead to mere-
ly repair the cystocele and rectocele and 
amputate a portion of the plaintiff's cervix. 
The repair of the cystocele was completed 
\ without incident. However, during the re-
pair of the rectocele one of the curved 
; cutting needles used to suture the torn dia-
phragm became disengaged from the nee-
: dleholder. Although the doctor realized the 
^needle remained in the operating site, his 
j attempts to locate it by palpating the sus-
~peet area were unsuccessful and the opera-
tion was completed without recovery of the 
''lost needle. 
^ Following the operation, the plaintiff re-
* mained under the care of Dr. Hicken until 
t'his retirement on July 1, 1970, when his 
^partner, Dr. A. James McAllister, assumed 
1
3 !• These terms refer to the bladder and rectum 
^ respectively and denominate a condition in 
which these organs protrude from the abdomi-
nal cavity through a rupture in the pelvic dia-
xbs ^  a&m and into the vaginal area 
t *• The other defendant, Dr James McAllister, 
ft£ W a s a Partner of Dr Hicken at the time of the 
J * operation and following Dr Hicken's retire-
1 m e n t
 assumed the plaintiff as a patient 
Notwithstand-
ing the plaintiff's repeated complaints of 
pain in the pelvic-abdominal area, Dr. Hick-
en and Dr. McAllister never informed her 
of the presence of the needle. In fact, the 
plaintiff had no knowledge of the presence 
of the needle until 1976 when Dr. Robert 
Maddock, who she consulted because of low-
er abdominal pain, revealed its presence to 
her.4 
At trial the plaintiff averred the defend-
ant Hicken was negligent in the perform-
ance of the 1964 operation and because of 
his negligence, she has incurred certain 
damages, e. g., pain and suffering and re-
lated medical expenses. Plaintiff also aver-
red the defendants acted negligently in not 
informing her of the presence of the needle. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, 
the defendants moved pursuant to Rule 50, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a direct-
ed verdict on the grounds the evidence 
presented by the plaintiff was insufficient 
as a matter of law to create a jury question 
on the defendants' negligence. The trial 
judge granted this motion on the basis of 
the plaintiff's failure to introduce expert 
testimony to establish the applicable stan-
dards of care. 
[1,2] In malpractice actions generally 
the physician is held to the standard of skill 
employed by his contemporaries in the same 
or similar communities. Therefore, before 
the plaintiff can prevail in a medical mal-
practice action, he must establish both the 
standard of care required of the defendant 
as a practicing physician in the community 
and the defendant's failure to employ that 
standard. 
3. Although Dr McAllister was not present at 
the original operation, the plaintiffs files con-
tain the Operation Report which under jthe 
heading "Complications" states "A small 
curved cutting needle was broken while repair-
ing the rectocele and is apparently lying in the 
levator am or the gluteus muscle or fascia on 
the left side 
4. Dr Maddock became aware of the needle 
from x-rays taken of the area for use in his care 
of the plaintiff 
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In the majority of medical malpractice 
cases the plaintiff must introduce expert 
testimony to establish this standard of care. 
Expert testimony is required because the 
nature of the profession removes the partic-
ularities of its practice from the knowledge 
and understanding of the average citizen. 
[3] However, this Court has recognized 
certain exceptions to the general rule re-
quiring expert testimony.5 Specifically, ex-
pert testimony is unnecessary to establish 
the standard of care owed
 : the plaintiff 
where the propriety of the treatment re-
ceived is within the common knowledge and 
experience of the layman. The loss of a 
surgical instrument or. other paraphernalia, 
in the operating site, exemplifies this type 
of treatment. We explained in Fredrickson 
v. Maw:B 
Whether'" a surgical operation, was un-
skillfully or skillfully performed is a sci-
entific question. If, however, a surgeon 
should lose the instrument with which he 
operates in the incision ' ; , it 
would seem as a matter of common sense 
that scientific opinion could throw little 
light on the subject. '-''"" 
[4-6] The loss of the surgical cutting 
needle by Hickeri falls squarely within the 
perimeters of this exception to the general 
5. See Marsh v, Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 
' P.2d 1108 (1959). 
6. Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 388, 227 
' P.2d 772, 773 (1951); quoting from Wharton v. 
Warner, 75 Wash." 470, 135 P.-. 235, 237 (1913); 
.. see also Lipman v. Lustig, 346. Mass. 182, 190 
N.E.2d 675 (1963); Taylor v. Milton, 353 Mich. 
421, 92N.W.2d57(1958); Ballance v. Dunning-
ton, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N.W. 329 (1928). 
7. The trial court appeared to have overlooked 
the initial breach of the defendant's duty, i. e., 
the loss of the needle. The defendant's realiza-
tion of the absence of the needle and his at-
tempt to retrieve it does not obviate the conse-
quences of its loss. Whether or not the defend-
ant acted negligently in leaving the needle in 
the person of the plaintiff represents a separate 
issue. The plaintiffs failure to present a prima 
facie case on that issue does not eliminate the 
defendant's responsibility for the initial loss. 
8. See Talbot V. Dr. W. H. Groves' Latter-Day 
Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 
(1968). 
rule. The guidance provided by expert * 
timony is unnecessary in this situation "B 
therefore, expert testimony should not h 
been required to establish the professionals 
standard of care under the facts ofuthe*'. 
present case.7 :•.-- -• ustr 
Concomitant with the establishment0^ 
• - *- - *4 'fa 
the community standard is the plaintiffs* 
proof that the defendant failed to exercisej 
the level • of skill this standard requires^ 
[7,8] When the appropriate evidentiary^ 
basis is presented a plaintiff may ampler 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a~ 
this burden.8 This doctrine establishes, ai 
inference of negligence from the circum-
stances incident to the operation.9 It fs" 
procedural rather than substantive ruleipi 
law which carries the plaintiff past a'rric: 
tion for nonsuit where the circumstahtii., 
evidence introduced by the plaintiff is suffiS 
cient to support the application of tbe'di 
t:i ine and its inference of negligence.10 ? 
.KC-JB0' 
delineated the evidentiary foundati 
hi :!:li the plaintiff must establish befoj 
emr. I : •} ing th E d : 2ti ine of res, ipsa loquit. 
in M ooi e i , J am ssl:l t ; hen we s t « ^ * 
The rule is appli< 
. (1) The accident v. as of'a kir 
* the ordinary eour^ of events, «-
have" happened had the defendant* us 
9. Joseph v.-Dr. W H Groves' JL 
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, " " 
(1960). In Joseph, this Court 
basis for the application of p 
malpractice actions when w* 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur spnngs Trcm.fi 
very practical process of drawing logicaljp 
elusions from circumstantial evidence. Jtgp, 
pose is to permit one who suffers injuring 
something under the control of anothencmlifc 
ordinarily would not cause the injury excep 
the other's negligence, to present his griek 
to a court or jury on the basis of the reasbj 
inferences to be drawn from such factsjfc 
th9ugh he may be unable to presented 
.evidence of the other's negligence.'^^348^ 
at 936. 'J'tr-*\t 
10. 1 urnei v. Willis, M Hawaii ciiy, 5b26 
710 (1978). . . . . . . . . «^rl 
11. Moore v. James, 
221, 224 (1956). • 
:> i t a r 2 d ^ 9*> 
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instrument or thing control of the defendant, and the plaintiff due care, (2) the 
causing the injury was at the time of the 
accident under the management and con-
trol of the defendant, and (3) the accident 
happened irrespective of any participa-
tion at the time by the plaintiff. 
[9] The establishment of this evidentia-
ry basis presents a peculiar problem to a 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case be-
cause of the necessity of showing what the 
usual outcome of a medical procedure would 
be when the required due care is employed. 
Generally, this requires the introduction of 
expert medical testimony to establish the 
fact the outcome is more likely the result of 
negligence than some other cause. This 
testimony would be necessary to provide 
the evidentiary basis from which the jury 
could conclude the result is more probably 
than not due to the negligence of the at-
tending physician.12 
[101 However, in certain situations, the 
medical procedure is so common or the out-
come so affronts our notions of medical 
propriety that expert testimony is not re-
quired to establish what would occur in the 
ordinary course of events. In this type of 
situation the plaintiff can rely on the com-
mon knowledge and understanding of lay-
,men to establish this element.13 
c [11] Therefore, when the instrumentali-
ty causing the injury is in the exclusive 
-i _ __ 
-12. See Talbot, supra note 8, 440 P 2d at 873 
"513. This Court has previously recognized this 
exception in Frednckson v Maw, supra note 6, 
* 227 P 2d at 773, where we quoted "So, in this 
p
 case, where a surgeon loses a metallic spnng 
in the body of his patient, and fails to 
_ discover and remove it, it would seem that a 
K
 jury would have abundant justification for in-
ferring negligence without the aid of expert 
' -testimony " (Quoting from Wharton v War-
ner, supra note 6, 135 P at 237) Some courts 
hmit the application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur exclusively to this type of situation 
'See Swanson v Hill, 166 F Supp 296 (N D N D 
1958) This appears to be a strict application 
°f the doctrine requiring the result to "speak 
for itself without the aid of any other proof 
*hus, the application of the doctrine has some-
times been explained by courts as eliminating 
the necessity of the plaintiffs procurement of 
expert testimony in the initial stages of proof 
does not participate in the acts causing the 
injury, then negligence may be inferred 
from the injury alone if: (1) the cause of 
injury is so obviously negligent that negli-
gence may be inferred as a matter of law; 
(2) people would know from common expe-
rience the result would not have happened 
without negligence; or (3) when a physician 
testifies bad results would not have oc-
curred if proper care had been used.14 
[12] While we will not say the act of the 
defendant in losing the needle from the 
needleholder was negligent as a matter of 
law, the bad result, i. e., the needle present 
in the body of the plaintiff, is such that 
people would know from common knowl-
edge and experience it is more probably 
than not the result of negligence.15 There-
fore, in the present case, expert testimony 
was not required to establish this element 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
[13-15] The evidence presented at trial 
indicates the instrumentality which caused 
the bad result was in the exclusive control 
of the defendant at the time of the acci-
dent. Furthermore, the plaintiff was under 
a general anesthetic and could not partici-
pate or'contribute to the act causing the 
injury. These facts when combined with 
the nature of the accident provide a suffi-
cient evidentiary foundation for the appli-
cation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in 
See Dietze v King, 184 F Supp. 944, 946 (E D 
Va 1960) 
14. See Tomei v Hennmg, 67 Cal2d 319, 62 
Cai Rptr 9, 431 P 2d 633 (1967) 
15. See Miller v. Kennedy, 11 WashApp 272, 
522 P2d 852 (1974), approved and adapted, 85 
Wash 2d 151, 530 P 2d 334 (1975), This case 
must be distinguished from the situations in 
which the needle is broken during the suturing 
The malfunctioning of the surgical instruments 
presents an intervening cause for the accident 
beyond the control of the physician In that 
situation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may 
still be applicable because the result is more 
probably than not the result of negligence, but 
the intervening cause may be used as a defense 
against the plaintiffs proof of proximate causa-
tion The present situation is more analogous 
to the loss of whole instruments and other 
paraphernalia in the course of the operation 
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this' case. The application of the' doctrine 
provides a rebuttable inference of negli-
gence which will carry the plaintiffs case 
past the motion for nonsuit.16 •  ' •'•:. ••• •• ' 
" "49] Therefore, under the facts of 
- •. -w»ny was not required 
\ce of the defendant 
aim me Li'iai ^K in granting a 
directed verdict af *e plaintiff be-
cause of the lack r»f that testimony.17 
[20—22] The trial court also erred in not 
submitting to the jury the plaintiff's second 
cause of action, concerning the doctor's fail-
ure to disclose the presence of the needle. 
The relationship between a doctor and his 
patient creates a duty "in the physician to 
disclose to his patient any material informa-
16 See Moore v. James, supra note 11, 297 P.2d 
at 224; • The defendant may introduce evidence 
to rebut the inference of negligence established 
by the application of the doctrine. While the 
defendant may introduce conflicting medical 
testimony on the cause of the accident this 
should not be relied upon by the trial judge to 
remove the case from the jury's consideration. 
Rather, this establishes a conflict in the evi~ 
dence which it is the jury's duty to resolve 
17.. The plaintiff also has the burden of proving 
the negligence of the defendant was the proxi-
mate cause of. the injury. This proof requires 
some expert testimony in medical malpractice 
cases. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 
P.2d 216 (1943). In the present case the de-
. fendant, an acknowledged expert, testified the 
position of,the needle was such that it could 
produce pain. Although there is contradictory 
evidence that the pain the plaintiff suffered was 
due to other medical abnormalities the testimo-
ny of the defendant is sufficient to render cau-
sation a question of fact to be determined by 
the jury. As we explained in Anderson, 
it is not necessary that the proxi-
mate cause of an injury sustained through the 
negligence of a doctor be proved with exacti-
tude. . . .", and "If the injury sustained 
could be attributed to two or more causes, one 
of which was the negligence of the doctor, it 
would be a question for the jury to determine 
which was the proximate cause of the injury." 
Id. 139 P.2d at 220. See also Forrest v. Eason, 
123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953); 13 A.L. 
R.2d, Proximate Causation—Malpractice, Ac-
•"' tions, Section .2, page 22."' •' '••'•'•:; 
18. Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary and Casualty 
Hospital, 396 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We 
find in the fiducial qualities of that relationship 
[between physician and patient] the physician's 
duty to reveal to the patient that which in his 
best interests it is important UM- IK 
know." 396 F.2d at 935.) 
tion concerning" the -patient's' physical condi-
tion. This duty to inform stems from .the 
fiduciary nature of the relationship18, and 
the patient's right to determine what shall 
or shall, not. be done with his bod} 1-
[23, 24] The scope of the duty is defined-
by the materiality of the information in the 
decisional process of an ordinary individual! 
If a reasonable person in the position of the; 
plaintiff would consider the information im-; 
portant in choosing a course of treatment 
then the information is material and disclo-1 
sure required.20 :,r": _ :• 
[25-28] Once the duty to dist, ose certa 
information is established, then the phys 
cian's total breach of that dut\ 2I a^  foundj 
should j 
19. Schioendorff v. Society of New York Hospl4 
tal, 211 NY. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); see a^so| 
Miller v, Kennedy, supra note 15, 522 P.2d af 
860. In Miller the court explained, "The<paj« 
tient is entitled to rely upon the physician Ifo 
tell him what he needs to know ab< 
condition of his own h (- ! v r "• " v , p n * 
i ight'to chart his ov 
must supply the patiLi» ..... .•« il 
the patient will need in order i< 
chart that destiny witK ^:pr'*v " 
2*! I h( m< -iibers of the jury can discern <wh|S 
• >uA)U man would consider material infj 
r.i >h in i decision concerning his weU.rbgi 
->\ l^h i lere may be certain situations;)sijg 
as the patient's incompetence or specific .me 
cal reasons for withholding material "infpn 
tion where expert testimony may estabhsn 
defense for nondisclosure, it is not essent ia^ 
the plaintiffs establishment of a prim&flffl 
case. See Wilkinson v. Vesey^llO R.I. 606JT 
A.2d 676 (1972). ("The decision as t o ; w M | 
or is not material is a human judgment,. inX 
opinion, which does not necessarily requl«£l 
assistance of the medical profession.;"/;,!. 
A.2d at 688.) This objective approach[.lias-
accepted by* some courts in the context 
formed, consent malpractice actions, ij^f 
ler v. Kennedy, supra note 15, 522 P.2cj$$t 
While analogy to the informed consent ,dqc| 
is helpful it is not dispositive. The PI] 
situation differs from that * 
formed consent context and c 
must reflect this difference. See L 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C 
21 • In Wilkinson, supra, note 2U 295 
686, the court, explained: "As explK 
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in the present case, presents to the jury the 
question of what damages were proximate-
ly caused by the breach. Where the physi-
cian fails to disclose to his patient any in-
formation concerning a material fact, there 
is no question of skill and judgment, no 
question of practice beyond the knowledge 
of laymen which must be established 
through expert testimony22. To borrow 
justice Wiest's much quoted phrase from 
j?a/iance,23 even the "merest tyro" would 
-know the nondisclosure was improper.24 
"^  [29] Damages which may be shown to 
follow as a proximate cause of the nondis-
closure include reasonable charges for dis-
covery and removal of the needle and mone-
tary compensation for the mental anguish 
'following the realization of the needle's 
presence.' 25 
* 
CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., 
'concur. 
f
' STEWART, Justice (dissenting in part 
and concurring in part): 
;« I respectfully dissent. 
* The majority, in my view, misapplies a 
[^ common sense rule, applicable in simple 
^malpractice fact situations, and arrives at a 
f^esult which would allow the jury to find 
^egligence in total ignorance of whether 
m Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 
1^(1967), the Natanson [Natanson v. Kline, 186 
fKan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (I960)] rule provides 
. that where a physician is silent "and 
pTmakes no disclosure whatever, he has failed in 
^the duty owed to the patient and the patient is 
|flot required to produce expert testimony to 
show that the doctor's failure was contrary to 
g accepted medical practice 
s In determining the existence and the extent 
of a physician's duty to disclose in each partic-
ular situation, the jury need not depend exclu-
sively on expert testimony. In nondisclosure 
t^cases the jury is not invariably functioning m 
&}H **** 0 f s u c h t e c n n i c a l complexity that it is 
bound to medical custom, as established 
pnrough expert testimony, as an inexorable ap-
fPJJ^ion of the community standard of reason-
5 7filf C a r e ' Canterbury v- Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
h\
 dP'C- Cir- 1972>- I n Canterbury the court 
1 discussing the basis of disclosure required m 
/*e informed consent context explained: "Nor 
*is W e ! 8 n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t t o b i n d t h e disclo-
Lv, r e °bligation to medical usage is to abrogate 
decision on revelation to the physician 
Dr. Hicken's conduct violated the applicable 
standard of care. Clearly this case falls 
within the scope of the rule that expert 
testimony in a medical malpractice case is 
necessary to establish proper standards of 
medical performance. In particular, the 
majority misapplies the rule that "loss of a 
surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, 
in the operating site, exemplifies [the] type 
of treatment" that is "within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman." 
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 
P.2d 1108 (1959). In short, the plaintiff's 
failure to produce expert testimony as to 
the standard of care will necessarily mean 
that a verdict is based on speculation. 
It is an unrealistic rule that holds in all 
cases abandonment of a surgical instrument 
or other paraphernalia in a person during 
the course of an operation can be considered 
negligence by a lay person without regard 
for the nature of the surgical procedures 
involved. It need hardly be reiterated that 
a physician is not a guarantor of the results 
of an operation. Marsh v. Pemberton, su-
pra. Nor does he warrant against all acci-
dents which may occur during surgical pro-
cedures. The basis for fastening liability on 
a defendant in a malpractice suit is negli-
gence, not the occurrence of an untov/ard 
circumstance. In the instant case, the sur-
alone. Respect for the patient's right of self 
determination on particular therapy demands a 
standard set by law for physicians rather than 
one which the physicians may or may not im-
pose upon themselves." 464 F.2d at 784. 
23. Ballance v. Dunmngton, 
N.W. at 330. 
supra note 6, 217 
24. See Taylor v. Milton, supra note 6; the 
present factual situation could also be used to 
establish a cause of action in fraudulent 
concealment. Where a physician has knowl-
edge of a fact concerning the patient's physical 
condition which is material to that patient and 
he fails to disclose it the confidence relation-
ship between them creates a duty to disclose 
which may render his silence fraudulent. See 
Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 
(1940). 
25. See Jackson v. United States, 182 F.Supp. 
907 (D.C.Md.1960), Houston Clinic v. Busch, 
64 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex.Civ.App. 1933). 
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gical operation was not perhaps as unusual 
and complex as some of the advanced proce-
dures now being used, but it clearly was of 
such a nature that application of the Marsh 
rule is inappropriate, and there is no evi-
dence in the record which indicates that Dr. 
Hicken was negligent at all. There is even 
evidence that Dr. Hicken's conduct may not 
have been the actual cause of the loss of the 
cutting instrument in the plaintiff. He tes-
tified that in operations of the type he 
performed on the plaintiff the surgical in-
strument sometimes breaks just below the 
eye through which the catgut thread is 
passed and that, given the nature of the 
operation, sound medical judgment often 
dictates leaving the instrument in the body 
if it cannot be readily located. 
The inappropriateness of the legal rule 
applied by the majority is demonstrated by 
the testimony of Dr. Hicken. Operating 
inside a body cavity, he could not see what 
he was doing and had to orient his actions 
primarily by touch. He described the prob-
lems relating to the loss of the needle as 
follows: 
A. Well, you are working down there, 
[inside the vagina], you have the retrac-
tors in and you have—you're bringing 
this [i. e., the needle] around on one side 
of the tissue and trying to bring it around 
and all at once you don't have ahold of 
the needle and then the thing you do, you 
have to bring your forceps back but, then 
you poke—use your lights and you look in 
there to see if you can see it. You put 
your glove finger in and you try to pal-
pate it to see if you can feel it and as a 
general rule one can feel and in knowing 
the exact area in which you were work-
ing, one can generally feel where the 
suture is or the needle is. In this case, 
we did not find it. 
Q. All right. Now, for that needle to 
become loose from the holder that ratchet 
could be disengaged, did it not? 
A. Well, the ratchet could be disen-
gaged but the needle—by far the more 
common way of losing a needle in this 
operation is, you are working up in there 
—see, I told you, you put your finger 
here as a guide to exert a little pressure 
as you bring it around. You are working 
in a zone that has blood. There is fati 
That means there is oils and itfs possible 
for this to just rotate and slip out of the 
needle holder. That's the usual thing 
that happens. s~ si 
The needle may also break off because of 
a defect in the needle itself or because i^pf 
the forceps or other holding implement! 
Dr. Hicken stated: , &! 
For instance, we have no way of know 
ing whether the needle was whole or br<F 
ken. t<v| From experience in handling these 
things, where the thread goes throuj"1 
the needle it is very thin and frequently 
needle will break at that part but—anj 
you have a little—just a splinter of "tl 
eye of the needle left and separates frbij 
the main shaft of the needle and whe] 
you pull your hemostat back you Jiaj 
nothing. Both the eye of the needle >ai 
the main curved needle still remains*il 
situ. That means in position in the 
in which you are working. 
Loss of the needle could also occur for ottij 
reasons. 
You are getting a bite of t i s sue^ 
are coming down and getting a bit4| 
tissue—you see, here's a ratchet JTt 
locks it. I showed you yesterday, 
when you are sewing, you do nottdj| 
your fingers in these openings^ of 
ratchet. You take your hand out and| 
it against the palm here using this/in 
to give you a little force and a directw 
mechanism for the point of the ne| 
and you come around like this.., 
sometimes you hit heavy muscles, sg| 
times you have thinner muscles,^ 
times you have scar tissue. If the^ 
der and things have been outftqjo$ 
that tissue has been irritated arid tip 
a lot of scar tissue until you getl 
resistance in bringing the needle ti 
and it's very easy for the—possible 
the needle, being in oil and bio 
fatty tissue down there, too, ttfaS 
needle could rotate and slip out.;^ 
we bring the needle—when we b^ 
the needle holder out it was stilH§ 
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. and the needle wasn't in it so that's why 
.you assume that the needle was broken or 
, lost. 
The doctor was well aware of the relative 
hazards of searching further for the lost 
needle as opposed to leaving it within the 
body cavity. He consciously made a medi-
cal judgment as to which course of action 
would result in the least risks to the pa-
tient. He testified: 
Well, because this woman was elderly. 
She was not in the best physical condi-
tion. We had had her on the operating 
table for one hour and to get X-ray ma-
chines at that time—we are talking about 
fourteen years ago—at that time we had 
to get X-ray machines from the basement 
up into the operating room and it would 
take too much time to complete that sort 
• of a procedure and the second thing is 
that from my experience in such cases 
' and from being very conversant with lit-
\ erature on this subject, as I was a Profes-
» sor and teacher in medical schools, I knew 
3Uhat a needle left in this particular area 
1 was not particularly harmful to the pa-
.» tient. It is common knowledge that we 
l leave metal in the pelvic area very fre-
~
r
 quently. Now, for example, in some of 
our operations instead of using sutures 
„ . and ties to tie around bleeding blood ves-
r fc sels, we have an instrument that we go in 
r^ there and we put a metal clip on that 
^ blood vessel because it's easier to do, it's 
V quicker to do and it is innocuous 
Jr^JThis testimony, in my view, destroys the 
^necessary foundation for application of the 
>*rule that loss of a surgical instrument in a 
! J ^ y establishes, without more, an infer-
ence of negligence. Nor do the facts pro-
vide a foundation for application of the 
J^trine of res ipsa loquitur. As this Court 
Stated in Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-
$*y Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 
* M 935 (1960): 
y^.UJt is realized that res ipsa loquitur has 
gfekPeen. applied in various fields where an 
injury occurs which is not to be expected 
J; tf Proper standards of care and skill are 
^-observed. But this is done only with 
^caution, particularly in the medical field 
because of the realization that many as-
pects of the treatment of human ills can-
not yet be regarded as exact science and 
a bad result may obtain even though rec-
ognized standards of care and skill are 
employed. [10 Utah 2d at 99, 348 P.2d at 
938.] [Emphasis added.] 
I recognize that there is a ring of com-
mon sense to the proposition that leaving 
foreign objects in a person constitutes neg-
ligence, see Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 
385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951), but neither justice 
nor common sense are enhanced by the me-
chanistic application of a rule of law to a 
fact situation that is only superficially re-
lated to the type of situation the rule was 
intended to govern. In this case, I cannot 
see how a jury could possibly find negli-
gence in light of Dr. Hicken's testimony and 
in the absence of any contrary expert testi-
mony. I think the trial judge was right in 
directing a verdict on this issue. 
I concur, however, with the majority that 
the defendants had a duty to inform the 
plaintiff of the fact that a foreign object 
had been left in her body. 
In the Matter of the GUARDIANSHIP 
of Alice KESLER. 
No. 15960. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 28, 1980. 
Appeal was taken from an order of the 
District Court, Millard County, D. Christian 
Ronnow, J. pro tern., declaring ward an 
incompetent and appointing a guardian for 
her estate. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
J., held that trial court should not have 
proceeded under repealed guardianship 
statutes merely because petition was filed 
one day prior to time statutes became a 
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nation, (2) has not been emphasized by ei-
ther counsel or the court, and (3) has not 
been elicited by the prosecution.6 
Affirmed. 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
Arthur Dennis KUSY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
K-MART APPAREL FASHION CORP., a 
Delaware corporation, and John Doe, 
an individual, Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 18360. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 24, 1984. 
Action was brought in which plaintiff 
sought to recover for personal injuries he 
sustained when pallet on which he was 
standing allegedly "broke and he fell to 
ground. The District Court, Salt Lake 
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., entered judg-
ment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., 
held that* (1) admission in answers to inter-
rogatories that pallet board where plaintiff 
stepped broke off and plaintiff fell to 
ground should have been admitted for im-
peachment purposes, even though interrog-
atories were signed by someone other than 
testifying witness, and (2) plaintiff intro-
duced sufficient evidence at trial to entitle 
him to a res ipsa loquitur instruction. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Evidence <S=>222(1) 
Pretrial Procedure <s=*307 
Admission in answers to interrogato-
ries, which were signed by general manag-
er of store, on behalf of corporate defend-
ant, that pallet board where plaintiff 
stepped broke and plaintiff fell to ground 
should have been admitted for impeach-
ment purposes in personal injury action, 
even though answers to interrogatories 
were signed by someone other than the 
testifying witness who implied that plain-
tiff had merely fallen off-pallet and that 
pallet had not broken. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 33(b); Rules of Evid., Rule 63(7). 
2. Negligence <s=138(2) 
Before being entitled to jury instruc-
tion on res ipsa loquitur, plaintiff must 
show that accident was of a kind which, in 
ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened if due care had been observed, 
the plaintiffs own use or operation of 
agency or instrumentality was not primari-
ly responsible for injury, and that agency 
or instrumentality causing injury was un-
der the exclusive management or control of 
defendant. 
3. Negligence <s=>138(2) 
Once plaintiff makes a prima facie 
showing of elements, he is entitled to a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction. 
4. Negligence ®=>138(2) 
In order to determine appropriateness 
of res ipsa loquitur instruction, court must 
view evidence in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. 
5. Negligence <^138(2) 
Res ipsa loquitur instruction should 
have been given in action in which plaintiff 
sought to recover for his personal injuries 
sustained when he fell to the ground from 
pallet which broke under hjm, in light of 
plaintiffs testimony which would support 
an inference that pallet would not have 
broken if due care had been observed," 
plaintiffs testimony that he unloaded truck 
in usual manner, consistent with directions 
of manager of garden department, and fact 
that defendant retrieved pallets in its own 
6. Id at 223 
KUSY v. K-MART APPAREL FASHION CORP. Utah 1233 
Cite as 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984) 
yard and brought them to truck for plain-
tiffs use. 
6. Negligence <&=>121.2(8) 
Control necessary for a res ipsa in-
struction is control exercised at time of 
negligent act. 
7. Negligence <s=»138(2) 
A res ipsa loquitur instruction would 
not be appropriate as to theory of negligent 
failure to inspect. 
8. Negligence <s=>138(2) 
Res ipsa loquitur instruction may be 
appropriate as to theory of negligent main-
tenance. 
9. Negligence ^121.2(11) 
Where res ipsa loquitur has been prop-
erly brought into a case, it will not be 
removed by mere prima facie showing of 
specific negligence, but under such circum-
stances the case should be submitted on 
both the theory of specific negligence and 
res ipsa loquitur. 
10. Negligence <s=>121.2(ll) 
Res ipsa loquitur should not be re-
moved by proof of specific negligence un-
less proof goes so far as to fully explain 
the cause of injury by positive evidence 
revealing of the facts and circumstances. 
11. Negligence @=>140 
Unavoidable accident instruction 
should be given on remand of personal 
injury action only if evidence showed that 
this was an unusual and unexpected occur-
rence which resulted in injury and which 
happened without anyone failing to exer-
cise reasonable care. 
Wilford A. Beesley, Jack Fairclough, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Alan L. Larson, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
1. For cases declaring the proprietor's duty to 
use reasonable care to maintain premises in 
safe condition for business invitees, see Walker 
v. Union Oil Mill, Inc., La., 369 So.2d 1043 
(1979); Husketh v. Convenient Systems, Inc., 295 
OAKS, Justice: 
In this personal injury action, the jury 
found no negligence on the part of defend-
ant K-Mart. On appeal, plaintiff claims 
that the trial court erred by refusing to 
admit into evidence defendant's answer to 
an interrogatory. He also cites error in the 
failure to give his proffered jury instruc-
tion on res ipsa loquitur and in the instruc-
tion given on avoidable accident. We re-
verse. 
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver. 
In May 1976, he delivered a load of trees 
and shrubbery to one of defendant's stores 
in Murray. In the unloading process, plain-
tiff requested assistance from the garden 
shop manager, Hunt. Hunt designated his 
employee, Coupe, to deliver pallets by fork-
lift to the door of plaintiffs truck. Coupe 
selected pallets from a pile on the store's 
premises and raised them to the level of 
the truck's bed, approximately five feet 
from the ground. Plaintiff then placed 
from twenty-five to thirty trees on each 
pallet. 
Plaintiff's injury occurred after he suc-
cessfully unloaded two pallets of trees. He 
contends that he noticed some damaged 
boards toward the back of the third pallet 
Coupe delivered. Fearing that the boards 
might break and spill some of the trees, he 
requested a new pallet. Coupe refused. 
After plaintiff unloaded six or eight trees 
onto this pallet, some of its boards (not 
those he had originally noticed) broke un-
der plaintiff's foot, causing him to lose his 
balance, fall to the ground, and break his 
wrist. Plaintiff alleged that defendant 
negligently maintained or negligently 
failed to inspect the pallets to insure their 
safety.1 
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF ANSWERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES 
Plaintiff was the only eyewitness to testi-
fy about the accident. Coupe, the other 
N.C. 459, 245 S.E.2d 507 (1978). See also Di-
Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 
Cal.Rptr. 772 (1962) (duty to inspect for latent 
defect). 
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eyewitness, was apparently out of the 
country. Defendant presented only one 
witness, Hunt. He was on the premises 
when the accident occurred and approached 
the scene immediately thereafter. Hunt 
testified that he did not know whether the 
pallet broke or whether plaintiff merely fell 
from the pallet. He testified that he ob-
served no broken boards or debris on the 
ground when he first walked up to the 
scene. Thus, Hunt's testimony at least to 
some degree refuted plaintiff's version of 
the'accident and implied that plaintiff had 
merely slipped from the pallet. 
[1] While cross-examining Hunt, plain-
tiffs attorney sought to read one of de-
fendant's answers to interrogatories. (The 
answers were signed by Michael Street, 
general manager of the K-Mart store, on 
behalf of the corporate defendant.) In that 
answer, defendant admitted that "the pal-
let board where [plaintiff] stepped broke 
off and plaintiff fell to the ground." The 
trial judge refused to allow counsel to read 
this answer, ruling that since the interroga-
tories were signed by someone other than 
the testifying witness, they could not be 
used for impeachment. This was reversi-
ble error. 
Rule 33(b), Utah R.Civ.P., allows an-
swers to interrogatories to be used at trial 
"to the extent permitted by the rules of 
evidence." Utah Rules of Evidence 63(7), 
in effect at the time of trial, provided that 
a statement made by a party would not be 
excluded under the hearsay rule when the 
statement was offered against him. See 
Terry v. Panek, Utah, 631 P.2d 896, 898 
(1981).2 An admission of a party, when 
offered against him, comes in as substan-
tive evidence of the facts stated. Geldert 
v. State, 3 Haw.App. 259, 649 P.2d 1165, 
1172 (1982). This is especially appropriate 
when the evidence is embodied in answers 
to interrogatories, since a declarant has 
ample time to consider such a statement 
and submits it under oath. 
Defendant argues that the admission in 
the answer to the interrogatory was inap-
2. We note that our new evidence rules are to the 
same effect an admission of a party-opponent, 
propriately used to impeach Hunt, since 
Hunt did not sign it. We disagree. Hunt 
was the only witness who testified on be-
half of defendant. Through his testimony, 
Hunt gave the impression that the boards 
on the pallet did not break and that plain-
tiff had merely fallen off the pallet. Plain-
tiff was then entitled to introduce whatever 
substantive evidence he had to contradict 
the witness and support his own version of 
the facts. Specifically, "answers to inter-
rogatories can be used by an adverse party 
for any purpose, including attacking the 
credibility of a party as a witness." Far-
kas v. Sadler, R.I., 375 A.2d 960, 964 
(1977). That rule covers the proposed use 
of the answer to the interrogatory to im-
peach the witness in the circumstances of 
this case. 
We are unable to say that the error in 
excluding the answer to the interrogatory 
was harmless in this case. Hunt's testimo-
ny implied that plaintiff had merely fallen 
off the pallet and that the pallet had not 
broken. The only evidence that the pallet 
had in fact broken was plaintiff's own testi-
mony, which the jury could have viewed as 
self-serving. Plaintiff's credibility would 
have been greatly enhanced if the jury had 
been informed that defendant, in sworn 
answers to interrogatories, had given the 
same rendition of the facts. Failure to 
allow the evidence was prejudicial to plain-
tiff's case. We must therefore reverse and 
remand the case for a new trial. 
For the guidance of the district court on 
remand, we proceed to address the issues 
regarding jury instructions. 
II. RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
Plaintiff requested jury instructions on 
res ipsa loquitur. For reasons that do not 
appear in the record, the trial court refused 
to give them. On appeal, defendant argues 
that plaintiff failed to make out the ele-
ments that are necessary before such an 
instruction is given. 
offered against that party, is not hearsay. Utah 
Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2) 
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[2] Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary during the course of his work. 
rule that permits an inference of negli-
gence on the part of a defendant under 
well-defined circumstances. Before being 
entitled to such a jury instruction, a plain-
tiff must show: 
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had due care 
been observed; (2) that the plaintiffs 
own use or operation of the agency or 
instrumentality was not primarily re-
sponsible for the injury; and (3) that the 
agency or instrumentality causing the in-
jury was under the exclusive manage-
ment or control of the defendant. 
Anderton v. Montgomery, Utah, 607 P.2d 
828, 833 (1980) (citations omitted). One of 
the purposes of the res ipsa instruction is 
to "cast the burden upon [the person who 
controlled the agency or instrumentality 
causing the injury] to make proof of what 
happened/' Id. at 833, quoting Lund v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 
280, 351 P.2d 952, 954 (1960). It should be 
noted, however, that "[o]nce the elements 
of res ipsa loquitur have been established, 
it merely permits and does not compel the 
inference of negligence by the fact finder." 
Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 532, 
543 P.2d 820, 825 (1975). See also Brizen-
dine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dis-
trict, 97 Idaho 580, 585, 548 P.2d 80, 85 
(1976). 
[3,4] Once the plaintiff makes a prima 
facie showing of the elements, he is enti-
tled to a res ipsa instruction. The trial 
court should not weigh conflicting evidence 
of the elements; this is the jury's function. 
In order to determine the appropriateness 
of a res ipsa instruction, the court must 
view the evidence "in a light most favor-
able to the plaintiff " iAnderton v. 
Montgomery, 607 P.2d at 833. 
[5] Under the standard discussed 
above, this plaintiff introduced sufficient 
evidence at the trial to entitle him to a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction. There was a pri-
ma facie showing of each of the three 
elements. First, plaintiff testified about 
his extensive experience utilizing pallets 
He testified 
that pallets are able to bear far greater 
weight than was placed on the pallet that 
broke here. This testimony would support 
an inference that the pallet would not have 
broken if due care had been observed, as 
discussed below. E.g., DiMare u Cresci, 
23 Cal.Rptr. at 776, 373 P.2d at 864 ("[ordi-
narily steps which are part of a common 
stairway do not collapse when used by a 
tenant in a normal manner unless the land-
lord who has had the duty to maintain and 
inspect them was negligent"). Second, 
plaintiff testified that he unloaded the 
truck in the usual manner, consistent with 
the directions of the manager of the garden 
department. Third, defendant retrieved 
the pallets from its own yard and brought 
them to the truck for plaintiffs use. 
Defendant argues that the first element 
("kind of accident") was lacking because 
the jury found that neither party was negli-
gent. This begs the question. Plaintiffs 
evidence entitled him to the res ipsa in-
struction, and he does not lose that entitle-
ment because of what the jury found with-
out the instruction. 
[6] Defendant further argues that the 
third element ("exclusive management or 
control") was lacking, since there was testi-
mony that some of the pallets were not 
owned by defendant and that pallets were 
always being delivered and picked up from 
defendant's premises. However, the issue 
is not ownership but control. The control 
necessary for a res ipsa instruction is con-
trol exercised at the time of the negligent 
act. Town of Reasnor v. Pyland Con-
struction Co., Iowa, 229 N.W.2d 269 
(1975); Birmingham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
Tex., 516 S.W.2d 914, 918 (1974). It is clear 
from uncontradicted evidence that defend-
ant had exclusive control of the instrumen-
tality that caused the injury as of the time 
the alleged negligent act occurred.
 t 
In this case, we know from defendant's 
admission in its answer to the interrogato-
ry that plaintiffs injury was caused by his 
fall and that his fall was caused by the 
breaking of the pallet. We do not know 
what caused the pallet to break. Similarly, 
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in Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo.App. 374, 570 
P.2d 544, 548-49 (1977), it was clear that 
plaintiffs injury resulted from inadequate 
anesthetization when tubing connecting 
him to the anesthesiology apparatus be-
came dislodged, but it was unclear what 
caused the tubing to be dislodged. On 
those facts, it was held error to refuse a 
res ipsa instruction. 
In this case, plaintiff alleged and sought 
to prove two different theories under which 
defendant would be responsible for the de-
fective condition of the pallet that caused 
the injury: negligent failure to inspect and 
negligent maintenance. In support of the 
first theory, plaintiff elicited from Hunt an 
admission that the pallets were not inspect-
ed before they were provided for use by 
plaintiff. In support of the second theory, 
Hunt admitted that the pallets were 
stacked in an unprotected area where they 
were sometimes run over by motor vehi-
cles. 
At the second trial, the court must decide 
if a res ipsa instruction is appropriate on 
the basis of the evidence submitted there. 
Assuming plaintiff can prove that the pal-
let broke and caused his fall, but cannot 
point to the specific act that caused the 
pallet to break, a res ipsa instruction could 
be appropriate. However, if the evidence 
goes so far as to explain the precise cause 
of the „ break, res ipsa is no longer neces-
sary and therefore would be inappropriate. 
Crawford v. Rogers, Alaska, 406 P.2d 189, 
193 (1965); Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan. 
391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145, 149-51 (1968); 
Dabroe v. Rhodes Go., 64 Wash. 431, 392 
P.2d 317, 322 (1964). See generally Webb 
v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 
2d 275, 285, 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (1959). 
[7] A res ipsa instruction would not be 
appropriate as to the theory of negligent 
failure to inspect. Defendant admitted at 
trial that it failed to inspect the pallets 
before providing them for plaintiff's use. 
This admission leaves nothing to infer 
about the cause of the accident so far as it 
pertains to this theory of responsibility. 
The only remaining issue is whether failure 
to inspect (assuming inspection would have 
revealed the defect) constitutes a breach of 
defendant's duty to provide a safe working 
place for its business invitees. The res 
ipsa instruction has no function under this 
issue. 
[8] A res ipsa instruction may be appro-
priate as to the theory of negligent mainte-
nance of the pallets. There was evidence 
at trial that pallets on defendant's premises 
were stacked in an unprotected area where 
they were sometimes run over by motor 
vehicles. At the same time, plaintiff can-
not point to an individual event or practice 
of defendant's that produced the defective 
condition in the particular pallet that broke 
and caused this accident. Thus, under this 
theory of responsibility, we have evidence 
of specific acts of negligent maintenance 
by defendant, but no clear demonstration 
of the cause of the defect in the pallet that 
broke. 
[9,10] The rule we choose to follow in 
this circumstance is the rule articulated by 
the Kansas Supreme Court in Ballhorst v. 
Hahner-Foreman-Cale, Inc., 207 Kan. 89, 
99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 (1971): 
[W]here res ipsa loquitur has been prop-
erly brought into a case it will not be 
removed by a mere prima facie showing 
of specific negligence, but under such 
circumstances the case should be sub-
mitted on both the theory of specific 
negligence and res ipsa loquitur We 
further [hold] that res ipsa loquitur 
should not be removed by proof of specif-
ic negligence unless the proof goes so far 
as to fully explain the cause of the injury 
by positive evidence revealing all of the 
facts and circumstances. 
(Italics in original.) Accord Hugo v. Man-
ning, supra; Fields v. Berry, Mo.App., 549 
S.W.2d 122, 124-25 (1977). See also Har-
per v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 935-36, 523 
P.2d 536, 538-39 (1974) (pleading). 
In the second trial of this case, plaintiff 
may be able (by proof of specific acts or 
practices of defendant) to make a prima 
facie showing that the defective condition, 
of the pallet that broke was caused by 
defendant's maintenance (or lack of mainte-
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this was an unusual and unexpected occur-
rence "which result[s] in injury and which 
happenfs] without anyone failing to exer-
cise reasonable care " Id. 
nance). If so, the jury might find defend-
ant negligent on that theory even without a 
; res ipsa instruction. But under the rule in 
Ballhorst, the prima facie showing of spe-
cific acts of negligence in respect to main-
tenance would not preclude an otherwise 
appropriate res ipsa instruction, so long as 
the specific evidence of negligence does not 
"fully explain the cause of the injury by 
positive evidence revealing all of the facts 
and circumstances." Consequently, a res 
ipsa instruction may be available on this 
theory. 
On remand, the district court will deter-
mine on the evidence at the second trial 
whether plaintiff has made a prima facie 
showing of the elements necessary for the 
res ipsa instruction and, if so, whether the 
evidence of specific acts of defendant's 
negligence so clearly explain the cause of 
the accident that res ipsa loquitur is not 
appropriate. 
III. UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT 
The trial court gave defendant's pro-
posed jury instruction on unavoidable acci-
dent. Plaintiff argues on this appeal that 
the instruction should not have been given. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have disap-
proved such an instruction, see, e.g., Lewis 
v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 61, 
396 P.2d 933, 941 (1964), and we have said 
that it is 'Only to be used "in_a rare 
case " Stringham v. Broderick, Utah, 
529 P.2d 425, 426 (1974). Nevertheless, we 
have approved unavoidable accident in-
structions in two recent cases. Anderson 
v. Toone, Utah, 671 P.2d 170, 174 (1983); 
Anderton D. Montgomery, 607 P.2d at 834-
35 (case involving res ipsa loquitur). "Such 
an instruction should be given with caution 
and only where the evidence would justify 
it." Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 
210, 213, 436 P.2d 442, 445 (1968) (emphasis 
in original). 
[11] It will be up to the district court on 
remand to determine whether the facts 
presented at the second trial warrant an 
unavoidable accident instruction. The in-
struction should only be given if the evi-
dence could be interpreted as showing that 
The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for a new 
trial consistent with this opinion. Each 
party to bear own costs. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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THORNE AND WILSON, INC., A Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18825. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 24, 1984. 
Investment broker dealer brought ac-
tion to obtain declaration that it was not 
subject to sales taxes for sale of rare Unit-
ed States coins, foreign coins, and precious 
metals. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Philip R. Fishier, J., held sale 
of such items subject to state sales tax, and 
broker dealer appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) rare Unit-
ed States coins, foreign coins, and precious 
metals sold by broker dealer for their ex-
trinsic value, and not for use as currency, 
were "tangible personal property" subject 
to state sales tax, and (2) sales taxation of 
such items did not impinge upon federal 
government's exclusive rights with regard 
to coinage of money. 
Affirmed. 
